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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The dynamics of European integration have gained momentum in recent years. As
a response to the economic crisis, new responsibilities have been transferred to Eu-
ropean authorities. The no-bailout rule incorporated in Art. 125 of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union has been largely disregarded: The Euro-
pean Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was established in 2010 – a fund financed
by the member states of the Eurozone and authorized to lend up to EUR 440 bil-
lion to Eurozone member states when necessary. In 2012 the European Stability
Mechanism (ESM), a permanent firewall for the Eurozone with a lending capacity
of EUR 500 billion, was added to the temporary EFSF. Moreover, starting on May
10, 2010 the European Central Bank (ECB) began purchasing government bonds
of highly indebted Euro states. While in conflict with Art. 123, the majority in
the ECB directorate legitimizes its decision with the need of intervention in order
to assure the functioning of the monetary transmission mechanism and to stabilize
the price level. As a result, the ECB has lost its independence to a large extent
and has moved far away from the well-established model of the Bundesbank. The
area of banking supervision will extend the competencies of the European Cen-
tral Bank in 2014. Moreover, the so called “Sixpack” entered into force in 2011,
1
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containing five regulations and one directive justified by the common objective of
reducing public deficits and macroeconomic imbalances.
These examples and many others show that the European authorities have sub-
stantially changed or bypassed the rules of the game set at the beginning of the
experiment called the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The pro-
cess of European integration has assumed new proportions and the subsidiarity
principle has been largely disregarded. The EMU has lost attractiveness for still-
non-member-countries, and Euro skepticism has reached historical levels. The dis-
cussion about introducing the right to leave EMU for Euro member states without
leaving the European Union has gained importance.
This doctoral thesis represents an accumulation of articles on different topics from
the broad research field of European economic and monetary integration. It ad-
dresses the issue of how desirable the EMU is and claims that a core monetary
union with Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria,
Denmark and at most Slovenia would be more desirable than the current constel-
lation of the EMU. Other member states in transition are less desirable members
of the monetary union as their real exchange rates have experienced significant
trend real appreciation since the beginning of transition. The driving forces of
the real appreciation are examined in a detailed analysis showing that the real
exchange rate has been largely driven by productivity growth, increasing demand
for tradable goods and the progress in transition. In the second part, the process
of European integration has been addressed from the political economy perspec-
tive. Trust in European and national institutions declined in the last decades and
political mistrust and alienation of the population are calling the legitimacy of the
political process into question. Empirical analyses show that the level of trust,
as well as trust in national relative to European institutions, can be explained to
a large extent by the existence of principal-agent problems in the structures of
political institutions. The problem is more severe at the European than at the
national level since distance to European institutions is much larger in direct and
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figurative way.1 The study is completed by an analysis of the monetary policy rule
used by the Bundesbank as a potential prototype for the ECB.
This work does not claim to have covered all topics of European economic and
monetary integration. However, it contributes to the discussion about the increas-
ing integration dynamics by pointing out that integration should not be pushed
forward at any price. First, the existing problems of the European Union should
be addressed, including lack of transparency in the political process or contraven-
tions against the rules of the game by some member states or European authorities.
The flood tide of new rules and institutions that aim at intensifying the process of
European integration in recent years are therefore largely misplaced. They have
been enacted much too early and are the focus of broad criticism.
1.2 Structure and main findings
The next chapter is devoted to the question about desirability of monetary union.
According to Vaubel (1976), currency unification is less desirable the more often
real exchange rate adjustments are needed. Ten years later, Mussa reconsidered the
high correlation between nominal and real exchange rate movements and presumed
predominant influence of transitory factors on the development of real exchange
rates (Mussa 1986). The application of the real exchange rate criterion for the
viability of countries to form a monetary union should be based on real exchange
rate variation that is not caused by short-lived shocks to nominal exchange rates.
Using the methodology introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989), the analysis
examines the contribution of temporary and permanent shocks to the variation
of real and nominal exchange rates among European countries. Imposing the re-
striction that temporary shocks should not affect the real exchange rate in the
long run, the results of the structural vector autoregression analysis indicate that
1Due to e.g. spacial distance, long delegation chains, language barriers etc.
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in most of the EU-15 countries nominal exchange rate flexibility was used as a
means to effect real exchange rate adjustments before 1999. Based on the results,
the most viable monetary union is of eight members: Germany, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia. Furthermore, the
empirical analysis applies the real exchange rate criterion to the Eastern enlarge-
ment of EMU and shows that giving up nominal exchange rate flexibility would
be very painful for transition economies like Poland, Hungary and the Czech Re-
public as they have experienced strong real appreciation since the beginning of the
transition process.
In the third chapter, the driving forces of real appreciation during the process
of transition are analyzed using panel data of ten Central and Eastern European
countries between 1993 and 2012. The real exchange rate is decomposed into two
components: the real exchange rate of the external sector, i.e. the terms of trade,
and the price of tradables in terms of nontradables. For the purpose of the em-
pirical analysis, the economies are divided into a tradable and nontradable sector
using the degree of openness of the main industries. The key results show that
one explanation for the real appreciation is growth of productivity in the trad-
ables sector, as described by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). Furthermore,
increasing demand for luxury goods has also contributed to the real appreciation
in transition economies. Luxury goods are mainly tradables in these countries
and the real appreciation is brought about by an increase in the prices of trad-
ables. Increasing private sector share in GDP and growth of investment have,
on the contrary, weakened the real exchange rate appreciation, since they are as-
sociated with real depreciation. In the longer run, mainly factors related to the
real convergence are expected to have influence on the real exchange rate in CEEC.
In the fourth chapter, the focus turns to some political economic aspects of Euro-
pean integration. The analysis investigates the determinants of trust in national
and European political institutions. First, the concept of relative trust is intro-
duced and a range of socio-cultural and political-economic factors are examined
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for their impact on the level of trust in the national relative to the European Par-
liament on the one hand, and the national relative to the European executive on
the other. The empirical analysis makes use of survey data from Eurobarometer
and shows that socio-cultural and performance-based factors, perceived benefits
and principal-agent problems explain the relative trust that the respondents have
in the national and the EU institutions. Second, the effects of the current eco-
nomic crisis on the determinants of trust in political institutions are analyzed. The
process of centralization in the European Union accelerates significantly at times
when trust in European governmental institutions reaches its historical minimum.
The chapter investigates the driving forces of popular trust in national parliament
and national government on the one hand, and the European Parliament, the Eu-
ropean Commission and the Council of the European Union on the other. The
panel analysis is based on semiannual data for 27 member states over the period
2004-2011. The results show decreasing trust in times of crisis. It is not only the
outcome of poor economic conditions but it can also be viewed as dissatisfaction
with crucial characteristics of the political regime and the structures of the Euro-
pean Union.
The last chapter analyzes the monetary policy rule of the Bundesbank. Several
empirical studies suggest that the Bundesbank has pursued inflation targets rather
than monetary targets. These studies have been criticized because they do not
adequately measure the deviation from target and because they use some short-
term interest rate as a measure of the Bundesbank’s policy actions instead of the
comprehensive measure, the monetary base adjusted for changes in reserve require-
ments. The analysis shows that, in the period from 1979 III to 1998 IV, changes
in adjusted monetary base growth reacted negatively and significantly to devia-
tions from target monetary expansion as measured relative to the nearest margin
of the target band if, and only if, no control variables were added. With control
variables, the significance of this coefficient drops to 10 percent. By contrast, de-
viations of the inflation rate from the inflation objective used to derive the money
supply target never have any significant effect on changes in adjusted monetary
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base growth. This result holds regardless of whether the lagged or the currently
expected inflation rate is employed. The results are consistent with money supply
targeting (if anything) but not with inflation targeting.
Chapter 2
Quo vadis Eurozone? A
Reappraisal of the Real Exchange
Rate Criterion
2.1 Introduction
The variation of real exchange rates (RER) as a criterion for the desirability of
currency unification was introduced by Vaubel in the 1970s as the idea of creating
a monetary union was launched within the structures of the European Commu-
nity (see Vaubel 1976, 1978). As Vaubel pointed out, the flexibility of nominal
exchange rates is an effective means of carrying out equilibrium real exchange rate
adjustments. In inflationary situations the continuous adjustment of the nominal
exchange rate (NER) can avoid real exchange rate instability and economic distor-
tions. Furthermore, the largest fraction of real exchange rate variations take place
through nominal exchange rate changes, if permitted. This stylized fact has also
been confirmed in a range of studies, of which Mussa (1986) has gained the most
popularity. Therefore, joining a monetary union is less desirable for countries in
need of large real exchange rate adjustments.
7
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In his analyses Vaubel (1976, 1978) compares RER changes among Community
countries with those among regions or cities of three existing currency areas, Ger-
many, Italy and USA. The results show that the variation of RER is significantly
larger among Community countries. He refers to at least seven reasons for sus-
pecting that the larger variance of Community RER is partly due to institutional
factors which hamper the comparison of cross-country and within-country RER
movements. However, Vaubel’s analysis shows that RER changes are likely to be
systematically correlated with the magnitude of the benefits stemming from cur-
rency unification.
Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) take up the results by Vaubel (1976, 1978) and
compare the conditional variance and the persistence of RER shocks between Ger-
many and eight European countries with those of RER shocks within the existing
German monetary union. Using monthly series of consumer prices and nominal
exchange rates over the time span of 1973-1989, they evaluate the RER criterion
for desirability of currency unions, and show that “Europe of Two Speeds” existed
at the time of their research with Germany, France and the small neighbors of
Germany being a viable monetary union, whereas further reduction of RER vari-
ability was needed in order to include Denmark, Italy and the United Kingdom.
The methodology proposed by Von Hagen and Neumann (1994) has also been
applied for the case of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Ku-
tan and Zhou (2008) investigate the conditional variance and persistence of RER
changes between Germany as representing the EU standard and other EU mem-
ber states. They extend the time span used by Von Hagen and Neumann (1994)
through 2004, and evaluate the desirability of monetary union between EU-15 and
the CEEC who joined the EU in 2004 and 2007. Their analysis also highlights the
need for RER adjustment as an important criterion for the viability of the common
currency area: the larger and more persistent RER changes are needed between
the member states, the higher are the costs associated with the enlargement of the
monetary union. Comparing five periods of different exchange rate arrangements,
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they find that the variability and the persistence of RER shocks have declined
significantly between the EU founding member states. Although the introduction
of the common currency has reduced the variability of RER, Kutan and Zhou
show that it is too early to enlarge the monetary union by including the new EU-
member states. In the jargon of Von Hagen and Neumann (1994), they refer to an
“EU of three speeds”. At the time of their research Cyprus, Malta, Estonia, and
Slovenia had already met the desirability conditions for entering the Eurozone,
including low variability and persistence of RER shocks, as well as high degree of
monetary policy coordination.
The publication of these research results has been of considerable political sig-
nificance in the context of EMU enlargement. Furthermore, the current discussion
about the most appropriate way out of the economic crisis can benefit from this
comprehensive methodology for analyzing the costs of being a member of a mone-
tary union. The aim of the present chapter is to contribute to the discussion about
the desirability of monetary unification within the European Union by reconsid-
ering the real exchange rate criterion as proposed by Vaubel (1976, 1978). First,
the empirical analysis investigates the persistence of real exchange rate movements
vis-a-vis Germany using a range of different measures. The results point toward
a substantial mean reverting component in a number of countries. Therefore, the
observed high correlation between nominal and real exchange rate movements can
result from transitory influences on the development of real exchange rates (see
e.g. Mussa 1986). In such a case, the variability of real exchange rates is less con-
clusive with regard to the disadvantages stemming from currency unification. If
the high RER variability is caused by short-lived shocks to the nominal exchange
rate, then it could be argued that nominal exchange rate flexibility is less desirable
since it causes movements away from the equilibrium path. However, in case that
the variability of real exchange rates is caused mainly by permanent shocks, the
real exchange rate criterion can be applied as proposed by Vaubel (1976, 1978).1
1The importance of the decomposition of real exchange rate variation into a component due
to monetary or temporary causes and a component due to real causes has been also stressed by
Vaubel in a later publication (see Vaubel 2003, footnote 34).
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Using the methodology introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989), the present
analysis examines the influence of temporary and permanent shocks on the vari-
ation of real and nominal exchange rates among European countries. Imposing
the restriction that temporary shocks should not affect the real exchange rate in
the long run, the analysis indicates that in most of the EU-15 countries nominal
exchange rate flexibility was used as a means to effect real exchange rate adjust-
ments before 1999. Based on the results, the most desirable monetary union of
eight member states should be between Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
France, Luxembourg, Netherlands and Slovenia. Further on, the empirical analy-
sis applies the real exchange rate criterion to the Eastern enlargement of EMU and
shows that giving up the nominal exchange rate flexibility would be very painful
for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
This chapter is organized as follows. The next section analyzes the persistence
of real exchange rates between Germany and the other EU countries. Section
2.3 presents the methodology of the empirical approach for the decomposition of
RER and NER variation into a transitory and a permanent component. Section
2.4 contains the results of the empirical analysis. Concluding remarks are offered
in Section 2.5.
2.2 Real exchange rate persistence
Before proceeding with the analysis of RER persistence a closer look at the data
provides valuable insights about its time series features. A plot of all real and
nominal exchange rates against Germany as representing the standard of the EU
is provided in Figure A2.1 in the Appendix. The real exchange rate is calculated
as follows:
Qt = Et
P ∗
P
, (2.1)
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whereas E denotes the nominal exchange rate, P ∗ the price level in the foreign
country, and P the price level in the home country. The data is taken from the
IMF International Financial Statistics database. It includes monthly, seasonally
unadjusted observations on nominal exchange rates and consumer prices from Jan-
uary 1973 to September 20112. The nominal exchange rate vis-a-vis Germany is
defined as the price of the Deutsche Mark (or the Euro) in terms of the particular
home currency. Both, nominal and real exchange rates are expressed as indices
with January 2005 serving as a base.
Aside from the overall trend of the series, the nominal exchange rate exhibits
a pattern similar to that of the real exchange rate in most of the current EMU
member states before the adoption of the Euro. However, some notable excep-
tions are apparent from Figure A1. Austria and the Netherlands, for instance,
exhibit real exchange rate adjustment without significant nominal exchange rate
movements, since they chose to stabilize their nominal exchange rates against the
Deutsche Mark since the early 1980s. A similar development has been observed
in Estonia due to the currency board arrangement adopted almost immediately
after introducing the Estonian Kroon.
The common overall pattern of real and nominal exchange rate movements can
also be observed in the remaining member states which (still) have not joined the
EMU. Besides countries like Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, where fixed exchange
rate regimes do not allow for nominal exchange rate adjustment, much of the real
exchange rate variation is reflected by the development of the nominal exchange
rates, or vice versa.
The launch of the common European currency has marked the beginning of a
period characterized by minor real exchange rate variation in most of the coun-
tries. Nevertheless, many of the currencies have experienced a continous real
appreciation vis-a-vis Germany which occurred through inflation rates in excess of
2However, producer prices were used in the case of Ireland and United Kingdom, since
comparable consumer prices were not available for these countries over the whole time period.
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the German inflation rate. As stated above, real exchange rate adjustments can
be achieved in a less painful way if nominal exchange rate flexibility is granted.
Therefore, estimation of the costs of giving up the national currency should con-
sider the extent to which nominal exchange rate flexibility has effectively been
used as an adjustment mechanism, as well as the actual need for real exchange
rate adjustment.
The calculation of RER persistence serves as a suitable starting point of the analy-
sis since it can be used as a rough approximation of the need for real exchange rate
adjustments. Considering that the RER persistence is inversely proportional to the
speed of mean reversion after a particular shock, it delivers valuable information
about the kind of shocks driving the overall real exchange rate movements. For
instance, high persistence values, respectively high values for the half life of RER
disturbances, are likely to be observed if the development of the real exchange rate
is mainly driven by permanent shocks. In terms of the real exchange rate criterion
for the desirability of currency unification, the costs of giving up the national cur-
rency are higher, the higher the RER persistence between the particular countries.
The majority of Purchasing Power Parity studies calculate the RER persistence
assuming that real exchange rate dynamics can be best described as an AR(1)
process, as represented by the following equation (see e.g. Imbs et al. 2005, Choi
et al. 2004):
qt = c+ ρqt−1 + t. (2.2)
qt represents the logarithm of the real exchange rate, c is a constant term and
t denotes the disturbance term. The estimated autoregression coefficient ρˆ can
then be used to calculate the half-life of deviations from Purchasing Power Parity
(PPP). The half-life T1/2 is defined as the number of periods needed for half the
effect of a particular shock to dissipate. The half-life can be derived using the
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following standard formula:
T1/2 =
ln(0.5)
ln(ρˆ)
. (2.3)
This conventional procedure is also applied in the present analysis. Columns (1)
and (2) of Table 2.1 report the estimated values of ρˆ and T1/2 for the EU countries
vis-a-vis Germany. The half-life was calculated, using monthly observations of the
real exchange rates in logarithms and then transformed into years needed for half
of the given shock to dissipate.
The overall results presented in columns (1) and (2) of Table 2.1 can be sum-
marized as follows. The half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate ranges from
about one year in Bulgaria to 192.5 years in Estonia. As a whole, the higher AR(1)
coefficients, implying high RER persistence and therefore little reversion, are ob-
served in the transition economies (the only exceptions being Romania, Bulgaria,
and Slovenia). This is an expected outcome, since these countries have experi-
enced substantial real appreciations in recent years and their real exchange rates
contain therefore large trend components.3 Although the fixed exchange rate ar-
rangements in some of these countries have dampened the short-term variability
of real exchange rates, the real appreciation due to productivity growth as in the
framework of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) and other real factors is ex-
pected to bring about higher autoregression coefficients than e.g. in Luxembourg.4
The RER persistence in Slovenia is similar to that of many EU-15 countries. The
low half-life values in Bulgaria and Romania are probably due to the economic
turbulences at the beginning of the transition process. Within the EU-15 coun-
tries the half-life of RER shocks is relatively low, with Austria as an exception.5
Somewhat higher values of about ten years have been estimated for countries like
Denmark, Portugal and Spain.
3See Chapter 3 of this thesis.
4For a discussion about potential explanations for the real appreciation in CEEC see among
others Boeva (2009), Egert et al. (2005), as well as Chapter 3 of the present thesis.
5The high RER persistence in Austria is not surprising, since it is the result of continous
real appreciation vis-a-vis Germany.
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Table 2.1: Real exchange rate persistence in the EU vis-a-vis Germany (until
Sept. 2011)
half β β β β β
Country N ρˆ life k = 12 k = 24 k = 36 k = 48 k = 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Austria 464 .9993*** 82.5 .228*** .217*** .259*** .425*** .440***
Belgium 464 .9854*** 3.9 -.042 -.243*** -.318*** -.420*** -.606***
Bulgaria 248 .9364*** .9 .052 .144*** .209*** .289*** .301***
Cyprus 464 .9890*** 5.2 -.002 .071* -.183*** .009 -.175***
Czech Rep. 224 .9992*** 72.2 -.062 .367*** .232** .060 .072
Denmark 464 .9949*** 11.3 -.079*** -.144*** -.148*** -.147*** -.178***
Estonia 231 .9997*** 192.5 .637*** .423*** .228*** .142*** .112***
Finland 464 .9919*** 7.1 .076** -.337*** -.371*** -.211*** -.191***
France 464 .9692*** 1.8 -.129*** -.570*** -.479*** -.252*** -.358***
Greece 464 .9911*** 6.5 -.279*** -.143*** -.143*** -.244*** -.349***
Hungary 428 .9977*** 25.1 .125** -.010 .130*** -.008 -.142***
Ireland 446 .9774*** 2.5 -.165*** -.079* .101** -.066 -.193***
Italy 464 .9885*** 5.0 .052 .041 -.172*** -.192*** -.192***
Latvia 235 .9992*** 72.2 .482*** .297*** .260*** .203*** .086***
Lithuania 225 .9995*** 115.5 .332*** .434*** .270*** .198*** .136***
Luxembourg 464 .9853*** 3.9 .001 -.259*** -.293*** -.265*** -.166***
Malta 463 .9908*** 6.2 .153*** .110** -.095* -.329*** -.410***
Netherlands 464 .9845*** 3.7 -.083*** -.238*** -.316*** -.278*** -.267***
Poland 284 .9943*** 10.1 -.367*** -.018 .236*** .292*** .365***
Portugal 464 .9951*** 11.8 -.071** -.371*** -.262*** -.010 .015
Romania 251 .9665*** 1.7 -.255*** -.218*** .279*** .408*** .339***
Slovak Rep. 224 .9995*** 115.5 .391*** .691*** .922*** 1.002*** 1.127***
Slovenia 237 .9945*** 10.5 -.044 .123 -.348*** -.570*** -.494***
Spain 464 .9938*** 9.3 -.068** -.192*** -.167*** -.259*** -.380***
Sweden 464 .9855*** 4.0 -.189*** -.594*** -.350*** -.275*** -.224***
UK 463 .9907*** 6.2 -.057 -.056 .000 -.255*** -.392***
ρˆ denotes the first order autoregression coefficient.
β represents the persistence of RER changes as in Huizinga (1987).
The reported half life is in years.
*/**/*** indicate respectively 1%/5%/10% significance level of the coefficients.
The measurement of RER persistence by the half-life of shocks to the real exchange
rate derived from the coefficient of an AR(1) process has become a standard in
the literature examining the validity of Purchasing Power Parity. In addition,
further extensions of the autoregressive process have been proposed to estimate
the longevity of shocks to the real exchange rate, including the estimation of
AR(p) models (e.g. Mark 2001) and the utilization of impulse response functions
(see among others Cheung and Lai 2000, Kilian and Zha 2002, Murray and Papell
2002). A slightly different application of the autoregressive process in the context
of RER persistence has been proposed by Huizinga (1987). He suggests to estimate
the share of the shocks that can be expected to be reversed in a given period. The
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methodology involves estimating the regression model:
qt+k − qt = βk(qt − qt−k) + t, (2.4)
the interpretation being as presented below. A coefficient β = −1 would imply
that 100% of any real appreciation or depreciation over the last k years can be
expected to be reversed in the following k years. In his analysis Huizinga estimates
β for different k values and shows that the mean-reverting component in RER be-
comes weaker with decreasing time interval. Columns (3)-(7) of Table 2.1 present
the estimated values of β for the case of EU countries for k = 12, 24, 36, 48, 60
months. In some countries like France, Belgium and the Netherlands the rela-
tively low half-life of shocks to the real exchange rate are also confirmed by the
negative β coefficients, regardless of the horizon for which they were estimated.
In Poland the low RER persistence based on the AR(1) process estimates for the
levels can be observed for small k as well. However, as the time interval increases
the β values become positive, indicating that shocks are more persistent than the
calculated half-life suggests. In Bulgaria and Romania, where extremely low half-
life values were observed, in spite of trend real appreciation, the β values suggest
RER persistence far exceeding that calculated from the AR(1) estimation of the
levels. For large k the β values become positive and highly significant. In the other
transition economies the estimated β values are positive and significant, therefore
confirming the high RER persistence in these countries.
To sum up, the analysis indicates significantly higher levels of RER persistence in
CEEC than the average (with Slovenia being a notable exception) with the low-
est levels in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Based on these
results the costs of currency unification are the lowest in the latter countries, im-
plying that according to this methodology they form a more desirable monetary
union with Germany than most CEEC countries. The results indicate that most
transition economies will have to accept high costs by adopting the common Eu-
ropean currency in the near future. They should wait until their real appreciation
slows down considerably. Moreover, the results show that in many current EMU
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member states nominal exchange rate flexibility would have been a valuable in-
strument for real exchange rate adjustment. For instance, Portugal and Spain
exhibit relatively high AR(1) coefficients and the analysis of the β values indicate
that only about one-third of a shock to the real exchange rate over the last five
years is expected to be reversed in the next five years.
2.3 The empirical model
The high levels of real exchange rate persistence in many countries have led to
a large body of literature trying to explain the slow mean reversion process. At-
tempts to investigate the so called PPP Puzzle, i.e. the extremely slow rate at
which shocks to the real exchange rate seem to cancel out, consider for instance
sticky price models as explanation. As a result of monetary shocks, immediate
adjustments of nominal exchange rates are associated with large real exchange
rate movements since national price levels adjust slowly. The main reason is the
binding character of long-lasting contracts. In his influential paper, Mussa (1986)
has pointed out that sluggish price adjustment must be the main explanation for
the short-term movements in real and nominal exchange rates. However, Bergin
and Feenstra (2001), Chari et al. (2002), Huizinga (1987), Kollmann (2001) and
Tille (1998) among others have shown that only extremely long-ranging contracts
can explain the observed persistence.
Chari et al. (2002) investigate the effect of monetary shocks on real exchange
rates in a two-country sticky price model with price-discriminating monopolists.
Their analysis reproduces the observed volatility in RER, assuming one-year con-
tracts, but it cannot generate the high persistence observed in the data. Bergin and
Feenstra (2001) use a model with translog preferences, which amplify the effect of
price stickiness in generating persistence. However, their analysis also points out
the duration of contracts should be at least 2-3 years in order to generate the very
high persistence of real exchange rates. As further explanation Benigno (2004)
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proposes to reinterpret the way monetary policy is conducted in order to repro-
duce the deviations from PPP. Endogenous monetary policy designed in a way to
smooth disturbances in the real economy can interact with nominal price sticki-
ness in a complementary way to generate RER persistence as observed in the data.
Regardless of the source of real exchange rate persistence, it is a well accepted fact
that monetary policy brings about substantial real exchange movements. Bergin
and Feenstra (2001) and Chari et al. (2002) estimate an average autocorrelation
of the real exchange rate amounting to about 0.8 over the period of one quarter,
with a standard deviation between four and five times that of real output. Al-
though some part of the real exchange rate persistence is brought about by real
factors, there is a substantial part which can be ascribed solely to monetary policy.
Clarida and Gali (1994) examine the role of monetary policy for four countries
vis-a-vis the US dollar. Using the approach pioneered by Blanchard and Quah
(1989) they estimate a three-equations open macro model in the spirit of Dorn-
busch (1976) and Obstfeld (1985). Especially for the case of Germany and Japan
they show that monetary shocks explain a substantial amount of the variance of the
US dollar RER: more than 41% of the variance of the USD/DM real exchange rate
and more than 35% of the USD/YEN real exchange rate can be ascribed to mon-
etary shocks at a twelve-month horizon. The main core of their results has been
confirmed by Rogers (1999) and Faust and Rogers (2003). In several alternative
VAR specifications with five variables Rogers (1999) analyzes the GBP/USD real
exchange rate using over a hundred years of data. Depending on the specification,
the real exchange rate variability in the short run (twelve months) ascribed to mon-
etary shocks ranges between 19% and 60%, with a median contribution of 40.6%.
Faust and Rogers (2003) estimate a seven-variables model as in Eichenbaum and
Evans (1995) and analyze the effect of monetary shocks over a 48-months horizon.
The results point toward a variance share of over 50% that can be attributed to
monetary shocks. Even in a further specification with fourteen variables the vari-
ance share of monetary shocks remains substantial, about one-third.
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The examination of sources for RER movements using the Blanchard/Quah method-
ology within a multivariate framework requires imposing a wide range of con-
straints, many of which are questionable. In the present analysis the methodology
is applied in a bivariate framework using only the real and nominal exchange rates
in order to investigate the sources of real exchange rate movements and the costs
of giving up the national currencies in Europe by placing only one restriction,
namely that, in the long run, the real exchange rate is not affected by nominal
and temporary real shocks.
More specifically, the empirical approach focuses on decomposition of real ex-
change rate variation into two components, permanent and transitory. In their
seminal paper Blanchard and Quah (1989) proposed a method to identify the dy-
namic effects of supply and demand shocks on real GNP and unemployment. Blan-
chard and Quah apply a bivariate structural vector autoregressive model (SVAR)
imposing a long-term restriction as strategy for identification. Lastrapes (1992)
introduces a natural extension of the estimation technique applied by Blanchard
and Quah (1989) to the study of exchange rate behavior. Using monthly IMF data
between 1973 and 1989, Lastrapes investigates the driving sources of nominal and
real exchange rates between the United States on the one hand and Germany,
Japan, Italy and Canada on the other.6 His findings indicate that nominal and
real exchange rate fluctuations were mainly caused by real shocks between 1973
and 1989. Therefore Lastrapes concludes that nominal exchange rate flexibility
is required to facilitate the changes in relative prices across borders and efficient
allocation of resources.
In the following, a brief overview of the estimation procedure is presented be-
fore proceeding to the empirical results regarding the EU countries. Consider the
6Originally the data set used by Lastrapes included the United Kingdom as well. However
these series were dropped from further consideration after investigating the stationarity of the
exchange rates. See below.
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following bivariate stable vector autoregressive process
∆yt = A0∆yt + A1∆yt−1 + A2∆yt−2 + ...+ Ak∆yt−k + ut, (2.5)
where
∆yt =
∆qt
∆et

represents the vector of the endogenous variables in first differences. et is the
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of the foreign currency
in home currency units. qt is the log of the real exchange rate,
qt = et + p
∗
t − pt, (2.6)
with pt and p
∗
t denoting the logarithms of the price levels in the home and in the
foreign country, respectively. A0, A1...Aq represent matrices of parameters with
A0 =
 0 a02
a03 0
.
The contemporaneous covariance matrix of disturbances is given by Ω, with
Ω = E[utu
′
t] =
ω11 0
0 ω22
.7
The disturbances contained in the vector ut are assumed to be white noise and
represent two fundamental structural shocks as pointed out in the discussion below.
The reduced form of the linear dynamic structural model can be represented as
7Placing the zero restrictions in A0 and Σ is convenient normalization in the VAR literature.
For further discussion of VAR and SVAR models see among others Amisano and Giannini (1997),
Luetkepohl (2005), Stock and Watson (2001) and Watson (1994).
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follows:
∆yt = (I − A0)−1A1∆yt−1 + (I − A0)−1A2∆yt−2
+...+ (I − A0)−1Ak∆yt−k + (I − A0)−1ut
= Π1∆yt−1 + Π2∆yt−2 + ...+ Πk∆yt−k + t, (2.7)
with
Σ = E[t
′
t] =
σ11 σ12
σ12 σ22
.
Equation (2.7) is a convenient starting point of the analysis because its parameters
can be estimated together with the variance-covariance matrix Σ in a straightfor-
ward way using ordinary least squares as a vector autoregression model (VAR).
The moving average representation of the derived VAR model expresses the en-
dogenous variables in ∆yt as a function of current and past innovations t and can
be obtained by solving equation (2.7) for the final form of ∆yt,
∆yt = (I − Π1L− Π2L2 − ...− ΠkLk)−1t =
C11(L) C12(L)
C21(L) C22(L)
1t
2t
 = C(L)t.
(2.8)
C(L) is the matrix of long-run responses of ∆y to exogenous shocks, whereas each
element of the matrix is an infinite order lag polynomial.
To demonstrate the interpretation of the elements in C(L) equation (2.8) can
be represented as:
∆qt
∆et
 =
1,t
2,t
+
C11,1 C12,1
C21,1 C22,1
1,t−1
2,t−1
+
C11,2 C12,2
C21,2 C22,2
1,t−2
2,t−2
+ ... (2.9)
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The coefficient C11,2 represents for instance the response of ∆q in period t + 2 to
a unit innovation in 1 occuring in period t, whereas all other shocks at all other
dates are held constant. Therefore, the function C11,s(s) is the impulse response
function and shows the response of ∆q in time to a unit innovation in 1.
Although reduced form VAR can be used to estimate the coefficients in Π1, ...,Πq,
the information delivered by the VAR estimations is not sufficient to investigate
the effect of the structural shocks contained in the vector ut on the levels of the
variables and the first differences. Even though the impulse response functions
given by the matrix C show the response of the differenced nominal and real ex-
change rates to the reduced form disturbances, 1 und 2, it is the response to
the structural innovations u1 and u2 which is of particular interest. The reduced
form disturbances are only a linear combination of the structural innovations, as
defined in equation (2.7) above:
(I − A0)−1ut = t. (2.10)
Therefore, the moving average representation of the model can be rewritten as:
∆yt = C(L)(I − A0)−1(I − A0)t, (2.11)
or
∆yt = Cˆ(L)ut, (2.12)
whereas Cˆ(L) = C(L)(I − A0)−1 contains the impulse response functions of the
nominal and real exchange rates in first differences to the structural innovations
u1 and u2. In order to calculate Cˆ, A0 needs to be known. A further restriction
is needed and it can be derived from the long-run neutrality of transitory shocks
on the real exchange rate. Under the assumption that u1 represents permanent
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shocks and u2 transitory shocks, this restriction implies that
lim
k→∞
∂qt
∂u2,t−k
= 0. (2.13)
This restriction is equivalent to setting the accumulated effect of the transitory
shock on ∆qt equal to zero. It should, however, be kept in mind that the imposed
restriction is not testable, since it does not overidentify the structural model.
Thus, the methodology introduced by Blanchard and Quah (1989) decomposes
the variation of real and nominal exchange rates within a SVAR framework into
a transitory and a permanent component.8
The estimated coefficients can then be used to decompose the overall real exchange
rate. The structural shocks can be calculated from the disturbances of the VAR
model after imposing the long-run neutrality condition for the transitory shock:
ut = (I − A0)t. (2.14)
The real exchange rate driven by permanent shocks in the absence of transitory
shocks can be obtained by replacing the transitory shocks contained in u2 by zero.
2.4 Estimation results
For the purpose of the empirical analysis, the time series calculated from IMF
data as described in Section 2.2 have been converted into logs and expressed as
first differences. Preconditions for the estimation of the SVAR model are a sta-
tionary vector process ∆yt and no cointegrating relationship between qt and et. In
most of the cases nonstationarity of ∆yt and cointegration of the exchange rates
in levels appeared nonproblematic.9 However, the null of nonstationarity can be
8The application of the Blanchard/Quah framework has led in the literature to the inter-
pretation of the transitory (permanent) component as nominal (real) shock. However, there are
some potential problems with this interpretation. For further details see Lastrapes (1992).
9The results of the modified ADF test for nonstationarity as well as those of the Engle-
Granger test procedure for cointegration are reported in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
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Table 2.2: Test statistics from the modified ADF test for cointegration and
nonstationarity of NER and RER in levels and first differences: EU-15 (1973-
1998)
NER RER Cointegration test
Country levels ∆ levels ∆ (Engel-Granger)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Austria -3.478(1)** -8.986(1)*** -.902(1) -7.393(4)*** -4.286(1)***
Belgium -.635(1) -9.868(1)*** -2.347(1) -8.772(1)*** -.288(1)
Finland -1.793(1) -4.915(4)*** -1.223(1) -4.238(4)*** -1.668(1)
France -.511(1) -9.880(1)*** -3.885(1)*** -10.440(1)*** -1.475(1)
Greece -.770(1) -6.145(1)*** -2.659(6)* -2.233(11) -1.976(4)
Ireland -.158(1) -3.093(6)** -2.885(1)* -5.934(1)*** -.793(1)
Italy -.530(1) -3.628(5)*** -2.045(1) -6.482(1)*** -1.691(1)
Luxembourg -.635(1) -9.868(1)*** -2.974(1)** -4.775(4)*** -2.974(1)**
Netherlands -1.517(2) -10.598(1)*** -1.522(1) -9.511(1)*** -1.023(1)
Portugal .442(1) -7.219(2)*** -2.277(1) -9.621(1)*** -1.424(1)
Spain -.959(1) -9.861(1)*** -1.717(1) -7.970(1)*** -2.626(1)*
Denmark -.020(1) -11.035(1)*** -2.086(1) -11.807(1)*** -3.120(1)
Sweden -2.325(1) -8.136(1)*** -2.672(1)* -7.777(1)*** -.556(1)
UK -1.194(1) -8.956(1)*** -2.542(1) -7.428(1)*** -1.921(1)
*/**/*** indicate respectively 1%/5%/10% significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity.
Table 2.3: Test statistics from the modified ADF test for cointegration and
nonstationarity of NER and RER in levels and first differences: CEEC (1993-
2006) and Cyprus and Malta (1973-2006)
NER RER Cointegration test
Country levels ∆ levels ∆ (Engel-Granger)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Czech Rep. -1.478(1) -6.428(1)*** -2.104(1) -7.323(1)*** -.676(1)
Hungary -.109(1) -6.197(1)*** -1.843(1) -3.944(1)*** -.728(1)
Poland -.394(1) -7.512(1)*** -1.903(1) -8.347(1)*** -1.207(1)
Romania .084(1) -8.129(1)*** -2.031(2) -6.253(2)*** -2.004(1)
Slovakia -.620(1) -7.049(1)*** -2.031(2) -6.253(2)*** -.711(1)
Slovenia .547 -5.719(1)*** -2.528(1) -6.886(1)*** -.405(1)
Cyprus -1.743(1) -8.170(1)*** -2.418(12) -1.526(11) -2.049(1)
Malta -1.594(5) -1.004(1) -1.649(12) -2.515(11) -1.593(5)
*/**/*** indicate respectively 1%/5%/10% significance level for rejecting the null hypothesis of
non-stationarity.
rejected in some countries for the levels of nominal or real exchange rates. In
particular in Austria, France and Luxembourg the results should be interpreted
with caution, since overdifferencing of the exchange rates makes the application
of the Blanchard-Quah approach less appropriate for these countries.
In the following the dynamic effects of transitory and permanent shocks on ex-
change rates have been analyzed. The unrestricted VAR has been estimated for
n = 12.10 Besides the constant and a deterministic trend, seasonal dummies have
10The optimum lag-length according to the Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion turned
out to be 1 in most of the cases. However, the implementation of the Lagrange-multiplier test
showed considerable autocorrelation of the residuals. Therefore the number of lags included has
been increased in order to account for remaining autocorrelation and set uniformly to 12 to
assure comparability of the results.
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been included in some cases, since the time series exhibit strong seasonal patterns
in some countries. Subsequently, SVAR has been estimated placing the neutrality
long-term restriction in the equation of the real exchange rate.
Figures A2 in the Appendix depicts the responses of real and nominal exchange
rates to permanent and transitory shocks in the EU-15 countries.11 The long-term
effect of transitory shocks on RER approaches zero due to the neutrality restriction
imposed. In many countries, both real and nominal exchange rates in the short
run exhibit a pattern consistent with the overshooting hypothesis of the 1970s.12
The peak is reached after about 6-12 months in Austria, Belgium, Finland, France
and Spain and much sooner in the remaining countries. It is followed by gradual
decline of the nominal exchange rate toward the long-term value. Remarkable
exceptions from this pattern can be observed in Greece, Luxembourg and Portu-
gal, where the responses increase steadily until the long-term values are reached.
In all countries the long-term responses of nominal exchange rates to transitory
shocks are strongly positive, indicating that nominal shocks are absorbed also by
the nominal exchange rates over time and not solely by the price levels. The real
exchange rate returns to its initial value after approximately 1.5-3.5 years.
Of great relevance for the implementation of the real exchange rate criterion is fur-
ther the response of nominal and real exchange rates to permanent shocks. In most
of the countries the pattern of the dynamic response of nominal exchange rates to
permanent shocks is very similar to that of the real exchange rate. Therefore nom-
inal exchange rate flexibility has indeed been used as an adjustment mechanism for
permanent changes in the real exchange rate. The long-term responses to the dif-
ferent shocks are also presented in Table 2.4. In order to investigate the challenges
associated with the adaptation to the situations with common currency, the last
column of Table 2.4 reports the share of long-term response of real exchange rates,
which has been carried out by nominal rate adjustments. The results indicate that
11The dashed lines represent the 95% confidence interval from a bootstrap simulation with
500 replications.
12See e.g. Dornbusch (1976).
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Table 2.4: Long-term responses of real and nominal exchange rates in EU-15
to permanent and transitory shocks (1973-1998)
Response of RER to a Response of NER to a share of permanent shock
Country permanent transitory permanent transitory to RER accounted for by NER
shock (1) shock (2) shock (3) shock (4) (3)/(1)·100%
Austria .0051 .0000 .0022 .0023 43.1
(.0012) (.0008) (.0006)
Belgium .0093 .0000 .0076 .0066 81.7
(.0020) (.0028) (.0022)
Finland .0382 .0000 .0321 .0057 84.0
(.0114) (.0093) (.0016)
France .0121 .0000 .0108 .0073 89.3
(.0022) (.0027) (.0025)
Greece .0139 .0000 .0222 .0229 159.7
(.0034) (.0113) (.0089)
Ireland .0159 .0000 .0112 .0116 70.4
(.0036) (.0045) (.0027)
Italy .0216 .0000 .0184 .0056 85.2
(.0053) (.0047) (.0011)
Luxembourg .0082 .0000 .0095 .0067 115.9
(.0018) (.0037) (.0023)
Netherlands .0235 .0000 .0165 .0096 70.2
(.0050) (.0046) (.0025)
Portugal .0345 .0000 .0414 .0130 120.0
(.0106) (.0146) (.0032)
Spain .0230 .0000 .0230 .0093 100.0
(.0048) (.0057) (.0026)
Denmark .0092 .0000 .0049 .0069 53.3
(.0020) (.0023) (.0018)
Sweden .0298 .0000 .0262 .0087 87.9
(.0073) (.0066) (.0022)
UK .0256 .0000 .0269 .0090 105.1
(.0053) (.0064) (.0023)
Standard errors from the bootstrapping procedure are presented in parentheses. All coefficients
are highly significant, except for the cases indicated by ns.
over the period from 1973 to 1998 the nominal exchange rate flexibility was utilized
to a lesser extent in countries like Austria and the Netherlands, where only 43%,
respectively 70% of real exchange rate changes occur through nominal exchange
rate movements.13 At the other extreme are countries like Greece, Portugal and
Spain, in which the response of the nominal exchange rate has even outpaced that
of the real rate. The remaining countries can be placed in between. Considering
the EU-15 countries which are not part of the EMU, the results indicate that in
Denmark the adjustment to the common currency would have been comparable to
that in Austria and the Netherlands. In the UK nominal exchange rate flexibility
has been used much more often as an adjustment mechanism for permanent RER
shocks. The adjustment to the common currency here would have been compara-
ble to that in Spain and Portugal.
13In Ireland the calculated number of 70.2% is relatively small as well. However, this result
is mainly due to the fact, that producer prices were used for this country. Therefore, the
comparability is not granted for the case of Ireland and the results should be interpreted with
caution.
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Table 2.5: Long-term responses of real and nominal exchange rates in CEEC
(1993-2006) and Cyprus and Malta (1973-2006) to permanent and transitory
shocks
Response of RER to a Response of NER to a share of permanent shock
Country permanent transitory permanent transitory to RER accounted for by NER
shock (I) shock (II) shock (III) shock (IV) (III)/(I)·100%
Czech Rep. .0113 .0000 .0078 .0054 69.0
(.0034) (.0029) (.0019)
Hungary .0133 .0000 .0184 .0095 138.3
(.0035) (.0065) (.0035)
Poland .0228 .0000 .0221 .0318 96.9
(.0054) (.0124) (.0157)
Romania .0306 .0000 .0072ns .0444 23.5
(.0081) (.0121) (.0125)
Slovakia .0453 .0000 .0080 .0105 17.7
(.0131) (.0045) (.0032)
Slovenia .0165 .0000 .0000ns .0058 0.0
(.0052) (.0231) (.0013)
Cyprus .0173 .0000 .0129 .0052 74.6
(.0035) (.0029) (.0009)
Malta .0087 .0000 .0008ns .0023 9.2
(.0025) (.0007) (.0004)
Standard errors from the bootstrapping procedure are presented in parentheses. All coefficients
are highly significant, except for the cases indicated by ns.
Figure A3 and Table 2.5 present the results of the estimation with regard to the
new EU member states with flexible exchange rate arrangements.14 The responses
of nominal and real exchange rates to transitory shocks have been similar to those
in the EU-15. Concerning the response to permanent shocks, the results indicate
that in Slovakia, Slovenia, and most notably Romania only a small amount of the
real exchange rate adjustment has been brought about through nominal exchange
rate changes. However, in Hungary and Poland, permanent shocks to the real
exchange rate are carried out mainly by nominal exchange rate adjustments.
The examination of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism reveals
valuable insights about the behavior of the real exchange rate in some member
states since the adoption of the Euro. Greece, Portugal and Spain, for instance,
experienced a considerable real appreciation vis-a-vis Germany. In these countries
14Transition economies with fixed exchange rate arrangements have been excluded from the
analysis since the methodology presupposes a minimum of exchange rate flexibility. However,
as regards the utilization of the nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism they can
be classified as countries, in which the challenge of adaptation to the situation with common
currency is not that pronounced, since they do not use the nominal rate flexibility at all.
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the adaptation to the common currency has been especially challenging, since be-
fore 1999 they had extensively used nominal exchange rate flexibility as an adjust-
ment mechanism. Moreover, depreciation had served to accomodate high inflation
rates. It would have been better to allow for a more gradual adaptation to the
common currency in these countries by a stepwise decrease of nominal exchange
rate flexibility (if at all). This would have permitted adaptation of the process of
expectation formation as well.
Further information contained in the SVAR estimates can be summarized using
the variance decomposition of the forecast errors (FEVD). FEVD is a measure for
the relative importance of the shocks under consideration to the system. Tables
2.6 and 2.7 report the relative contributions of permanent and transitory shocks
to the real and nominal exchange rates. The left block of the tables reveals that
even at short time horizons real exchange rate movements are mainly driven by
permanent shocks. Only in Italy, the Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia and Czech
Republic more than 25% of the forecast error variance at the one-month horizon
is attributed to transitory shocks. Considering the right hand panel of the tables
showing the relative contribution of permanent shocks to the nominal exchange
rate, the results confirm by and large the outcome of the impulse-response func-
tions. Especially in Denmark and the Netherlands the nominal exchange rate
is mainly driven by transitory factors. However, in other countries like Finland,
Greece, Portugal and Spain over 70% of the nominal exchange rate movements
are due to permanent adjustments. In CEEC the nominal rate flexibility seems
to be of great importance especially for Hungary and Poland, where the relative
contribution of permanent shocks to the nominal exchange rate amounts to 91%
and 69% respectively.
The parameters of the estimated SVAR equations can be further used to approx-
imate the share of RER variance caused by transitory and permanent shocks. In
the next step the structural shocks have been calculated from the disturbances in
the two SVAR equations. The transitory shocks have been replaced by zero and
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Table 2.6: Forecast error variance decomposition of real and nominal exchange
rates in EU-15 (1973-1998)
Relative contribution of Relative contribution of
Country permanent shocks to RER (in %) permanent shocks to NER (in %)
k = 1 k = 12 k = 60 k = 1 k = 12 k = 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Austria 93 90 88 55 54 55
Belgium 86 81 79 45 45 44
Finland 94 89 88 75 74 73
France 94 87 85 74 71 70
Greece 99 96 95 78 74 74
Ireland 91 86 86 49 50 50
Italy 72 71 71 46 47 49
Luxembourg 100 93 93 87 83 82
Netherlands 71 71 70 27 28 29
Portugal 94 90 89 86 83 83
Spain 95 94 91 75 75 74
Denmark 86 83 81 24 25 26
Sweden 93 88 88 69 68 67
UK 85 80 81 65 66 65
Table 2.7: Forecast error variance decomposition of real and nominal exchange
rates in CEEC (1993-2006) and Cyprus and Malta (1973-2006)
Relative contribution of Relative contribution of
Country permanent shocks to RER (in %) permanent shocks to NER (in %)
k = 1 k = 12 k = 60 k = 1 k = 12 k = 60
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Czech Rep. 63 56 56 26 26 28
Hungary 100 96 90 94 93 91
Poland 87 86 83 70 70 69
Romania 63 60 60 16 17 21
Slovakia 72 70 70 34 37 39
Slovenia 99 95 95 0 2 5
Cyprus 100 98 97 61 60 60
Malta 85 76 76 7 9 10
the new time series containing the permanent shocks and the zeroed-out transitory
shocks, uˆt, have been used to achieve the movements of the real exchange rate that
are caused solely by permanent shocks.
The variance of the real exchange rate driven by permanent shocks in absence of
transitory shocks is shown in Table 2.8. The results indicate that there is a range
of countries where the variance of real exchange rates vis-a-vis Germany driven
by permanent shocks has been relatively low. The calculated values show that a
monetary union between Germany on the one hand and Austria, Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, Netherlands and most notably Denmark would be a more dsirable
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Table 2.8: Variance of RER due to permanent shocks in EU-15, Cyprus and
Malta (1973-1998) and CEEC (1993-2006)
Variance
Country due to
perm. shocks
Austria 44.4
Belgium 45.2
Finland 199.3
France 44.5
Greece 134.1
Ireland 73.1
Italy 154.4
Luxembourg 49.0
Netherlands 24.7
Portugal 269.8
Spain 146.8
Denmark 24.6
Sweden 138.1
UK 180.4
Czech Rep. 647.1
Hungary 344.7
Poland 425.6
Romania 2205.2
Slovakia 1150.0
Slovenia 40.6
Cyprus 91.5
Malta 259.3
currency area than with the other countries.15 On the other hand, the inclusion
of countries like Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Finland is associated with in-
creasing costs of monetary unification. Among the new member states Slovenia
exhibits variance comparable to Austria and Belgium and can therefore be con-
sidered an adequate member of the currency area. The variance in the remaining
CEEC is extremely high, even in Slovakia, where the Euro has already been in-
troduced as official currency. The accession of these countries is less desirable as
long as they are in need of large real exchange rate adjustment.
Figure 2.1 combines the results of the variance analysis and the impulse response
functions. Several groups of countries can be identified. The first group includes
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia.
In these countries the nominal exchange rate has been used as an adjustment
mechanism for permanent shocks to the real exchange rate, but the need for real
15The value for Ireland is relatively low too. However, this is again due to the fact that
consumer prices were not available for this country and producer prices were used instead.
Therefore, the result is not really comparable to the others.
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exchange rate adjustment vis-a-vis Germany has been relatively low. These coun-
tries would form a desirable monetary union with Germany. The second group
consists of Greece, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and probably Cyprus, where
the need for real exchange rate adjustment has been pronounced and the nominal
exchange rate has been used as valuable adjustment mechanism. These countries
are less suitable to form a desirable currency area with Germany, and it is not sur-
prising that most of them faced considerable difficulties in the last years including
loss of competitiveness. The third group includes the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. These countries use the exchange rate flexibility, and they should
do so in the future since the need for permanent real exchange rate adjustment
with respect to Germany is very high there. According to the real exchange rate
criterion they should not join the monetary union, at least not in the near future.
The last group includes countries, where the nominal exchange rate has not been
extensively used as an adjustment mechanism, but the permanent component of
the RER variance has been high to very high. This group includes Malta, Roma-
nia and Slovakia. These countries are in need of real exchange rate adjustments
and do not form a desirable monetary union with Germany. They would benefit
from having and using flexible exchange rates vis-a-vis Germany as an adjustment
mechanism.16
16This group can be reasonably extended by the countries excluded from the analysis due to
lacking nominal exchange rate flexibility, Bulgaria and the Baltic states. They do not use the
nominal exchange rate as an adjustment mechanism. However the real appreciation in the last
decades does not allow them to form a desirable monetary union with Germany.
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2.5 Concluding remarks
This chapter has examined the dynamics and sources of real and nominal exchange
rate changes in EU countries prior to their accession to the monetary union. In the
first place, the real exchange rate persistence turned out to vary widely among EU
countries, indicating that RER shocks, as well as the adjustment path of the real
exchange rate, differ accross member states. In the second part of the analysis, an
attempt was made to decompose the variance of nominal and real exchange rates.
The results indicate that real exchange rates are driven mainly by permanent
shocks and these have been carried out through nominal exchange rate changes,
especially in countries like Hungary, Poland, Finland, Greece, Portugal and Spain.
Reappraising the real exchange rate criterion proposed by Vaubel (1976, 1978),
this outcome implies that these countries benefit, or would have benefited, from
retaining nominal exchange rate flexibility. Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Slovenia, on the other hand, are more likely
to fulfill the real exchange rate criterion and could thus form a more desirable
monetary union with Germany.
These results are relevant not only as regards the future accession of CEEC to the
monetary union. Moreover, they indicate that a possible way out of the currency
union would be less costly for current member states like Greece, Portugal and
Spain, since they will regain the nominal exchange rate flexibility, which they have
extensively used before the Euro introduction.
Chapter 2. Reappraisal of the Real Exchange Rate Criterion 33
Appendix
Figure A2.1: Nominal and real exchange rates of EU member states vis-a-vis Germany (Attention should be
paid to the different scaling in the case of CEEC, especially in the case of Lithuania.)
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Austria
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Belgium
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Finland
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER France
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Greece
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Ireland
Chapter 2. Reappraisal of the Real Exchange Rate Criterion 34
 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Italy
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Luxembourg
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Netherlands
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Portugal
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Spain
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Cyprus
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Malta
Chapter 2. Reappraisal of the Real Exchange Rate Criterion 35
 
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Denmark
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Sweden
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1970m1 1980m1 1990m1 2000m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER UK
 
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Slovenia
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Slovakia
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Estonia
Chapter 2. Reappraisal of the Real Exchange Rate Criterion 36
 
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Bulgaria
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Czech
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Hungary
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Latvia
0
20
0
40
0
60
0
80
0
10
00
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Lithania
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Poland
0
10
0
20
0
30
0
40
0
In
de
x 
(20
05
m
1=
10
0)
1995m1 2000m1 2005m1 2010m1
time_set
ner rer
NER / RER Romania
Chapter 2. Reappraisal of the Real Exchange Rate Criterion 37
Figure A2: Dynamic responses of real and nominal exchange rates in EU-15 to permanent and
transitory shocks (1973-1998)
A. Austria
B. Belgium
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
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C. Denmark
D. Finland
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
. . i
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E. France
F. Greece
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
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a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
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G. Ireland
H. Italy
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. E  response to per anent shock d. E  response to transitory shock
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I. Luxembourg
J. Netherlands
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
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K. Portugal
L. Spain
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to per anent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
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M. Sweden
N. UK
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
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B. Czech Republic
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
Figure A3: Dynamic responses of real and nominal exchange rates in the new EU member
states to permanent and transitory shocks
A. Cyprus
c. E  response to per anent shock d. E  response to transitory shock
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E. Hungary
F. Malta
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
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G. Poland
H. Romania
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
c. NER response to permanent shock d. NER response to transitory shock
a. RER response to permanent shock b. RER response to transitory shock
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Chapter 3
Explanations for the real
appreciation in the New EU
Member States in Transition1
3.1 Introduction
Almost 25 years of transition have brought about significant change in the struc-
ture of Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). According to the latest
report of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), many
of these countries have almost finished the transition process to market economy.2
The 2012 report points out that the new EU member states from Central and East-
ern Europe who joined the European Union in 2004 and 2007 have already achieved
an encouraging average of above 3.6 points of the transition indicators with 4.3
being the score for the advanced industrialized countries (EBRD 2012). After the
1The first draft of this chapter was written while I was a visiting researcher at the Bulgarian
National Bank (BNB). I am indebted to Grigor Stoevski, Emilia Penkova and Slavi Slavov for
their detailed feedback on the preliminary version. I would like to also thank Alexandru Minea,
Nikolay Nenovsky, Kalina Dimitrova, Andrey Vasilev, Rosen Rozenov, Svilen Pachedjiev, as well
as all the staff at the department of Mariela Nenova and the participants in the BNB seminar
for helpful comments and suggestions. Furthermore, my best thanks go to Stoyan Bozhkov and
Tzvetomir Tzanov for their friendly support during my stay at the BNB. Although my stay at
the BNB was financially backed by the visiting researcher program, the views expressed in the
chapter are my own and do not necessarily reflect the official views of the BNB. All remaining
errors are mine.
2The present chapter covers ten countries in transition, namely those who joined the Eu-
ropean Union in 2004 and 2007 because they can be considered a homogeneous group sharing
similar characteristics and the common target of joining the European Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU).
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accession to the European Union, the next step which these countries may take
is the adoption of the Euro. Slovenia was the first to introduce the European
currency at the beginning of 2007 and was followed by Slovakia in 2009, Estonia
in 2011 and Latvia in 2014. The remaining six countries are expected to join the
system in the near future. However the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria is
often considered a hard task for the CEEC because the strong real appreciation
as a result of the real convergence process and further transition specific changes
since the breakdown of the COMECON3 makes the simultaneous achievement of
low inflation and nominal exchange rate stability very difficult. Furthermore, the
trend appreciation of the real exchange rate makes the Euro adoption by these
countries less desirable.4
The development of the real exchange rate (RER) is one of the “diagnostic” charac-
teristics of the transition period (Fischer 2002) and is often seen as an indicator for
the potential loss of competitiveness in the export sector (see e.g. Oomes 2005).5
The collapse of the Communist system was accompanied by sharp nominal and
real depreciation of the currencies of Central and Eastern Europe. To a large ex-
tent the depreciation was a result of the monetary overhang at the beginning of
the transition process. However, the political and economic uncertainty explains
the fact that the CEEC began the transition not only with depreciation but also
with strongly “undervalued” currencies, as has often been claimed in the analyses
of RER development in CEEC (Halpern/Wyplosz 1997, Krajnyak/Zettelmeyer
1998).6 7 The real appreciation that followed was initially considered as a cor-
rection to the sharp depreciation. However, the real exchange rate continued to
appreciate long after the initial level had been re-attained. The real appreciation
turned out to be a phenomenon characterizing the transition process.
3Council for Mutual Economic Assistance.
4See Chapter 2 of the present thesis.
5Real appreciation does not necessarily imply loss of competitiveness, though. In order to
evaluate the effect of real appreciation on competitiveness, the driving forces of the real exchange
rate need to be examined. See below.
6The real exchange rate at the beginning of the transition process was often considered
“undervalued”. The usage of this term affords the knowledge of the equilibrium real exchange
rate, though. Since there is no consensus in the literature about the calculation of equilibrium
values for the real exchange rate, the term “undervalued” should be taken with caution.
7The explanation proposed by Halpern and Wyplosz (1997) is based on the lack of confidence
in the untested authorities. Uncertainties surrounding the equilibrium value of the exchange rate
at the beginning of transition made policymakers prefer to err rather on the side of “undervalu-
ation”.
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Figure 3.1 plots the development of the real effective exchange rate of CEEC
against their 42 main trading partners. The consumer price deflated index is
expressed relative to the base year 2005 with decreasing values indicating real ap-
preciation. The magnitude of the real exchange rate appreciation differs across
countries. Nevertheless, it is a common phenomenon in these countries on their
way through the process of transition. Real appreciation was especially high in
the first years of transition and has slowed down during the recent economic crisis.
The most pronounced real exchange rate appreciation was observed in Lithua-
nia, followed by Estonia and Bulgaria. In Slovenia, on the contrary, the pace of
real exchange rate development has been rather modest, especially in recent years.
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Czech Rep.
Estonia
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Hungary
Poland
Romania
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Slovakia
Figure 3.1: Real effective exchange rates in CEEC
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat; 2005=100; Consumer price
deflated against 42 main trading partners; Decreasing values indicate real appreciation.
The observed development of real exchange rates in transition economies led to a
large body of literature. Many approaches were proposed to explain the CEEC
real appreciation. Some authors refer to productivity developments as in the
Balassa-Samuelson framework focusing on the supply side of the economies (e.g.
Golinelli/Orsi 2002, Jazbec 2002, Rother 2000, Sinn/Reutter 2001). Others claim
that the productivity differentials account only for a small part of the real appre-
ciation and search for further determinants in other macroeconomic variables such
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as demand side factors (Coricelli/Jazbec 2004) and shifts of production toward
new goods or goods of better quality (Backe´ et al. 2003, E´gert 2004, E´gert et al.
2003, Mihaljek/Klau 2003). The present chapter offers a comprehensive analysis
of the driving forces of the real exchange rate in CEEC in the process of transi-
tion. Potential explanations for the development of the RER are discussed and
empirically tested whereas the RER is decomposed in two components - the real
exchange rate of the tradables sector of the economy and the price of tradable
goods in terms of nontradables relative to a reference country.
The contribution of the present analysis to the discussion about explanations for
the real appreciation is threefold. First, in-depth analysis of the development of
consumer prices should shed light on the main categories of goods and services
which have promoted real appreciation in transition economies. Second, the trad-
ables/nontradables dichotomy is examined with regard to the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe using the degree of openness of the main industries as an
indicator. A more precise distinction between tradables and nontradables should
facilitate the investigation of potential driving sources of real appreciation, like
e.g. the Balassa-Samuelson effect. And third, detailed analysis of private con-
sumption demand including the calculation of income elasticity contributes to the
examination of consumption-driven real appreciation as proposed by Bergstrand
(1991).
The results partly differ from the existing body of literature exploring the real ex-
change rate movements in the transition countries. The presence of productivity
driven real appreciation as proposed by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) is
confirmed by and large. The elasticity of the overall real exchange rate responses
to productivity of tradables relative to nontradables lies between -0.25 and -0.56.
Furthermore, a range of demand side variables has affected the development of real
exchange rates in CEEC. The effect of the shift in private consumption is different
from the one described in the literature thus far.8 The present analysis points
out that private consumption has indeed shifted toward luxury goods. However,
luxury goods are mostly tradables in CEEC as opposed to the assumption made
by Bergstrand (1991). Shifts of private consumption have led to increasing prices
of tradable goods and services relative to abroad. The empirical analysis further
shows that the effect of increasing investment demand on the real exchange rate
has weakened the real appreciation, since growing investment demand leads to
8See e.g. Bergstrand (1991), Coricelli and Jazbec (2004).
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real depreciation. The progress in transition has affected the real exchange rate as
well: increasing private sector share and decreasing share of administered prices
are associated with real depreciation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reconsiders the theoret-
ical explanations for the real appreciation in the CEEC. In Section 3.3, disaggre-
gated consumer prices are used to identify categories of goods and services most
affected by the real appreciation. Section 3.4 investigates tradability in different
industries and presents the main results of the empirical analysis. Finally, Section
3.5 contains some concluding remarks.
3.2 Theoretical background
The real exchange rate is defined as the price of a foreign commodity bundle in
terms of domestic commodity bundles:
Q = E · P
∗
P
, (3.1)
or respectively
q = e+ p∗ − p (3.2)
expressed in logarithms. E refers to the nominal exchange rate as the price of
foreign currency in terms of home currency. P represents the overall price level;
asterisks denote variables for the foreign country and small letters represent the
corresponding variables in logarithms. An increase in the real exchange rate there-
fore indicates a real depreciation of the home currency.
The price level in each country can be calculated as the geometric average of the
price level in the tradables (T) and nontradables (N) sector:
p = αpT + (1− α)pN (3.3)
p∗ = α∗pT∗ + (1− α∗)pN∗, (3.4)
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where α denotes the weight of tradable goods in the price index and is calculated
as the share of tradables in the overall consumption expenditure. (1 − α) is re-
spectively the share of nontradables.
Substituting equations (3.3) and (3.4) into equation (3.2) and rearranging leads
to the following equation:
q = [e+ pT∗ − pT ] + [(1− α)(pT − pN)− (1− α∗)(pT∗ − pN∗)] (3.5)
The first term in parentheses is the real exchange rate calculated merely with
prices for tradable goods, thus the real exchange rate in the tradables sector.9 It
will be denoted qT . According to relative Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) it should
be constant over time or at least revert to a constant mean value, since tradable
goods are exposed to international competition.10 The second term is the price
of tradable goods in terms of nontradables relative to that in the foreign country,
respectively weighted by the share of nontradables in overall consumption expen-
ditures. It can be thought of as the real exchange rate of the sheltered sector and
will be labeled qN . Decreasing relative prices of tradables to nontradables at home
relative to abroad lead ceteris paribus to a real appreciation. This effect can be
strengthened by an increasing share of nontradables in the overall consumption in
the home relative to the foreign country. Based on equation (3.5), an appreciation
of the real exchange rate is thus formed by the combined effect of the real appreci-
ation in the sector of tradable goods and the increase in the price of nontradables
in terms of tradables relative to the foreign country, again weighted by the share
of nontradables in consumption:
qˆ = qˆT + qˆN . (3.6)
A hat indicates that the corresponding variables are expressed as growth rates.
Equations (3.5) and (3.6) represent the basis for further discussion.
9See e.g. E´gert et al. (2005)
10In a weakened version, relative PPP has often been interpreted in terms of a mean reversion
process. The real exchange rate does not have to be constant but rather revert to a constant
mean. The estimated deviation from the relative PPP has, in many studies, a half-life of four
years. See e.g. Frankel and Rose (1995) for a panel projection of PPP.
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3.2.1 Explanations for the adjustment of the relative prices
Most of the theoretical work on the real exchange rate determinants relies on the
assumption that relative PPP holds in the external sector. The fluctuation of
the real exchange rate is then explained by variations in the relative price be-
tween tradables and nontradables. The theoretical approaches behind the adjust-
ment of tradables prices in terms of nontradables can be broadly divided into two
groups. The first group includes models that explain the relative price movements
from the supply side of the economy. The best known two approaches are the
Balassa-Samuelson effect and the relative factor endowments effect - as proposed
by Bhagwati (1984). The second group of explanations refers to demand side fac-
tors such as shifts of private consumption demand from tradables to nontradables
(Bergstrand 1991), increasing government spending or investment demand as a
share of GDP and shifting the overall demand toward nontradable goods (e.g.
Edwards 1989, De Gregorio and Wolf 1994, Schro¨der and Pfadt 1998). Besides
these two main groups, increasing relative price of nontradables can be induced
by transition specific factors like e.g. price liberalization.
3.2.1.1 Supply-side explanations
Productivity growth in the sector of tradables
In the spirit of Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964), a rapid increase in the pro-
ductivity of the tradables sector (mainly manufacturing) relative to that of the
nontradables sector (mainly services) can lead to increasing relative prices of non-
tradables. If this effect is stronger in the home than in the foreign country and
the real exchange rate of the external sector is constant in accordance with rel-
ative PPP, this implies a real appreciation of the home currency.11 The starting
point is a model of a small open economy, in which both tradable and nontradable
11As visible from the decomposition of the RER, the weight of nontradables in the overall
consumption expenditures also has to be accounted for (see equation (3.5), p. 52). Significantly
lower weights of nontradables in the CEEC than in industrialized countries can be considered as
an explanation for the low power of approaches ascribing the real appreciation to the movements
of the relative prices (see e.g. E´gert et al. 2003). The increase in the price of nontradables
relative to tradables in the home country can only result in real appreciation if it exceeds the
increase in the corresponding relative price abroad by an extent accounting for the different share
of nontradables.
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goods are produced according to constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas produc-
tion functions of capital and labor employed:12
YT = AT · LbT ·K(1−b)T (3.7)
YN = AN · LcN ·K(1−c)N , (3.8)
where Y, L,K,A denote output, labor, capital and total factor productivity, respec-
tively. The values of b and c are restricted as follows: 0 < b, c < 1. Furthermore,
labor elasticity of production is larger in the nontradables sector than in the sector
of tradable goods, c > b.
According to relative PPP in the external sector, prices of tradable goods result
from the world market equilibrium and are therefore exogenous to the model.
The capital stock is fixed for one period ahead and capital costs are determined
under the assumption of full capital mobility by the world market interest rate. It
is further assumed that intersectoral (but not international) labor mobility leads
to nominal wage equalization between the two sectors of the economy and that
operating under the conditions of perfect competition implies a real wage equal
to marginal labor productivity in each sector. The profit maximization problem
leads to following first-order conditions:
AT · (1− b) ·
(
1
KT/LT
)b
=
i
PT
, (3.9)
AT · b ·
(
KT
LT
)(1−b)
=
W
PT
, (3.10)
AN · c ·
(
KN
LN
)(1−c)
=
W
PN
, (3.11)
AN · (1− c) ·
(
1
KN/LN
)c
=
i
PN
. (3.12)
i denotes the interest rate and W the nominal wage in the economy. Equation
(3.9) can be used to determine labor input in the sector of tradables, LT , since it is
the only variable which is not predetermined by the assumptions. From equation
(3.10) the nominal wage in the tradables sector can be calculated, which prevails
also in the sector of nontradables due to intersectoral labor mobility. Equations
(3.11) and (3.12) represent a system of two equations in two variables, labor input
in the sector of nontradables and (relative) price of nontradables. Therefore, the
12See e.g. E´gert et al. (2003).
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relative price of nontradables is independent from demand factors and solely given
by the supply side conditions.
An increase of productivity in the sector of tradables leads to rising nominal wages,
which is then transferred to the closed sector where the productivity improvement
is smaller. Increasing labor costs in this sector are then compensated by raising
the prices of nontradable goods. If the productivity growth in the external relative
to the sheltered sector in the home country is larger than in the foreign country,
the prices of nontradables increase faster at home than abroad, thus inducing real
appreciation of the home currency (after accounting for the different weights of
nontradables in consumption). Moreover, since wages rise proportionally to pro-
ductivity in the tradables sector, this kind of real appreciation does not harm
international competitiveness.
Some authors differentiate between internal and external transmission mechanism
when analyzing the Balassa-Samuelson effect (see e.g. E´gert et al. 2003). The
internal transmission mechanism refers to the relationship between productivity
growth in the tradables sector and overall inflation.13 The external transmission
mechanism is then the connection between productivity developments in two coun-
tries and the real exchange rate.
Any empirical analysis of the Balassa-Samuelson effect requires answers to the
following questions:
1. What goods and services belong to the tradables sector and what goods are
nontradable?
2. Has growth of productivity in the sector of tradables been higher than in
the sector of nontradables?
3. Has productivity development led to increasing relative prices of nontrad-
ables to tradables? This relationship can be derived from the first order
13E´gert et al. (2003) use the term “overall inflation”. However, it should be stressed that
in the case of fixed money supply price level even falls with increasing average productivity.
Therefore, productivity growth does not necessarily result in overall inflation.
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conditions of the profit maximization problem:
PT
PN
=
∂YN/∂LN
∂YT/∂LT
=
c · YN/LN
b · YT/LT =
1
bYT /LT
cYN/LN
(3.13)
Therefore, the price of tradables relative to nontradables should decrease
if average labor productivity in tradables rises faster than in nontradables,
whereas the absolute value of the coefficient is expected to be smaller than
one, as c > b by assumption.
4. Has productivity growth in tradables relative to nontradables been faster in
the home country than abroad?
5. Has productivity development in the home country and abroad induced an
increase of relative prices of tradables to nontradables that is faster in the
home country than abroad? This relationship can be represented by the
following equation:
PT
PN
P ∗T
P ∗N
=
c
b
· YN/LN
YT /LT
c∗
b∗ ·
Y ∗N/L
∗
N
Y ∗T /L
∗
T
(3.14)
The fact that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is at work in the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe has been empirically supported by and large. The only
point of contention is the magnitude of the effect. In many empirical analyses
strong evidence is presented that more than half the real exchange rate move-
ments can be interpreted as driven by the productivity growth in the external
sector of the CEEC (Golinelli and Orsi 2002, Jazbec 2002). However, a second
strand of literature claims that the productivity development in CEEC explains
less than half the real appreciation (Backe et al. 2003, E´gert et al. 2003, Mi-
haljek and Klau 2003). The assumptions underlying the effect of Balassa and
Samuelson are separately analyzed e.g. in Breuss (2003), E´gert et al. (2002) and
Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2002). The main reason why the latter studies find
only a weak Balassa-Samuelson effect in the CEEC is the violation of PPP in the
external sector. Furthermore, low flexibility of the labor market and the relatively
low weight of nontradables in overall consumption expenditures compared to in-
dustrialized countries can also be considered as factors that limit the impact of
the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Thus far, a main drawback of the empirical analy-
ses of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is the insufficient examination of the relative
productivity between tradables and nontradables. A differentiation of the sectors
of tradables and nontradables is missing and the relative productivity is mostly
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proxied by productivity in manufacturing or by overall labor productivity.
Relative factor endowment
The general equilibrium framework is also applied by Bhagwati (1984) to explain
the differences in relative prices among countries. In addition to the Balassa-
Samuelson approach, Bhagwati’s explanation relies on the different relative factor
endowments: poor countries tend to be endowed with more labor relative to cap-
ital compared to rich countries and thus have lower wage-rental ratios. This is
the reason why nontradables are relatively cheaper in poor countries, since these
goods are more labor-intensive compared to the tradables. Increasing capital stock
leads therefore to real appreciation via higher prices of nontradables relative to
tradables. The operationalization of this approach has often been carried out
by including GDP per capita as a proxy since no reliable data about the capital
stock is available. However, this variable does not discriminate between the fac-
tor endowment effect and other explanations like the Balassa-Samuelson effect or
demand shifts if the latter are not explicitly accounted for.
Besides the Balassa-Samuelson effect and the effect described by Bhagwati (1984),
there is a range of explanations for real appreciation in CEEC with focus on the
demand side of the economies.
3.2.1.2 Demand-side explanations
Shift in relative consumption
Bergstrand (1991) proposed to explain the real exchange rate development by
shifts in the structure of the consumption expenditure. His considerations rely
on the Linder-Hypothesis that with higher income “products filling new needs are
added” (Linder 1961).14 Assuming non-homothetic preferences of the represen-
tative household, Bergstrand assumes that the nontradables (tradables) demand
exhibits an income elasticity larger (smaller) than one. Therefore, increasing in-
come leads to a change in the composition of private consumption with demand
14The shift in economic structures toward the tertiary sector was already a topic of discussion
in the 1930s. See Clark (1940).
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for nontradable goods showing a disproportionately high growth. The shift of
private consumption toward nontradables raises their relative price and causes an
appreciation of the real exchange rate. In the literature thus far, only Coricelli
and Jazbec (2004) allow explicitly for an adjustment of the consumption structure
in their analysis of the real exchange rate in the CEEC. However, they do not
distinguish between luxury and basic goods but rather use private consumption of
services as proxy for luxury goods.
Public expenditures
The structure of total demand can be further influenced by public expenditures.
On the one hand, fiscal policy can bring about a change in the relative price
of nontradables via its income and substitution effects. On the other hand, the
structure of government expenditures should also be accounted for. Given the
labor-intensive nature of public goods, it can be assumed that higher labor de-
mand will raise prices of nontradables, which tend to be labor-intensive as well.
Furthermore, debt-financed fiscal expansion leads to capital imports over increas-
ing real interest rates and therefore to real appreciation.
By and large, the empirical evidence confirms the hypothesis that expansionary
fiscal policy leads to real appreciation (De Gregorio and Wolf 1994, De Gregorio,
Giovannini and Wolf 1994, Edwards 1989). With regard to the countries of Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe, E´gert, Halpern and MacDonald (2005) list ten empirical
works showing that increasing government expenditure leads to real appreciation
and two in which the opposite effect was the case.
Investment demand
Most of the evidence on the appearance of a productivity-driven real apprecia-
tion relies on the transmission channel of the Balassa-Samuelson effect. However,
Fischer (2002) argues that technological advances can influence the real exchange
rate via a second channel as well, namely through increasing investment demand.
The model assumes that part of the investment expenditures fall on nontradable
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goods, such as infrastructure or the installation of new capital goods. In accor-
dance with the proposition of Schro¨der and Pfadt (1998), Fischer demonstrates
that the productivity gains attracting home and foreign direct investment lead to
an increasing demand for nontradables and thus contribute to the real apprecia-
tion via increasing relative prices of nontradables in terms of tradables. Increasing
investment demand is, thus, expected to lead to real appreciation via increasing
prices of nontradables if the share of nontradables in investment, like installation
cost etc., exceeds the share in the consumption demand which has been substi-
tuted by the additional investment demand.15
Further explanation for the relationship between investment and the real exchange
rate is based on the effect described by Bhagwati (1984). Increasing net invest-
ment leads to accumulation of capital stock and therefore raises the capital/labor
ratio in the particular country. In accordance with the argumentation by Bhagwati
(1984) this causes real appreciation via decreasing price of tradables relative to
nontradables since the production of tradables is more capital-intensive than the
production of nontradables. Furthermore, increasing supply of domestic tradables
leads to a depreciation of the real exchange rate of the tradables sector.
3.2.1.3 Price liberalization
The process of price liberalization affects the real exchange rate both in the
medium and the long run. In the later years of transition, most of the regu-
lated prices in the CEEC relate to nontradables like communication services and
basic goods like electricity and water supply and can affect the real exchange rate
via the channel of both the relative prices and the RER of tradables. The liberal-
ization of prices directly affects the overall price level in the short to medium run
through an adjustment of prices to the level of marginal costs under the assump-
tion of perfect competition. Given that the price regulation concerned mainly
nontradable basic goods, deregulation should lead ceteris paribus to decreasing
relative price of tradables in terms of nontradables. Furthermore, the negative
income effect associated with increasing prices of basic goods combined with the
inelastic demand for these goods is expected to negatively affect the demand for
15However, the lack of detailed data on services in the area of investment makes it impossible
to test this proposition.
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imported or luxury goods. The consequence of this secondary effect will be declin-
ing prices of domestically produced tradables in terms of nontradables if non-basic
goods are mainly tradables. To sum up, the short to medium term effect of price
liberalization on the real exchange rate is expected to lead to real appreciation of
the sheltered sector. The exposure to price competition is expected to cause real
depreciation in the long run.
3.2.2 Explanations for the movement of the real exchange
rate in the external sector
Most of the conventional explanations for real exchange rate appreciation in rapidly
growing economies assume that PPP holds in the tradables sector and attribute
the real appreciation to increasing relative price of nontradables. In CEEC real
exchange rates in the tradables sector have appreciated as well.16. The present
subsection summarizes some potential explanations for the development of RER
in the tradables sector. All determinants of the RER of the external sector are
supply side factors.
Quality improvement in the bundle of tradables
Although the small open economies from Central and Eastern Europe cannot affect
the prices of tradable goods on the world market, it is possible for them to experi-
ence a change in the composition of the share of the consumption basket containing
tradable goods and/or in the quality of these goods. A change in the reputation
of home-produced goods on the world market, sound marketing measures and the
shift of production toward goods with higher technological content or of better
quality could explain the relative increase in prices of tradable goods compared to
the world market level (see E´gert and Lommatzsch 2004, Oomes 2005). An empir-
ical investigation of this explanation is provided by E´gert and Lommatzsch (2004)
who assume that increased production quality is directly linked to productivity
improvement in the tradables sector during the process of transition. However,
using productivity as a proxy for the effect of quality improvement and better
reputation of the home-produced tradable goods on the world market does not
allow for distinguishing this effect from the conventional impact of productivity
16See Figures 3.3-3.4, pp. 94f.
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via the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Alternatively, the effect can be approximated by
the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows since the beginning of the
transition process, since it has been driven by and large by the import of know-how
or broadly by the activity of foreign investors. An increase in foreign direct invest-
ment is expected to lead to a quality improvement or a shift of production toward
goods with higher technological content, which, in turn, increases the prices of
tradable goods produced in the home country and leads to appreciation of the real
exchange rate of the external sector.17 However, an increase in FDI inflows also
augments supply in the tradables sector and can thereby lead to a depreciation of
the real exchange rate in the external sector.
Further explanations for the development of the real exchange rate in the exter-
nal sector can be found in some transition specific changes in the CEEC. Fischer
(2002) proposes to explore the effect of trade and price liberalization as well as
that of the privatization process on the real exchange rate. Whereas price lib-
eralization concerns mainly nontradable goods and services, trade liberalization
and privatization are possible explanations for real appreciation in the tradables
sector.
Trade liberalization
In a small open economy model the liberalization of international trade, also asso-
ciated with an increasing degree of openness, can lead to depreciation of the real
exchange rate of the external sector in the long run because it intensifies the price
competition on the national market of tradables. However, at the beginning of
transition it is also possible to observe an adjustment of the home market to world
market conditions improving marketing and the quality of exports.18 Opening for
international trade can then lead to real appreciation due to the increasing prices
of the tradable goods in which these countries have comparative advantage.
17Depending on the industry in which the FDI is allocated, the same argumentation can also
be applied to the real exchange rate of the sheltered sector.
18This effect should occur independently of the activity of foreign investors.
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Privatization
Depending on the industry to which the privatized enterprises belong, the pri-
vate sector share in gross domestic product (GDP) can influence both the RER
of the external sector and the relative price of tradables in terms of nontradables.
Privatization and the increasing private sector share in GDP increase the invest-
ment opportunities for home residents as well as for foreign investors. Improving
technology in production can lead to higher quality and prices of tradable and
nontradable goods produced in the home country. Therefore, real exchange rate
appreciation would be the result. However, this effect should be captured to a
large extent by the amount of FDI relative to GDP. Furthermore, increasing pri-
vate sector share in GDP leads to a lower share of subsidized prices. However, the
direct effect of price liberalization can be captured by the share of administered
prices in CPI, as described below.
Moreover, it is also possible to observe a long run depreciation of the RER when
the private sector share in GDP increases since it is also associated with intensifi-
cation of competition.
In his empirical analysis, Fischer measures the impact of the institutional arrange-
ments respectively by the tariff revenues as a percentage of imports, the share of
administered prices in CPI and the private sector share in GDP. The results show
that only the privatization variable has a strongly significant coefficient implying
appreciation of the RER as a result of progress in privatization between 1993 and
1999. In the present analysis, the influence of the transition specific changes will
be further investigated using a longer time span and controlling for their impact
on both components of the RER. The tariff revenues as a measure of the progress
in trade liberalization will be replaced by the degree of openness, since it was not
exactly the tariff policy that had blocked the international trade in the centrally
planned economies.
The real appreciation of the external sector can be considered one of the specific
characteristics of the transition process. It is mainly driven by the structural
changes on the way to a market economy and the adaptation to world market
conditions. It should diminish as the transition process goes forth.
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Figure 3.2 summarizes the factors for the dynamics of the real exchange rate in
the CEEC. In empirical investigations involving the tradables/nontradables di-
chotomy, it has been a difficult task to find a price index capturing solely the
prices of tradables. Whatever price index used, it always has some nontradable
components, including nontradable services like distribution, marketing, before
and after sales services, etc. (see among others Kravis and Lipsey 1978). Thus, it
cannot be ruled out that driving forces of the relative price of tradables to non-
tradables affect the real exchange rate of the external sector as well (see e.g. E´gert
et al 2005). This is represented by the dashed lines in Figure 2.
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3.3 Analysis of disaggregated consumer prices
The discussion in the preceding section points out that there is a range of possible
explanations for the real exchange rate appreciation in transition economies. A
closer look at disaggregated consumer price data should provide a first impression
about the explanatory power of some of the effects described above. Whereas
productivity data is necessary in order to evaluate whether, and to what extent,
real appreciation is driven by Balassa-Samuelson effects, the analysis of consumer
prices can provide answers to several questions:
1. Has the real exchange rate in services been appreciating faster than the
overall real exchange rate?
2. To what extent has real appreciation been driven by transition specific factors
like price and trade liberalization, e.g. in the energy sector?
3. Have consumption expenditures shifted away from basic goods like food and
toward more luxury goods and services, as proposed by Bergstrand (1991)?19
4. How important is the emergence and further development of markets for
new goods and services, e.g. in the field of telecommunication and high
technology?
The present section uses Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) provided
by Eurostat. The index contains twelve categories and comprises the prices of
all goods classes with share in total consumption expenditure larger than 1
1000
.
Data is available beginnning in 1996 for most of the CEEC under consideration.
However, in some cases analysis is constrained by the fact that for some categories
and subcategories time series begin later. For each category, the real exchange
rate is calculated against the Euro area average based on the HICP for the goods
and services contained in the category. The so obtained real exchange rates are
represented as indices with 2005 as base. The terms real appreciation and relative
price increase compared to the Euro area average are used synonymously.
Some common trends can be identified for most of the countries. Therefore, they
are not discussed separately for each country but rather are mentioned for the
first country and summarized at the end of the present section. Especially specific
19This question will be analyzed in detail in the next section. The present section is therefore
merely suggestive with respect to this question.
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development trends for the concrete country are listed and further analyzed where
reliable information is available.
3.3.1 Bulgaria
HICP data for Bulgaria is available for the most categories since 1997 (Table 3.1).
From 1997 to 2013, the overall real exchange rate appreciated by 45.9 percent.
The real appreciation based on services prices amounted to 68.8 percent and was
higher than that of the overall real exchange rate.
The largest price increase, at 99.8 percent, relative to the Euro area was observed
in the field of education. Especially tertiary education experienced a rapid price
increase since the Higher Education Act of 1995 built a legal fundament for private
universities. In 2013, there are 20 private colleges and universities, and the fees
are about three times higher than in public universities (which have experienced
a rapid price increase since 1995 as well). The share of education in overall HICP
has doubled between 1997 and 2013, although it is still lower than one percent.
A further category with high growth of relative prices compared to the Euro area
is alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics. Real appreciation based on prices
of these goods amounted to 80.3 percent and was mainly driven by hikes in excise
duties. For instance, since 1997 specific excise taxes on tobacco have increased
from 9 to 101 BGN per 1000 units (Skafida et al. 2012). As a result, the share
of the products contained in this category in overall HICP increased from 3.9 per-
cent in 1997 to 7.1 percent in 2013, although according to Eurobarometer data
the number of tobacco consumers has decreased between 2004 and 2012.
The real appreciation in the communication industry amounted to 56.8 percent and
was brought about by a sharp boost of prices for telephone and telefax services.
In the same time the share of consumption expenditure for telecommunication
services measured by the weight of these services in the overall HICP increased
tenfold - from 0.6 percent in 1997 to 6.2 in 2013. This development is due to the
introduction and expansion of internet services as well as mobile telephone ser-
vices. The largest mobile phone operator, M-Tel, was founded in 1994. In 2013,
its subscribers amount to more than 4 Mio., or more than half of the population
of Bulgaria. As regards to internet provision, almost half of the households still do
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Table 3.1: Development of HICP and weights in Bulgaria, 1997 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1997 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -35.2 48.7 22.2
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -80.3 3.9 7.1
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -25.8 8.8 3.3
footwear
Housing, water, -62.3 12.0 9.5
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -2.4 5.2 6.4
equipment and maintenance
Health -67.9 2.2 6.7
Transport -47.6 9.3 19.7
Communication -56.8 0.6 6.2
Recreation and -52.1 2.3 5.8
culture
Education -99.8 0.5 1.0
Restaurants and -62.4 3.2 7.0
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -56.2 3.5 5.1
and services
Overall HICP -45.9 100 100
Services -68.8 9.4 32.4
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
not have an internet connection (Special Eurobarometer 396). In Germany, less
than one third of the households do not have access to internet, and in Sweden and
the Netherlands even less than 10 percent. Consequently, the demand for commu-
nication services is expected to further increase in the future, therefore creating
addiitonal upward pressure for the prices in this area. Considering conventional
explanations for real exchange rate appreciation, this development comes next to
the approach proposed by Bergstrand (1991). With higher income, new products,
besides basic products like food and apparel, are introduced.
Another area of consumption goods with price increases above average relative to
the countries of the EMU is the category comprising housing, water, electricity, gas
and other fuels. The real appreciation based on the prices of these goods amounts
to 62.3 percent since 1997. The price of electricity has increased rapidly relative to
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the Euro area. According to data by Eurostat, Bulgaria still has the lowest nom-
inal price for electricity among the EU member states at 0,096 EUR/kWh. The
weight of housing and the other goods in this category in the consumption basket
of Bulgarian households has decreased from 12.0 percent in 1997 to 9.5 percent in
2013. Negative supply shocks in recent years were caused by the deactivation of
four out of six units of the nuclear power plant of Bulgaria as well as by the reorien-
tation toward higher share of renewable energy sources in total energy production.
The share of food and non-alcoholic beverages dropped from 48.7 percent in 1997
to 22.3 percent in 2013, although the real exchange rate in this sector appreciated
by a rate lower than that of the overall real exchange rate. Similar development
can be observed also in the area of clothing and footwear, where the share in the
overall HICP shrank from 8.8 percent in 1997 to 3.3 percent in 2013 while the
relative prices experienced an increase of only 25.8 percent compared to the Euro
area average. The development of price and share of these two areas in overall
HICP is also supportive for the explanation proposed by Bergstrand (1991) since
they indicate that basic goods have lost share in total consumption expenditure.
One sector that has made significant gains in importance since 1997 is transport,
comprising among others the purchase of transport vehicles. The share of trans-
port in consumption demand has increased from 9.3 percent in 1997 to 19.7 percent
in 2013, and the price development is comparable to the overall HICP. However,
the single prices contained in this group of goods and services have experienced
very different trends. Whereas the price of transport services has increased by over
65 percent relative to the Euro area average, the relative price for the purchase
of vehicles has decreased by 37.9 percent. The share of fuels and lubricants rose
from 3.6 to 8.7 percent in overall HICP and the prices jumped by 35.6 percent. It
has often been claimed that fuel cartels drive fuel prices up in Bulgaria. However,
Bulgaria’s Competition Protection Commission found no evidence on this matter.
Prices for cars decreased by almost 20 percent since the current economic crisis
reached Bulgaria at the end of 2007, while prices remained stable in the Euro area
on average. Further price decreases are expected in the future when the supply of
Chinese automobiles gains in importance. In 2012, Chinese automotive companies
began to assemble road vehicles in Bulgaria, and further expansion is expected by
the end of 2013 (GTAI 2013). Although Bulgaria is not that important as a mar-
ket, increasing supply of low-cost cars is expected to impose downward pressure
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on domestic prices.
The weights of two areas with mostly luxury goods and services, recreation and
culture as well as restaurants and hotels, in overall HICP have more than doubled
- from 2.3 to 5.8 percent and from 3.2 to 7.0 percent, respectively. The relative
prices in these categories have increased by 52.1 and 62.4 percent, respectively
and therefore faster than the overall real exchange rate appreciation. This devel-
opment is consistent with the conventional explanations for real appreciation in
rapidly growing economies although not all goods and services contained in these
categories are nontradables.
3.3.2 Czech Republic
For the Czech Republic, data for the main categories is available dating back to
1996. Detailed analysis of the price development is only possible for the time pe-
riod 2000-2013 since detailed data prior to 2000 is missing. In most categories, the
development is similar to that in Bulgaria (Table 3.2). However, there are some
notable exceptions. The overall real exchange rate appreciated by 38.2 percent
since 1996 and by 29.3 percent since 2000. Real exchange rate appreciation was
with 37.1 percent since 2000 higher in the sector of services.
In the Czech Republic, the shift in the consumption basket from basic goods to
more services and luxury goods started earlier than in Bulgaria. In 1996, the
share of food and nonalcoholic beverages was as low as 27.6 percent (compared
to 48.7 in Bulgaria in 1997) and that of clothing and footwear amounted to 8.1
percent. In 2013 food and nonalcoholic beverages make up only 17.7 percent of
the consumption basket (in Bulgaria still 22.2 percent). The share of clothing and
footwear shrank in the same time span to 3.7 percent. The real exchange rate
based on the price development of food and nonalcoholic beverages appreciated
with a pace well below the overall real exchange rate. The real exchange rate
based on the price index for clothing and footwear even depreciated against the
Euro area average. Therefore, a negative shock in relative demand can explain the
price movements in these two areas, as e.g. proposed by Bergstrand (1991).
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Table 3.2: Development of HICP and weights in the Czech Republic, 1996 -
2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -26.8 27.6 17.7
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -32.4 5.4 10.4
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and 11.8 8.1 3.7
footwear
Housing, water, -71.4 12.1 17.4
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -8.0 8.1 6.5
equipment and maintenance
Health -65.1 1.0 2.9
Transport -19.7 10.8 11.2
Communication -69.0 1.9 3.5
Recreation and -38.4 12.1 9.6
culture
Education -50.6 0.2 0.8
Restaurants and -37.1 6.9 8.8
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -40.7 5.7 7.2
and services
Overall HICP -38.2 / -29.31 100 100
Services -37.11 27.22 33.1
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 2000, 2: in 2000
Unlike in Bulgaria, the RER appreciation based on prices of alcoholic beverages,
tobacco and narcotics is below average in the Czech Republic. Excise duties in
1996 were already high, so the increase was not as pronounced as was the case in
Bulgaria.20
In the area of housing and telecommunications, the weights increased from 12.1
and 1.9 percent in 1996 to 17.4 and 3.5 percent, respectively. In these sectors the
most pronounced real appreciation was observed, about 70 percent since 1996 in
each case. More detailed data shows that the price increase in housing is mainly
driven by the prices of housing rentals and gas. Rental increases were caused by
deregulation, which came into force in 2007. Until the beginning of 2007 about one
fifth of the population lived in houses with regulated rents. Rentals for housing
20See e.g. Shirane et al. 2012.
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are weighted 4.6 percent in overall HICP and increased by 58 percent relative to
the Euro area average since 2000. A shift from heat energy to gas resulted in
an increasing weight for gas from 1.8 to 3.2 percent in consumption demand and
decreasing weight for heat energy from 4.1 to 2.1 percent. Gas prices subsequently
increased by 60 percent as compared to Euro area.
3.3.3 Estonia
Data for most categories of the Estonian HICP is available beginning in 1996. The
real exchange rate based on the overall HICP appreciated by 35.1 percent during
the time span from 1996-2013 (Table 3.3). Real appreciation in services was above
average. In the main categories with the largest shares in HICP, the apprecia-
tion is most pronounced in housing, transport and restaurants and hotels, and
less than average in furnishing and household equipment, food and non-alcoholic
beverages, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics and recreation and culture.
Some evidence in favor of relative price increase of nontradables to tradables, as
e.g. in the Balassa-Samuelson effects, can be observed in the data. On the one
hand, services like those contained in the categories recreation and culture and
transport experienced above average increases in prices relative to the Euro area
average. On the other hand, the price development for typically tradable goods has
been quite different: while goods contained in the category clothing and footwear
have experienced above average relative price increase, the opposite holds true for
furnishing and household equipment. The prices for vehicles purchased decreased
as compared to the Euro area. The index capturing price development of services
in Estonia is available back to 1998. The service based real appreciation amounted
to 36.2 percent from 1998-2013, whereas the overall real exchange rate appreciated
by 27.6 percent during the same time period.
Again, a relatively large real appreciation has been observed in the category com-
munication, at 51.5 percent. Both services and equipment experienced sharp price
increases due to intensified use of high technologies like internet and mobile tele-
phone communication. The share of communication in overall HICP has doubled
since 1996 and amounts to 4.2 percent in 2013. Other categories with increasing
share in total consumption expenditure are transport, health and recreation and
culture. The share of transport increased from 6.5 percent in 1996 to 13.8 percent
in 2013. Consumption expenditure in 2013 is more than double what it was in
1996 in most subcategories in transport, including purchase of vehicles, fuels and
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Table 3.3: Development of HICP and weights in Estonia, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -28.1 36.5 21.2
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -24.5 6.3 9.0
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -43.3 7.6 6.5
footwear
Housing, water, -56.5 21.6 14.7
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -9.4 6.1 4.6
equipment and maintenance
Health -43.9 1.3 3.4
Transport -35.2 6.5 13.8
Communication -51.5 2.1 4.2
Recreation and -30.8 5.3 7.8
culture
Education -53.4 0.1 1.4
Restaurants and -46.2 3.1 8.7
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -37.4 3.4 4.6
and services
Overall HICP -35.1 / -27.61 100 100
Services -36.21 12.72 29.2
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 1998, 2: in 1998
lubricants and transport services. Whereas prices of vehicles decreased compared
to the Euro area, a sharp increase in prices was observed in transport services and
fuels and lubricants for personal transport equipment.
The share of goods and services contained in recreation and culture increased from
5.3 percent in 1996 to 7.8 percent in 2013, and the real appreciation in this sector
was at 30.8 percent, thus below average. The highest price increases were recorded
in recreational and cultural services and newspapers, books and stationery. The
share of recreational and cultural services in overall HICP increased from 0.7 to
2.1 percent, therefore indicating that price increase could be the result of a pos-
itive shift in demand. The share of newspapers, books and stationery decreased
slightly, probably due to the common trend in this sector to switch from printed
media to electronic media.
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In the health sector, the share of goods and services in total HICP increased from
1.3 percent in 1996 to 3.4 percent in 2013. In 1996 the category of health consisted
of medical products, appliances and equipment. In 2013 the share of these goods
was 2.3 percent of overall HICP and additional goods like outpatient services (0.9
percent) and hospital services (0.3 percent) were included. The real appreciation
in this sector was 43.9 percent. Disaggregated data on the price development is
available since 2001. The largest price increase was observed in medical and phar-
maceutical services at 81.4 percent relative to the Euro area. On the contrary, the
price increase in medical products, appliances and equipment was below average
at 19.7 percent.
The price increase in housing relative to the Euro area was 56.5 percent and
therefore well above the overall real appreciation. Electricity prices experienced
an especially sharp 81.9 percent hike (in relative terms). The energy sector was
characterized by a monopolistic structure until recently. Market opening in 2013
will allow for other suppliers, especially from the other Baltic countries and Fin-
land, to serve the local market and therefore increase efficiency. In 2006, the
parliament adopted new legislation on renewable energy and in 2010 renewable
energy already accounted for 11 percent of Estonian internal energy production
(Schneider 2013). By 2020, energy from renewable sources should account for 25
percent of consumption. Therefore, further price increases in this area are possible
despite increasing competition.
The price increase in the housing category was accompanied by a strong decrease
in the share of housing expenditures in total consumption, from 21.6 percent in
1996 to 14.7 percent in 2013. Disaggregated data for the shares of subcategories
in housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels is available since 1998. The only
component in this category with an increasing share is rentals for housing. The
share increased from 0.9 percent in 1998 to 1.8 percent in 2004 and fell again as a
result of sharply increasing rentals during 2006-2008. In 2013, rentals for housing
accounted for 1.2 percent of the overall consumption basket. The share of the other
components in the housing category has decreased since 1998. A sharp decrease
in the share of heat energy and other services relating to the dwelling (n.e.c.) was
observed between 2000 and 2001. Primary energy consumption per unit of GDP
fell over the period 1995-2009 by as much as 4.4 percent p.a. (ABB 2011), with
the highest rates being recorded in the period 1995-2000. However, energy prices
experienced rapid increases in that period as well and did not allow for decrease
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in consumption expenditure in this area. As the price increase slowed down and
energy efficiency continued improving, the share of energy in overall consumption
dropped. Prices of electricity decreased compared to the Euro area between 2002
and 2005.
The share of other basic consumption goods like food and non-alcoholic beverages
and clothing and footwear decreased as well. Whereas food and non-alcoholic
beverages accounted for 34.2 percent in 1996, the share of these basic goods in
total consumption was 19.8 percent in 2013. The real appreciation based on the
price index in this sector amounted to 28.1 percent and was slightly below average.
The price development in this category can be interpreted in the sense of relative
shift toward non-basic goods driven by a positive income effect as proposed by
Bergstrand (1991). In clothing and footwear, prices have increased by 43.3 per-
cent since 1996 as compared to Euro area, and the share in total consumption
decreased from 7.6 percent in 1996 to 6.5 percent in 2013. Therefore, relative de-
mand shifted in favor of goods other than clothing and footwear confirming again
the presence of the effect described in Bergstrand (1991).
3.3.4 Latvia
The overall real exchange rate in Latvia appreciated by 34.9 percent during the
time period 1996-2013 (Table 3.4). As in the case of Estonia, the real apprecia-
tion based on the price index for services was at 41.3 percent, thus higher than
the overall real appreciation. The highest price increase relative to the Euro area
was observed in the telecommunication category, 56.0 percent, and the share of
the goods and services contained in this category increased from 1.2 percent in
1996 to 3.8 percent in 2013, the explanation for which is the same as the countries.
As in Estonia, the structure of consumption expenditure experienced a similar
overall development with three main differences: Firstly, the decline of the share
of food and non-alcoholic beverages was more pronounced in Latvia - from 42.0
percent in 1996 to 23.5 percent in 2013. Meanwhile, prices increased by 40.5 per-
cent and therefore more rapidly than in Estonia. Secondly, the share of housing in
overall consumption expenditure remained relatively stable at about 16.0 percent,
whereas the price increase was again above average at 54.2 percent. Lastly, the
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Table 3.4: Development of HICP and weights in Latvia, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -37.7 42.0 23.5
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -46.8 5.8 7.5
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -13.6 8.8 5.5
footwear
Housing, water, -54.2 16.0 15.8
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -11.4 3.2 4.1
equipment and maintenance
Health -40.9 3.3 5.2
Transport -35.4 7.1 14.9
Communication -56.0 1.2 3.8
Recreation and -23.4 5.5 7.1
culture
Education -52.4 0.8 1.4
Restaurants and -34.9 3.5 6.5
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -27.8 2.8 4.7
and services
Overall HICP -34.9 100 100
Services -41.3 15.9 29.3
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
share of furnishing, household equipment and routine maintenance increased from
3.2 to 4.1 percent in the period under consideration.
Additional differences can be observed regarding the price development. Price
increase was more pronounced e.g. in alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics
and amounted to 46.8 percent relative to the Euro area. The share of these goods
increased as well - from 5.8 to 7.5 percent. Furthermore, in contrast to Estonia, the
price increase in the category clothing and footwear was below average in Latvia
- the real exchange rate based on the index in this sector appreciated by only 13.6
percent.
The overall development of the components of HICP points toward more rapid
price increase in the price of nontradables, which can be caused both by the
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Balassa-Samuelson effect and the shift in consumption expenditure toward non-
basic goods. The share of basic goods like food and non-alcoholic beverages as well
as clothing and footwear declined and the share of non-basic goods and services
contained in the categories telecommunication and recreational and cultural ser-
vices increased in accordance with the explanation proposed by Bergstrand (1991).
For the further investigation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect, the examination of
productivity development is needed as pointed out earlier.
3.3.5 Lithuania
In Lithuania the overall real appreciation amounted to 46.0 percent in the time
period 1996-2013 (Table 3.5). The shift in consumption expenditure has been
more pronounced than in the case of either Estonia or Latvia. The share of food
and nonalcoholic beverages shrank from 51.5 percent in 1996 to 25.3 percent in
2013 as did the share of clothing and footwear - from 10.2 to 6 percent. Con-
sumption expenditure has shifted toward goods and services like those contained
in the categories telecommunication, health, recreation and culture, education and
restaurants and hotels. The shares of these categories increased substantially since
1996. Taken together, the goods and services listed above accounted for 8.1 per-
cent of the representative consumption basket in 1996. Their share reached 23.2
percent in 2013. Therefore, as in the other transition economies, the approach
proposed by Bergstrand (1991) can be used to explain part of the real apprecia-
tion in Lithuania.
The largest price increase relative to the Euro area at 82.7 percent has been, once
again, recorded in the telecommunications sector, 82.7 percent. However, prices in
housing increased sharply as well, by 71.0 percent since 1996. The price increase
was, on the contrary, below average in furnishing and household equipment as
well as in recreation and culture. In clothing and footwear, prices decreased as
compared to the Euro area. In the category transport prices of fuels and transport
services increased at an above average rate, while prices for purchases of vehicles
declined relative to the Euro area. The real exchange rate based on the overall
index for services appreciated by 56.4 percent, and therefore well above average.
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Table 3.5: Development of HICP and weights in Lithuania, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -43.2 51.5 25.3
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -42.7 6.2 8.9
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and 7.2 10.2 6.0
footwear
Housing, water, -71.0 15.4 13.2
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -16.3 2.5 5.3
equipment and maintenance
Health -50.6 1.4 6.1
Transport -52.5 4.2 13.4
Communication -82.7 0.8 3.4
Recreation and -32.9 2.8 5.2
culture
Education -52.2 0.3 1.7
Restaurants and -44.1 2.9 6.8
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -37.2 1.7 4.6
and services
Overall HICP -46.0 100 100
Services -56.4 10.5 25.1
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
3.3.6 Hungary
The overall real appreciation in Hungary amounts to 33.7 percent since 1996 (Table
3.6). The HICP index for services is available since 2001, and the real exchange
rate based on this index appreciated by 16.8 percent, which was slightly faster
than the overall real exchange rate (14.4 percent since 2001). As in the case of the
Czech Republic, and contrary to the other countries considered above, the share of
services in the overall HICP increased only marginally - from 29.8 percent in 2001
to 33.1 percent in 2013. The shift of relative consumption expenditure since 1996
can be observed by means of the weights in the individual categories. The share of
food and non-alcoholic beverages was already relatively low in 1996 and fell only
by 5.5 percentage points - from 25.6 percent in 1996 to 20.1 percent in 2013. The
decline was stronger in clothing and footwear - from 8.1 to 3.4 percent, and the
price increase was relatively low. The real appreciation measured by the prices in
this category amounts to 17.4 percent since 1996. As in the Czech Republic the
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Table 3.6: Development of HICP and weights in Hungary, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -35.9 25.6 20.1
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -37.4 6.9 7.8
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -17.4 8.1 3.4
footwear
Housing, water, -47.7 13.5 14.3
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household 7.3 7.1 5.2
equipment and maintenance
Health -61.3 1.5 5.1
Transport -24.5 13.3 15.6
Communication -56.2 1.9 4.5
Recreation and -27.5 9.1 7.5
culture
Education -32.8 0.3 1.6
Restaurants and -39.7 8.3 7.9
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -24.6 4.4 6.9
and services
Overall HICP -33.7 / -14.41 100 100
Services -16.81 29.82 33.1
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 2001, 2: in 2001
effect described by Bergstrand (1991) seems to have been weaker in Hungary, since
transition started earlier than in other CEEC. The share of services in categories
like recreation and culture and restaurants and hotels decreased since 1996. The
relative price increase in the category restaurants and hotels was 39.7 percent and
therefore above average. However, in recreation and culture the real appreciation
amounted to 27.5 percent and was by 6.2 percent lower than that of the overall
real exchange rate.
The highest real appreciation has been observed in the categories health, com-
munication and housing. In communication, development of prices and share in
the overall consumption basket has been similar as in the other countries. Prices
increased by 56.2 percent compared to the Euro area and the share went up from
1.9 percent in 1996 to 4.5 percent in 2013. Calculated by the price development
for health goods and services the real exchange rate appreciation since 1996 was
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almost twice as high as the overall real appreciation. The share of health increased
from 1.6 percent in 1996 to 5.1 percent in 2013. Most of the price increase took
place before 2001, and detailed analysis is not possible due to lacking data. In
1999, e.g., patients taking prescription drugs faced a rapid price increases (Kovac
1999). Domestic manufacturers raised prices by 10.0 percent as government cut
subsidies. The real appreciation since 2001 amounts to 24.0 percent and is caused
mainly by an increase in prices for pharmaceutical products. In 2013, they account
for 2.5 percent of the expenditure captured by the consumption basket, and the
price relative to the Euro area is 33.9 percent higher than in 2001.
The share of housing remained almost unchanged and amounts to 14.3 percent of
the expenditures contained in the consumption basket in 2013. The real exchange
rate measured by price development in this category appreciated by 47.7 percent
since 1996. In the period 2001-2013, for which detailed price data is available,
the real appreciation amounted to 29.5 percent and was driven, to a large extent,
by a gas price increase. Gas accounts for 4 percent of the expenditures contained
in the consumption basket and its price relative to the Euro area is 45.0 percent
higher in 2013 than in 2001. Data provided by the International Energy Agency
(IEA) shows that natural gas has the highest share of total primary energy supply
in Hungary (IEA 2011). The natural gas market was partially opened in 2004
and fully opened to competition in 2007. According to the IEA Hungary was the
member country most seriously affected by the Gasprom-Ukraine conflict about
gas pricing in 2006 (IEA 2007). It imports about 80.0 percent of its natural gas,
mostly from Russia and uses the Ukraine pipeline as the prime import route. As 60
percent of the capacity of the pipeline was lost in the beginning of 2006, Hungary
was not able to make up the supply lost from storage (IEA 2007). The new Law
on Strategic Gas Reserves aimed at increasing underground storage capacity. The
regulated gas price rose and the average gas price increased by almost 20 percent
in eight months.
To sum up, the real appreciation in Hungary was driven to a lesser extent by a
shift in relative demand. More important is the development of regulated prices
and sectors.
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3.3.7 Poland
In Poland, the overall real exchange rate appreciated by 22.0 percent since 1996
(Table 3.7). Real appreciation of services was substantially higher at 32.6 percent.
The main driving force of relative price increase compared to the Euro area was
the housing category. Consumption expenditure for housing, water, electricity and
fuels accounts for more than one fifth of the overall consumption basket - only in
Slovakia is the share higher. Not only is the share of housing in total consump-
tion very high - it is also the category with the highest price increase relative to
the Euro area. The real exchange rate measured by prices for housing, water,
electricity and fuels appreciated by 38.0 percent since 1996, which is almost twice
as fast as the overall real exchange rate. More than 10.0 percent of consumption
expenditure is allotted to energy goods including electricity, gas and other fuels.
The largest price hikes in this subcategory were experienced in electricity, at 45.9
percent and in gas, at 35.5 percent, relative to the Euro area. Demand for elec-
tricity grew since the mid-1990s (IEA 2011a). Yet, per-capita electricity demand
is still about 60.0 percent of the OECD Europe average. In the tertiary sector of
the economy, demand has especially increased above average. Electricity imports
nearly tripled between 2000 and 2009, although Poland remains a net electricity
exporter. Gas demand increased steadily since 2000 by rates similar to those of
electricity demand. Gas tariffs are still regulated and tariffs are supposed to cover
all the costs of gas supply (IEA 2011a). In spite of the price increase since 1996,
natural gas prices for households in Poland remain low compared to other Eu-
ropean countries. According to the IEA, Poland could have substantial amounts
of unconventional gas, i.e. shale gas. However, a range of challenges regarding
exploitation will postpone production to the 2020s at the earliest (IEA 2011a). If
shale gas resources are confirmed, prices will experience rapid decline and there-
fore will weaken real appreciation in the future. To sum up, price increases in
electricity and gas have been the result of positive demand shocks accompanying
economic growth.
Another area with an above-average relative price increase is again communication.
Real appreciation measured by the price index for this category amounted to 35.3
percent and the share in the representative consumption basket increased from 1.5
percent in 1996 to 3.2 percent in 2013. The price increase has been below average
in the categories food and non-alcoholic beverages, alcoholic beverages, tobacco
and narcotics and furnishing and household equipment. The real exchange rate
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Table 3.7: Development of HICP and weights in Poland, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -16.9 34.4 20.1
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -12.1 6.5 7.3
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and 56.8 7.4 4.3
footwear
Housing, water, -38.0 18.2 21.0
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -10.9 4.8 4.9
equipment and maintenance
Health -26.4 3.7 5.0
Transport -25.2 8.7 10.7
Communication -35.3 1.5 3.2
Recreation and -24.1 5.9 7.8
culture
Education -17.4 1.0 1.3
Restaurants and -23.5 2.5 3.2
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -25.9 5.4 11.2
and services
Overall HICP -22.0 100 100
Services -32.6 19.4 29.5
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
based on prices of clothing and footwear depreciated sharply by 56.8 percent. The
share of these basic goods and services has decreased substantially since 1996 in
accordance with the explanation proposed by Bergstrand (1991). The share of
recreation and culture and restaurants and hotels has increased between 1996 and
2013 and the price increase relative to the Euro area in these categories was slightly
above average. Besides the approach by Bergstrand (1991), the relative increase
in the prices of services can be the result of Balassa-Samuelson effects.
3.3.8 Romania
The real exchange rate appreciated in Romania by 52.2 percent between 1996 and
2013 (Table 3.8). Detailed data necessary to calculate the price index for services
is available since 2001. However, most of the real appreciation took place before
2001. The overall real exchange rate appreciated only by 15.5 percent since 2001
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Table 3.8: Development of HICP and weights in Romania, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -28.1 45.6 32.0
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -69.2 4.6 6.4
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -33.6 13.7 5.0
footwear
Housing, water, -88.4 8.0 11.6
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -13.6 7.3 5.1
equipment and maintenance
Health -43.9 1.5 7.4
Transport -63.5 7.0 12.4
Communication -100.9 1.0 6.5
Recreation and -47.5 5.9 5.7
culture
Education -228.9 0.3 1.1
Restaurants and -76.3 3.2 2.8
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -47.2 1.9 4.1
and services
Overall HICP -52.2 / -15.51 100 100
Services -12.81 13.72 23.4
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 2001, 2: in 2001
and the rate of real appreciation in services was against all odds even lower, 12.8
percent. The share of services in overall consumption basket increased though,
from 13.7 percent in 2001 to 23.4 percent in 2013.
As was the case in Bulgaria, the highest real appreciation since 1996 was observed
in the category of education at 228.9 percent. The share of education increased
at the same time from 0.3 to 1.1 percent. Furthermore, as in most of the other
CEEC the category of communication has also experienced a rapid price increase
in Romania. The real exchange rate based on the prices for communication goods
and services appreciated by 100.9 percent and the share increased from 1.0 percent
in 1996 to 6.5 percent in 2013. Other categories with above-average price increases
are alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics, housing, transport and restaurants
and hotels. In alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics prices jumped rapidly
since 2001, by 49.1 percent compared to the Euro area. The price increase at 53.5
percent was most pronounced for tobacco products, the main reason being a hike
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in excise duties. The real exchange rate calculated with the price index for hous-
ing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels appreciated by 49.0 percent since 2001.
The most pronounced increase relative to the Euro area was in housing rentals
at 95.2 percent. Furthermore, gas prices jumped by 65.7 percent relative to the
Euro area average and contributed significantly to the overall price increase in this
category. In restaurants and hotels as well as in transport the price increase took
place mainly before 2001, so detailed analysis is not possible due to lacking data.
As in other CEEC, consumption expenditure shifted away from basic goods like
food, clothing and furnishing and their respective price increases were well below
average. The prices in the categories to which these goods belong also decreased
compared to the Euro area. However, consumption expenditure shifted not to-
ward services like those contained in the categories recreation and culture and
restaurants and hotels, but rather to services from the area of health and trans-
port, which can be considered as basic goods. Therefore, the descriptive analysis
suggests low explanatory power of the approach proposed by Bergstrand (1991).
3.3.9 Slovenia
The lowest overall real appreciation was recorded in Slovenia at 11.5 percent since
1996 (Table 3.9). In the service sector, the relative price increase compared to the
Euro area was more than twice the overall real appreciation since 2000. Again,
prices rose rapidly in housing and communication while basic goods like food,
clothing and furnishing experienced price increases below average and declining
shares in the total consumption basket. The price development in recreation and
culture points toward a strong Bergstrand-effect. The real appreciation calcu-
lated with the HICP in this category appreciated by 22.5 percent since 1996 and
therefore almost twice as fast as the overall real exchange rate. The share in con-
sumption increased from 6.6 percent in 1996 to 8.1 percent in 2013.
In most of the other categories, price development was as in the CEEC described
above. Two important exceptions are the categories health and transport. The
share of health expenditures increased from 0.7 percent in 1996 to 4.2 percent
in 2013, and the share of out-patient services increased substantially since 2000.
However, relative prices declined in this category as compared to the Euro area
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Table 3.9: Development of HICP and weights in Slovenia, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -10.2 27.5 17.4
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -18.5 3.1 6.0
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -8.2 9.2 6.2
footwear
Housing, water, -35.9 12.1 10.2
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -5.4 8.0 6.2
equipment and maintenance
Health 2.6 0.7 4.2
Transport -1.0 15.8 17.6
Communication -46.6 1.3 3.5
Recreation and -22.5 6.6 8.1
culture
Education -13.5 0.8 1.6
Restaurants and -13.2 7.1 9.8
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -9.3 7.8 9.0
and services
Overall HICP -11.5 / -7.31 100 100
Services -14.91 26.82 34.3
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 2000, 2: in 2000
between 2000 and 2013. Medical and pharmaceutical services experienced a rapid
price increase relative to the Euro area while the growth of prices of medical
products, appliances and equipment was slower than the average in the other
Euro area countries. In transport, compared to the Euro area almost all prices
increased since 2000. Only purchases of vehicles became relatively less expensive,
as in the other CEEC. However, a 75.3 percent relative price decline for motor cars
produced a real depreciation calculated with the overall HICP in the transport
sector by almost 10 percent since 2000.
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Table 3.10: Development of HICP and weights in Slovakia, 1996 - 2013
HICP category RER growth based Weight of category
on HICP prices in % of total
in the category consumption expenditure
in % 1996 2013
Food and non-alcoholic -41.6 23.8 18.2
beverages
Alcoholic beverages, -45.8 5.8 5.4
tobacco and narcotics
Clothing and -42.9 13.2 4.7
footwear
Housing, water, -80.5 9.3 21.4
electricity, fuels
Furnishing, household -16.3 12.5 7.0
equipment and maintenance
Health -64.3 0.8 4.8
Transport -36.7 8.3 8.7
Communication -85.1 0.6 3.9
Recreation and -51.5 7.9 9.1
culture
Education -60.1 0.4 1.9
Restaurants and -52.3 12.5 6.6
hotels
Miscellaneous goods -50.2 4.8 8.2
and services
Overall HICP -54.4 100 100
Services -63.0 20.9 30.6
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
3.3.10 Slovakia
The most pronounced overall real appreciation based on HICP has been recorded
in Slovakia. Overall, RER appreciated by 54.4 percent since 1996, the rate being
marginally higher in services at 63.0 percent (Table 3.10). Meanwhile, the share
of services increased by almost 50.0 percent, from 20.9 in 1996 to 30.6 percent
in 2013. The share of basic goods decreased while the price increase in the cor-
responding categories has been below average. However, household expenditures
shifted mainly toward housing, water, electricity and fuels and to a lesser extent
toward the categories health, communication and recreation and culture. The
share of restaurants and hotels decreased from 12.5 percent in 1996 to 6.6 percent
in 2013. Growing consumption expenditure for housing has been caused mainly
by a sharp increases in prices for the goods and services contained in the housing
category. The real exchange rate calculated with the HICP for housing appreci-
ated by 80.5 percent. Only in communication has relative price increased faster
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at 85.1 percent. Gas and electricity prices experienced an especially significant
growth since 1996, by about 90.0 percent. As a consequence, their share in overall
consumption has more than doubled, from 5.7 percent in 1996 to 13.9 percent in
2013, in spite of substantial efficiency gains in recent years. Thanks to the transfer
of gas transit revenues, gas prices for households used to be the lowest in the re-
gion in the 1990s (IEA 2006). In 2003, gas prices were around USD 120/tcm and
increased to 190/tcm in the last quarter of 2005 as a result of the indexation to
oil prices (IEA 2006). Residential prices for electricity doubled between mid-2002
and mid-2004.
In the other categories, the price development is similar to the overall trend in
CEEC. The relative price increase in services has been only slightly higher than
the overall real appreciation and the shift toward other basic goods and services
like fuels and electricity indicates that the magnitude of the Bergstrand-effect may
be limited in Slovakia.
3.3.11 Summary of common trends
Table 3.11 summarizes the main findings of the detailed analysis of HICP based
real exchange rates. The development of the single prices contained in the HICP
points toward a significant magnitude of nontradables inflation which could be
caused e.g. by the Balassa-Samuelson effect. The increase of relative prices was
higher for services than for goods in most of the transition economies. Further-
more, the descriptive analysis of the data indicates that the argumentation pro-
vided by Bergstrand (1991) can be used as explanation for the real appreciation as
well. Households have shifted their consumption expenditures toward new types
of goods, like those contained in the category telecommunication, and have in-
creasingly demanded goods and services from the area of recreation and culture.
The weight of conventional basic goods like food and clothing has decreased sub-
stantially. Furthermore, the real appreciation was driven by a rapid increase of
prices in the housing category. Especially in regard to fuels and in some countries
to housing rentals, prices have increased since 1996.
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Table 3.11: Key findings regarding the development of RER based on HICP
(1996 - 2013)
Growth of overall
RER
Growth of RER
based on HICP for
services
Increase in the weight of
services in total
consumption expenditure
in % in % percentage points
Bulgaria -45.9 -68.8 23.0
Czech Republic -38.2 / -29.32 -37.12 5.92
Estonia -35.1 / -27.61 -36.21 16.51
Latvia -34.9 -41.3 13.4
Lithuania -46.0 -56.4 14.6
Hungary -33.7 / -14.43 -16.83 3.33
Poland -22.0 -32.6 10.1
Romania -52.2 / -15.53 -12.83 9.73
Slovenia -11.5 / -7.32 -14.92 7.52
Slovakia -54.4 -63.0 9.7
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: since 1998; 2: since 2000; 3: since 2001.
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3.4 Empirical Analyses
Before proceeding with the empirical investigation of the theoretical explanations,
the next subsection examines the tradables/nontradables dichotomy. The ad hoc
classification proposed here should shed light on the controversy regarding the
magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in the transition economies.
3.4.1 Defining tradability
The tradables/nontradables dichotomy is a central starting point for many research
topics such as the determination of inflation in open economies, the specification
and estimation of international trade flows and the theory of real exchange rate
determination (Goldstein and Officer 1979). Despite its significance to economic
theory, there has been no empirical analysis regarding the distinction between
tradable and nontradable goods for the case of the economies in transition. In the
present section a short overview of the related literature regarding industrialized
countries is presented and the main findings are applied to the case of the CEEC.
In accordance with the varying object of the different studies and the nature of
the data used in these studies, diverse tradables/nontradables classifications have
emerged in the literature (Dwyer 1992, Goldstein and Officer 1979). At one end
of the spectrum the tradables sector consists of a narrow class of goods that enter
into international trade (exports and imports) and satisfy the law of one price
(e.g. Viner 1937). At the other end there is a broad class of goods that either
earn or save foreign exchange (exports and import replacements) or could do so
at a certain relative price. Aukrust (1970) defines as sheltered industries those
whose products are left relatively free of foreign price competition (either because
of the nature of the products or because of government protection). Goldstein and
Officer (1979) apply three complementary criteria in their definition of the trad-
ables and nontradables sector, namely the degree of foreign trade participation
(it should be substantially higher for tradables), the cross-country correlation of
price changes (it should be higher for tradables) and the degree of substitutabil-
ity between domestic and traded goods from other countries (tradables should
be closer substitutes for actually traded goods). In later analyses De Gregorio,
Giovannini and Wolf (1994) and De Gregorio and Wolf (1994) propose rating a
sector as tradable if exports amount to more than 10 percent of the production
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value. According to their definition, the sector of tradable goods includes agri-
culture, mining, manufacturing and transportation services. All other products
belong to the sector of nontradables. However, the main purpose of distinguishing
between tradables and nontradables in the present analysis is to find industries
in which the prices are largely driven by the conditions of world market compe-
tition. Using only the share of exports in production as a reference point does
not allow room for industries with low production levels but high imports and
thus high consumption or investment expenditures. More suitable criteria for the
purpose of the empirical analysis of the real exchange rate are proposed by Dwyer
(1992) and Knight and Johnson (1997), that is the degree of export orientation
and the degree of import substitution. They define an industry as part of the
tradables sector if the share of its total supply accounted for by exports and/or
the percentage of demand accounted for by competing imports exceed 10.0 percent.
In accordance with the criteria of export orientation and import substitution/-
substitutability the present chapter ascribes an industry to the tradables or non-
tradables sector of the economy using the degree of openness. The value of trade
(imports plus exports) is divided by the value of the production of the indus-
try. A certain problem arising from this methodology is the specification of the
threshold value above which an industry should be defined as tradables. Given
that the overall degree of openness (ODO) exceeds 100.0 percent in most of the
CEEC, the previously used value of 10.0 percent of exports or imports relative to
the production value seems to be an inadequate threshold for the sector in which
the prices should be mainly driven by world market competition. Thus, in the
present analysis the classification of the industries is carried out in a way that the
degree of openness is much higher in the sector of tradables than in the sector of
nontradables.21
Data about foreign trade is taken from the statistics database of the World Trade
Organization and the United Nations and the production value data stems from
Eurostat. The year 2004 is taken as reference partly because of data constraints
and partly because in that year most of the transition-specific reforms should have
been completed. Only industries with high private sector participation are con-
sidered. This leaves government-provided services including electricity, gas and
water supply out of the analysis, since in many CEEC the latter had not yet been
21This criterion is similar to the first criterion in Goldstein and Officer (1979), namely the
degree of foreign trade participation.
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privatized. Their prices were highly regulated and cannot be considered as market-
determined. Data constraints make it impossible to include the sector of financial
services too. Table 3.12 shows the degree of openness of the main industries for
which reliable data for the transition economies is available.22
Apart from the mining sector where the degree of openness is extremely high in
some countries (the highest value is 27.49 in Lithuania), but relatively low in oth-
ers (the lowest value has been found in Romania, 1.63), the highest tradability
can be found in the sectors of travel, manufacturing and agriculture. In the travel
sector the degree of openness ranges from 0.98 in Romania to 4.75 in Bulgaria,
whereas in manufacturing the degree of openness is the highest in Estonia, 1.76,
and the lowest in Poland, 0.79. The highest value for the sector of agriculture has
been found in Estonia, 3.39. However, the lowest values are found to lie far below
the overall degree of openness, namely in Romania at 0.22, and in Bulgaria at 0.52.
At the other end of the spectrum are the sectors of transportation and other ser-
vices. The highest degree of openness in transportation has been found in the
Slovak Republic, 0.93, and the lowest in the Czech Republic, 0.32. In other ser-
vices the degree of openness is extremely low in Poland, 0.05, and the highest is
in Hungary, 0.27.
The data points toward a fairly clear-cut distinction between the sector of tradables
(mining, travel, manufactures) and the sector of nontradables (transport and other
services). The sector of agriculture is the only exception. It will be left out of the
following analysis, partly because of the large differences among the countries, and
partly because of the nature of the price-setting mechanism: in many countries, the
prices in agriculture have been highly regulated. The relative degree of openness
defined as the degree of openness of the particular industry relative to the ODO
confirms the classification above as well: the sector of transport and other services
shows values relatively lower than in the other industries.
22The last row of the table provides a comparison to Germany as the main trading partner
of most of the countries.
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Given the data limitations, it would be optimistic to argue that the tradable/non-
tradable dichotomy shows a high degree of precision. This classification, however,
explicitly accounts for specific characteristics and trade patterns of the CEEC and
is, therefore, more suitable than previous ones for the empirical analysis of the
real exchange rate movement in these countries. As stated above, especially the
estimation of the Balassa-Samuelson effect is expected to gain accuracy by using
this ad hoc classification in the calculation of the relative productivity. It will
also be applied to the calculation of relative consumption expenditure and the two
components of the real exchange rate.
The next section presents the dependent variables and a short overview of the
variables representing potential explanations discussed in the theoretical part (see
section 3.2) before proceeding to the results of the empirical analysis.
3.4.2 Decomposition of the real exchange rate
The tradable/nontradable classification derived in the preceding subsection can be
used to describe the development of the relative prices of tradables to nontradables
and the real exchange rate of the tradables sector. First, the overall real exchange
rate is calculated from Eurostat data on the nominal Euro exchange rate and the
overall HICP for the particular country and the Euro area as defined by equation
(3.1). Furthermore, a second measure for the real exchange rate is obtained by
replacing consumer prices with a GDP deflator for the transition economy under
consideration on the one hand and for Germany on the other, since Euro area
data is largely missing. The GDP deflator has been calculated for the main indus-
tries using Eurostat data on gross value added aggregates at current and constant
prices from the NACE-21 classification. The price level in the tradables sector was
obtained as the value-weighted average of the GDP deflators for Manufacturing,
Mining and quarrying and Accommodation and food service activities (NACE B,
C and I). The price level of nontradables is calculated accordingly from the GDP
deflators for the following categories: Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor
vehicles and motorcycles, Transportation and storage, Information and communi-
cation, Professional, scientific and technical activities, Administrative and support
service activities, Arts, entertainment and recreation and Other service activities
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(NACE G, H, J, M, N).23 The real exchange rate of tradables is calculated from
the nominal Euro exchange rate and the price level for tradables in the transition
economy and in Germany. Declining values indicate real appreciation as in the
case of overall real exchange rate. The relative price of tradables to nontradables
was obtained as the ratio of price level in the tradables sector to that in nontrad-
ables. In order to obtain the second term in equation (3.5)24 the relative price was
divided by the corresponding value for Germany. The theory on real exchange
rate determination suggests that declining values of relative prices are the main
cause of real appreciation as described in section 3.2.2. The two measures for the
overall real exchange rate, the real exchange rate of the tradables sector and the
price of tradables to nontradables relative to Germany represent further dependent
variables for the empirical analysis, besides overall RER calculated with HICP or
the GDP deflator. All four time series are represented as indices with base year
2005.
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict the development of the components of real exchange
rates in transition economies since 1995. The growth rates over the period 1996-
2012 are summarized in Table 3.13.25 One important difference between the real
exchange rates based on HICP and the GDP deflator refers to the bundle of goods
and services captured by the indices. As pointed out earlier, HICP covers all con-
sumption goods with weight in total consumption larger than 1
1000
. Therefore, the
development of prices for imported consumption goods is captured by HICP. GDP
deflator on the contrary covers all goods produced by the corresponding economy.
It includes prices of domestically produced export goods, but excludes imported
goods, both for consumption and investment purposes. This conceptual difference
should be kept in mind when analyzing the development of the real exchange rate
calculated with these indices.
23This list includes therefore all non-government services except for financial services, since
trade data about financial services is not available and tradability in this sector could not be
investigated.
24See p. 52.
25The growth rates reported in Table 3.14 refer to the time period 1996-2012 (if not otherwise
specified) since data on the GDP deflators for 2013 are still not available at the time of the
present research.
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Table 3.13: Growth of RER and its main components (1996 - 2012)
Growth of overall
RER based on
HICP
Growth of overall
RER based on the
GDP deflator
Growth of RER in
the tradables sector
Growth of relative
prices
(T/N)/(T*/N*)
in % in % in % in %
Bulgaria1 -38.5 -45.2 -50.9 8.0
Czech Republic -40.1 -60.5 -39.9 -38.6
Estonia2 -33.5 -50.9 -24.7 -44.5
Latvia -35.1 -54.1 -43.8 -16.4
Lithuania -46.1 -70.5 -67.3 -17.9
Hungary -34.0 -15.3 3.1 -23.1
Poland -22.7 -21.1 7.2 -35.3
Romania2 -49.3 282.5 314.5 -26.8
Slovenia -11.2 7.7 28.7 -25.6
Slovakia3 -48.1 -59.6 -28.7 -52.7
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Negative growth of real exchange rates corresponds to real appreciation.
1: 1998-2012; 2: 1996-2011; 3: 1997-2012.
Besides some differences in the variability of RER based on HICP and GDP defla-
tor, both series exhibit similar trends in most of the countries. Notable exceptions
are Slovenia and Romania, where RER based on HICP appreciated since 1995 but
RER based on GDP deflator depreciated until 2004. The development of RER
based on GDP deflator was largely driven by nominal exchange rate changes.
Both the Slovenian Tolar and the Romanian Leu experienced steady nominal de-
preciation until 2004 which outpaced the price increase of the overall domestic
production. In the other countries the overall trend indicates a real appreciation,
independent of the price index used for the calculation of the real exchange rates.
The real exchange rate appreciation of the tradables sector has outpaced the in-
crease in prices of nontradables relative to tradables in Bulgaria, the Czech Re-
public, Latvia and Lithuania (see Table 3.13). In Bulgaria, real appreciation in
the tradables sector was even higher than the overall real appreciation and com-
pensated for decreasing prices of nontradables relative to tradables. In Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia, on the contrary, real appreciation was
mainly driven by the adjustment of relative prices.
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To sum up, the decomposition of the real exchange rate indicates that driving
forces of tradables prices like quality improvements or trade liberalization have
influenced the overall real exchange rate. However, the conventional approaches
explaining overall real appreciation by internal real exchange rate changes driven
by improvement in relative productivity of tradables or shifts of total demand
should be investigated as well. They are expected to be driving forces of real
appreciation long after the process of transition is fully completed since they are
the result of the real convergence process.
3.4.3 Data: explanatory variables
3.4.3.1 Harrod-Balassa-Samuelson effect
The presence of productivity-driven real appreciation is examined in the present
analysis using Eurostat data on gross value added at constant prices as well as
employment statistics from the NACE-21 classification. Labor productivity is
calculated as the ratio of gross value added to the number of employees in the
particular industry.26 The same NACE subgroups were aggregated to obtain the
tradables and nontradables productivity as in the case of tradables and nontrad-
ables prices.27
Growth of productivity in both sectors is shown in Figure 3.5 for the period 2000-
2011.28 In all transition economies, productivity has grown more rapidly in the
tradables than in the nontradables sector. Slovakia especially has experienced a
rapid increase in tradables productivity, at 151.0 percent, during the time period
2000-2011, whereas productivity growth in the production of nontradables was as
low as 18 percent. In Romania, on the contrary, productivity increase in tradables
and nontradables sector was of similar magnitude, 80 percent and 68 percent, re-
spectively.
26A more accurate measure of labor productivity would be productivity per hour worked
instead of productivity per employee. However, due to lack of data the number of employees is
used in the present analysis.
27See p. 91.
28The data set covers the time span 1993-2012. However, 2000-2011 is the time period, for
which data for most of the country is available. Only in Poland does the time series begin later,
in 2004.
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Figure 3.5: Productivity growth in the tradables and nontradables sector in
CEEC (2000-2011) in percent
Productivity is defined as the ratio of gross value added at constant prices to the
number of employees.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
In the next step, relative productivity was calculated as the ratio of productivity
in the tradables sector to that of nontradables. Figure 3.6 depicts the development
of relative productivity since 1993. As illustrated in Figure 3.5, productivity of
tradables relative to nontradables has grown most rapidly in Slovakia. In most
of the countries the increase of relative productivity in the 1990s was only mod-
est. Especially at the beginning of transition, this outcome is not surprising, since
most of the services were provided by the state sector during the socialist regime
(Nenova 2004). The emergence and further development of the private service
sector has been favored since the beginning of the transition process. Therefore,
there has been high potential in the countries in transition for fast growth in pro-
ductivity both in the tradables and nontradables sector. Besides the failure of the
PPP in the external sector, productivity development in the nontradables sector
is a second factor that could have led to a lower explanatory power of the Balassa-
Samuelson effect in the early years of transition. A similar result is also reported
by Nenovsky and Dimitrova (2002) for the case of Bulgaria.
The increase in relative productivity gained momentum between 2002 and 2008 as
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Figure 3.6: Productivity in the tradables relative to the nontradables sector
in CEEC
Productivity is defined as the ratio of gross value added at constant prices to the
number of employees.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
the process of transition proceeded. Especially in Hungary and the Czech Repub-
lic, productivity growth in tradables relative to the nontradables sector accelerated
since the early 2000s. In the Baltic countries, this was the case since the beginning
of the economic crisis. In Bulgaria and Romania, on the contrary, relative pro-
ductivity has remained relatively stable, since the transition process was largely
postponed by the severe economic crisis in the 1990s.
The development of productivity in tradables relative to the nontradables sector
divided by the corresponding value for Germany is depicted in Figure 3.7. This
diagram confirms the results from Figure 3.6. The increase in relative productivity
accelerated especially in the years prior to the economic crisis and during the eco-
nomic crisis. The peak in 2009 is due to a sharp decrease in labor productivity in
the tradables sector in Germany. It was the combination of a drop in value added
and reduced working hours leaving the number of employees relatively stable.
Figure 3.7 shows that growth of relative productivity becomes less pronounced
after accounting for productivity developments abroad. In the Baltic countries,
Chapter 3. Real exchange rate appreciation in CEEC 100
Romania and Bulgaria productivity of tradables to nontradables relative to Ger-
many even decreased between 2002 and 2007. In Slovenia, Slovakia, Hungary and
the Czech Republic, on the contrary, the trend of relative productivity remained
positive even after accounting for productivity dynamics in Germany.
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Figure 3.7: Productivity in the tradables to the nontradables sector in CEEC
relative to Germany
Productivity is defined as the ratio of gross value added at constant prices to the
number of employees.
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
The ratio of relative productivity in the transition economies to that in Germany
will be used in the empirical analysis in order to investigate the impact of the
Balassa-Samuelson effect. Germany will be used as reference country because it is
an important trading partner for CEEC and furthermore the largest economy in
the Euro area. If all assumptions apply as in the framework described in section
3.2.2., then the productivity variable should affect the overall real exchange rate
via relative prices of tradables to nontradables. The expected sign is in both cases
negative, since increasing relative productivity compared to Germany should lead
to real appreciation via increasing prices of nontradables. The real exchange rate
of the tradables sector should remain unaffected by the development of relative
productivity. If, however, relative purchasing power parity does not hold in the
tradables sector, it is possible to observe real depreciation in the tradables sector
as a result of an increase in relative productivity. In the case it is significant, the
expected sign of relative productivity with regard to the real exchange rate in the
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tradables sector is therefore positive.
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Figure 3.8: Productivity in tradables to nontradables sector relative to Ger-
many (horizontal axis) and prices of tradables relative to notradables (vertical
axis) in CEEC (logs)
Productivity is defined as the ratio of gross value added at constant prices to the
number of employees; Relative prices based on the GDP deflator;
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
In Figure 3.8 productivity in tradables relative to nontradables (relative to Ger-
many) is plotted against relative prices of tradables to nontradables since pro-
ductivity is expected to affect the overall real exchange rate over the internal
real exchange rate, i.e. the relative prices. The regression lines suggest negative
relationship in all ten countries: increasing productivity in tradables relative to
nontradables is associated with decreasing prices of tradables relative to notrad-
ables. The highest correlation is observed in Slovenia, -0.93 and Slovakia, -0.95.
3.4.3.2 Shift in private consumption
In the style of Bergstrand (1991), real appreciation can be further produced by
a shift of private consumption from basic to luxury goods. Bergstrand assumes
that, contrary to basic goods, luxury goods are mostly nontradables. According to
Bergstrand rising income increases demand for nontradables relative to tradables
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since luxury products (basic goods) exhibit income elasticity higher (lower) than
one. The result is an increase in the prices of nontradables relative to tradables
and overall real exchange rate appreciation.29
In the present section assumptions underlying the Bergstrand model are exam-
ined in the context of CEEC. First, income elasticity of different categories of
consumption goods and services is analyzed thereby identifying luxury and basic
products consumed by households. Second, the pattern of consumption expendi-
ture is analyzed. The pattern of consumption of nontradables relative to tradables
is investigated, since Bergstrand proposes that real appreciation is caused by a
shift of consumption from tradables to nontradables. Furthermore, consumption
of luxury goods and services relative to basic goods and services is plotted and
it is shown that the pattern is different from that of nontradables consumption
relative to tradables.
For the identification of luxury and basic goods, disaggregated annual data on fi-
nal consumption expenditure of households by consumption purpose is taken from
Eurostat. The analysis is performed for 47 subcategories from the COICOP clas-
sification (see Table 3.14). The data is at constant prices and covers the time span
1990-2012. Income elasticities for the different categories are calculated using panel
regression of consumption expenditure on GDP per capita and consumer prices in
the particular category. PPP adjusted real GDP per capita and consumer prices
stem from Eurostat as well. All variables are expressed as logarithms. Nonstation-
arity of the time series is examined using the Im-Pesaran-Shin test for unbalanced
panels. The starting point of this test is a set of Dickey-Fuller regressions, one for
each panel (Im, Pesaran and Shin 2003). In the second step, the average of the
resulting t statistics is computed and the null hypothesis is tested that all panels
contain a unit root. The IPS test allows for heterogeneous panels and does not
require balanced datasets. However, there cannot be gaps in the panel when using
the IPS test.
As Table 3.14 indicates, most of the variables turned out to be I(1), thus the re-
gressions are performed in first differences. The Hausman test is used to evaluate
the appropriateness of country fixed effects. In the majority of the COICOP the
Hausman test showed no significant difference between the fixed and the random
29See section 3.2.1.2.
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Table 3.14: Unit root tests of prices, consumption and income
COICOP Category Zt˜−bar
Consumption ∆ Con-
sumption
Price ∆ Price
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
c011 Food -.820 -4.04*** 2.14 -6.43***
c012 Non-alcoholic beverages -.659 -3.32*** 2.22 -6.89***
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics
c021 Alcoholic beverages 1.74 -4.83*** -.275 -5.85***
c022 Tobacco -.325 -4.42*** 1.53 -5.80***
c023 Narcotics -.081 -3.69*** 2.08 -5.18***
Clothing and footwear
c031 Clothing 2.60 -4.79*** -3.76*** -5.90***
c032 Footwear including repair 3.10 -4.09*** -3.25*** -6.21***
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels
c041 Actual rentals for housing .218 -5.10*** -3.13** -5.02***
c042 Imputed rentals for housing 1.53 -3.95*** -.622 -4.43***
c043 Maintenance and repair of the dwelling -.298 -3.84*** -1.67** -5.95***
c044 Water supply and miscellaneous services relat-
ing to the dwelling
-.002 -5.91*** 1.86** -4.71***
c045 Electricity, gas and other fuels -2.38*** -6.68*** -1.06 -5.38***
Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance
c051 Furniture and furnishings, carpets and other
floor coverings
1.44 -3.87*** -3.24*** -5.52***
c052 Household textiles -.370 -4.45*** -3.23*** -6.22***
c053 Household appliances .696 -3.91*** -2.84*** -6.14***
c054 Glassware, tableware and household utensils .320 -5.25*** .273 -5.42***
c055 Tools and equipment for house and garden 1.67 -5.92*** -1.63* -5.81***
c056 Goods and services for routine household
maintenance
.165 -5.22*** -.758 -6.43***
Health
c061 Medical products, appliances and equipment -.106 -6.19*** -1.06 -6.29***
c062 Out-patient services -3.06*** -6.48*** .963 -6.01***
c063 Hospital services -1.93** -5.59*** .260 -5.53***
Transport
c071 Purchase of vehicles .784 -5.31*** -1.94** -6.08***
c072 Operation of personal transport equipment
(incl. fuels)
-.551 -5.28*** 1.65 -6.64***
c073 Transport services -2.82*** -5.03*** .792 -6.89***
Communication
c081 Postal services -1.12 -6.46*** .575 -6.64***
c082 Telephone and telefax equipment and services 1.73 -5.32*** 4.50 -4.46***
c083 Telephone and telefax services .993 -4.08*** -4.17*** -4.87***
Recreation and culture
c091 Audio-visual, photographic and information
processing equipment
2.58 -5.40*** 5.26 -5.45***
c092 Other major durables for recreation and cul-
ture
-1.68** -6.22*** -3.94*** -6.07***
c093 Other recreational items and equipment, gar-
dens and pets
1.61 -4.58*** -2.26** -6.37***
c094 Recreational and cultural services -2.25** -5.11*** -1.07 -5.44***
c095 Newspapers, books and stationery -1.14 -4.87*** -.308 -5.47***
c096 Package holidays -1.15 -6.30*** -.188 -5.47***
Education
c101 Pre-primary and primary education -3.25*** -6.26*** -.115 -5.63***
c102 Secondary education .424 -5.60*** -.828 -4.23***
c103 Post-secondary non-tertiary education -.484 -4.90*** -1.61* -3.55***
c104 Tertiary education .395 -6.11*** -.447 -4.76***
c105 Education not definable by level .160 -5.22*** -.980 -4.70***
Restaurants and hotels
c111 Catering services -1.41* -5.64*** -.481 -5.73***
c112 Accommodation services -1.33* -6.20*** -1.48* -5.42***
Miscellaneous goods and services
c121 Personal care .400 -4.98*** -1.70** -6.09***
c122 Prostitution -.905 -3.55*** 1.80 -3.82***
c123 Personal effects n.e.c. -.174 -4.85*** 1.88 -5.99***
c124 Social protection 2.41 -5.54*** .222 -6.05***
c125 Insurance -1.74** -6.35*** -.681 -5.86***
c126 Financial services n.e.c. -.788 -6.95*** -.380 -6.71***
c127 Other services n.e.c. -.516 -6.42*** -.989 -5.91***
Income per capita GDP ∆ GDP
.255 -4.38***
Im-Pesaran-Shin test with H0: all panel contain a unit root;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
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effect coefficients. Therefore, the coefficients of the (more efficient) random effects
model are reported if not otherwise specified. In the next step, a one-sided z-test30
is employed to evaluate if the estimated income elasticity in the particular cate-
gory exceeds one, i.e. if the category comprises mainly luxury goods. Reported
p-values refer to the H0 of elasticity≤1. If H0 cannot be rejected the alternative
test is applied to investigate if elasticity is significantly lower than one as should
be the case for basic goods.
The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Table 3.15. Income elastic-
ity varies between 0.13 for social protection and 3.13 for other major durables
from the area of recreation and culture, including durables for indoor and outdoor
recreation and musical instruments. As expected, income elasticity is low with
regard to conventional basic goods and services like food, medical products, water
supply and electricity, gas and other fuels. However, contrary to the proposition
by Bergstrand (1991), high income elasticity is not found to prevail in services
like recreational and cultural services but rather in tradable goods like vehicles,
household textiles and appliances, telephone and telefax equipment and services,
audio-visual, photographic and information processing equipment. Postestimation
one-sided tests indicate that (among other categories) these goods can be referred
to as luxury goods whereas basic goods are, among others, household services,
food and social protection.
The results of these empirical analyses indicate that one crucial assumption of the
model proposed by Bergstrand is not fulfilled in the case of CEEC. Contrary to
the assumption made by Bergstrand, luxury goods are mainly tradables in transi-
tion economies. It is still true that with higher income private consumption shifts
toward new goods and services. However, consumption expenditures shift away
from basic goods like household services, food and telephone and telefax services
toward mostly tradable goods like audio-visual technique, household appliances
and road vehicles, since their income elasticity exceeds one.
Figure 3.9 shows the development of nontradables consumption relative to trad-
ables compared to Germany. In most of the transition economies, relative con-
sumption of nontradables to tradables has been decreasing since the mid 1990s.
30t-test for the categories where fixed effects are more appropriate.
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Table 3.15: Classification of private consumption in luxury and basic goods
COICOP Category Income
elasticity
p-value Classification
Food and non-alcoholic beverages
c011 Food .65 1.000 Basic
c012 Non-alcoholic beverages 1.30 .067 Luxury
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco and narcotics
c021 Alcoholic beverages .53* .997 Basic
c022 Tobacco .79 .893
c023 Narcotics .26 1.000 Basic
Clothing and footwear
c031 Clothing .98 .522
c032 Footwear including repair 1.18 .264
Housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels
c041 Actual rentals for housing .87 .622
c042 Imputed rentals for housing .14 1.000 Basic
c043 Maintenance and repair of the dwelling 1.52 .150
c044 Water supply and miscellaneous ser-
vices relating to the dwelling
.52* .998 Basic
c045 Electricity, gas and other fuels .39 .961 Basic
Furnishings, household equipment and routine household maintenance
c051 Furniture and furnishings, carpets and
other floor coverings
1.13 .311
c052 Household textiles 2.50 .058 Luxury
c053 Household appliances 1.71 .002 Luxury
c054 Glassware, tableware and household
utensils
1.45 .010 Luxury
c055 Tools and equipment for house and
garden
1.22 .291
c056 Goods and services for routine house-
hold maintenance
.97 .610
Health
c061 Medical products, appliances and
equipment
.74* .911 Basic
c062 Out-patient services .98 .528
c063 Hospital services 1.41 .204
Transport
c071 Purchase of vehicles 2.28 .001 Luxury
c072 Operation of personal transport equip-
ment (incl. fuels)
.92 .871
c073 Transport services 1.08 .320
Communication
c081 Postal services .80 .599
c082 Telephone and telefax equipment and
services
2.53 .020 Luxury
c083 Telephone and telefax services .28 .952 Basic
Recreation and culture
c091 Audio-visual, photographic and infor-
mation processing equipment
1.41* .029 Luxury
c092 Other major durables for recreation
and culture
3.13 .046 Luxury
c093 Other recreational items and equip-
ment, gardens and pets
.91 .714
c094 Recreational and cultural services .83 .630
c095 Newspapers, books and stationery .91* .741
c096 Package holidays 1.45* .084 Luxury
Education
c101 Pre-primary and primary education .95 .648
c102 Secondary education 1.99 .217
c103 Post-secondary non-tertiary education 2.00 .000 Luxury
c104 Tertiary education 1.24 .130
c105 Education not definable by level 1.33 .341
Restaurants and hotels
c111 Catering services 1.06 .384
c112 Accommodation services 1.15 .292 Luxury
Miscellaneous goods and services
c121 Personal care 1.03 .446
c122 Prostitution .49 .958 Basic
c123 Personal effects n.e.c. 1.66 .016 Luxury
c124 Social protection .13 .998 Basic
c125 Insurance 2.72 .013 Luxury
c126 Financial services n.e.c. 1.60 .192
c127 Other services n.e.c. 1.22 .351
Source: Own calculations based on data by Eurostat.
Income elasticity in CEEC from random effects panel analysis 1990-2013 if not otherwise specified;
p-value of one-sided z-test calculated from the Wald χ2 statistic;
*Fixed-effects regression; p-value of one-sided t-test calculated from the Wald F statistic.
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The pace of increasing tradables consumption relative to nontradables has decel-
erated during the current economic crisis, thus confirming the results that luxury
goods are mostly tradables. Furthermore, consumption of nontradables relative to
tradables increased in Bulgaria during the severe economic crisis in 1996-1997.
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Figure 3.9: Private consumption of nontradable goods and services relative
to tradables in CEEC relative to Germany
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
Private consumption of nontradable goods and services relative to tradables (com-
pared to Germany) is plotted against prices of tradables relative to nontradables
in Figure 3.10. According to the model proposed by Bergstrand (1991) higher
consumption of nontradables relative to tradables should be associated with de-
creasing prices of tradables relative to nontradables. The relationship between
these two variables shown in Figure 3.10 is, however, positive in most of the coun-
tries. Although the statistical properties of these analysis are rather weak, it is
affirmative for the hypothesis that private consumption has shifted away from
nontradables toward tradable goods and services. The exact relationship will be
tested in the empirical model at the end of the present section.
This analysis demonstrates that increasing prices of nontradables relative to trad-
ables are not the result of a shift in private consumption demand toward nontrad-
ables as proposed by Bergstrand (1991). Earlier studies have indeed confirmed
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Figure 3.10: Private consumption of nontradable goods and services relative to
tradables (relative to Germany, horizontal axis) and prices of tradables relative
to nontradables (vertical axis) in CEEC (logs)
Relative prices based on the GDP deflator; Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat
data.
the effect of a private consumption increase on the real exchange rate.31 However,
income growth has shifted private consumption toward tradable goods. Therefore,
in the case that purchasing power parity is not fulfilled in the sector of tradables,
it is possible to observe an increase of tradables prices and real appreciation via
the real exchange rate of the tradables sector.
Figure 3.11 depicts the consumption of luxury goods relative to that of basic
goods, again compared to Germany. In most of the countries relative consump-
tion of luxury to basic goods and services increased in the time period 1998-2009
and dropped as a result of income decrease in the beginning of the economic cri-
sis. Relative consumption has increased again since 2009, especially in the Baltic
countries where the recovery from the economic crisis has been relatively prompt.
Relative consumption is still declining in Slovenia where GDP growth was negative
until the third quarter of 2013.
31See e.g. Boeva (2009).
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Figure 3.11: Private consumption of luxury goods and services relative to
basic goods and services in CEEC relative to Germany
Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
Figure 3.12 plots private consumption of luxury goods and services relative to ba-
sic goods and services against the real exchange rates of the tradables sector. The
graphical analysis shows that higher values of relative consumption are associated
with real appreciation in the tradables sector in almost all countries. The relation-
ship is especially pronounced in Slovakia, Czech Republic, Latvia and Lithuania.
In Figure 3.13 private consumption of luxury goods and services relative to basic
goods and services is plotted against the prices of tradables relative to nontrad-
ables. The positive relationship suggested by theory can be observed only in two
countries. The negative correlation observed in the other countries is possibly the
result of common cause interdependence.
In the empirical analyses of the driving forces of the real appreciation in transi-
tion economies both the relative consumption of nontradables to tradables and the
relative consumption of luxury goods to basic goods will be taken into account.
The correlation between these two variables is relatively low since not all goods
and services could be classified in the particular categories. The expected sign
of relative consumption of nontradables to tradables with respect to the overall
real exchange rate is negative, if significant. With higher relative consumption
of nontradables to tradables, relative prices of tradables to nontradables decrease
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Figure 3.12: Private consumption of luxury goods and services relative to
basic goods and services (relative to Germany, horizontal axis) and real exchange
rates of the tradables sector (vertical axis) in CEEC (logs)
RER(T) based on the GDP deflator; Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat data.
and the currency appreciates in real terms. The expected sign of relative con-
sumption of luxury goods to basic goods is negative as well. Increasing relative
consumption leads to higher prices of tradables and therefore to appreciation of
the real exchange rate in the tradables sector and the overall real exchange rate.
With regard to the prices of tradables relative to nontradables the expected sign
is positive, though.
3.4.3.3 Additional explanatory variables
The quality and reputation improvement of tradable goods is proxied by the gross
inflows of FDI provided by Eurostat. Higher FDI is expected to lead to real
appreciation via increasing price of tradables relative to abroad as a result of bet-
ter quality, reputation and marketing measures. Furthermore, net capital inflows
cause external real appreciation also by increasing demand for domestic goods.
Therefore, the expected sign of the variable is negative with regard to the overall
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Figure 3.13: Private consumption of luxury goods and services relative to
basic goods and services (relative to Germany, horizontal axis) and prices of
tradables relative to nontradables (vertical axis) in CEEC (logs)
Relative prices based on the GDP deflator; Source: Own calculation based on Eurostat
data.
real exchange rate and the real exchange rate of tradables.
Figure 3.14 depicts the development of gross FDI inflows to the CEEC since 1993.
In the early 1990s FDI inflows were relatively low. They increased during the
process of transition and reached their peak in most of the countries prior to the
current economic crisis. A drop was observed in the early 2000s as well as dur-
ing the economic crisis in 2009-2010. The largest aggregated FDI inflows were
recorded in Bulgaria and Estonia, 9.2 and 8.1 percent of GDP since 1996, respec-
tively.
In Figure 3.15 the values of FDI inflows are plotted against GDP deflator based
external real exchange rate in CEEC. The diagram is in accordance with the
hypothesis of negative relationship between FDI and external real exchange rates.
Higher FDI inflows are associated with real appreciation in most of the countries.
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Figure 3.14: Foreign direct investment in CEEC
Gross inflows in million Euro; Source: Eurostat.
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FDI inflows in million Euro; RER(T) based on the GDP deflator; Source: Eurostat.
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The effects of the progress in transition are analyzed as follows: The influence of
price liberalization and privatization on the development of the RER is measured
respectively by the share of administered prices in HICP (data provided by Eu-
rostat)32 and the private sector share in GDP (data from the EBRD transition
reports). As in the section about the implementation of the tradables/nontrad-
ables dichotomy, the degree of openness as a measure for the progress in trade
liberalization is calculated as the trade volume ratio to GDP with data from Eu-
rostat.
The expected sign of the variable capturing the effect of privatization is positive,
since increasing private sector share is associated with an intensification of com-
petition and should thus lead to lower prices in the home country and to real
depreciation. Likewise, the long-term effect of price liberalization and trade liber-
alization is expected to be real depreciation (positive sign of the coefficient of the
degree of openness and negative of the share of administered prices in HICP). How-
ever, because of the short time span of the analysis, it is also possible to observe
the opposite sign for trade liberalization, thus capturing the effect in the medium
run. Whereas trade liberalization affects mainly the external real exchange rate,
privatization and price liberalization can affect the prices of both tradables and
nontradables relative to abroad.
Figure 3.16 shows the development of openness in CEEC calculated as the ratio
of exports and imports of goods and services to GDP. The degree of openness has
experienced very different developments in the CEEC under consideration. At the
beginning of the transition process openness decreased probably due to shrinking
trade with other former communistic countries. Especially in Slovenia and Latvia
the drop of international trade between 1991 and 1994/1995 was substantial. An
upturn in international trade followed in almost all countries and the degree of
openness increased rapidly until 2007. International trade decreased again in 2009
as a result of the current economic crisis – a trend that was observed in developed
economies as well. However, the pre-crisis level of openness was reached within
two years in most of the countries. Over the entire time span since 1992, the most
rapid increase in the degree of openness has been recorded in Hungary, Slovakia
and Poland. This is probably due to their proximity to Western European coun-
tries.
32Price liberalization should lead to a decreasing share of administered prices.
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Figure 3.16: Degree of openness in CEEC
Degree of openness is calculated as value of international trade as percentage of GDP
in percent. Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat.
The explanation for the positive relationship between the degree of openness and
the real exchange rate refers mainly to the external real exchange rate. Trade
liberalization is associated with increasing competition for domestically produced
tradable goods. Therefore, tradable prices are expected to decrease with a higher
degree of openness. This means real depreciation of the overall real exchange rate
and RER of tradables (positive sign of the relationship).
The degree of openness is depicted against the external real exchange rates in
CEEC in Figure 3.17. The trend lines show a negative relationship between the
degree of openness and the real exchange rate in the tradables sector in five out
of ten countries. The negative correlation is consistent with an adjustment of
the home market to world market conditions at the beginning of the transition
process.33 However, the correlation is rather weak and is not present in the other
countries.
Data about administered prices stems from Eurostat and covers the time period
2001-2013. Figure 3.18 depicts the share of administered prices in overall HICP in
33See Section 3.2.2.
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Figure 3.17: Openness (horizontal axis) and external real exchange rates (ver-
tical axis) in CEEC (logs)
Degree of openness in percent of GDP and real exchange rates in CEEC; RER(T)
based on the GDP deflator; Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat.
the time period 2001-2013, for which data is available. In Poland, Romania, Slove-
nia and the Czech Republic the share of administered prices has decreased since
2001. In Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria the share is higher in 2013 than twelve
years ago. However, a higher share of administered prices does not necessarily
mean that the number of regulated prices has increased. An unchanged or even
decreasing number of price regulations has been accompanied by increasing prices
of the particular goods and thus has led to an increasing share of these goods in
HICP. Therefore, the number of HICP categories with administered prices will
be used as an alternative to the share of administered prices to account for these
effects.
Price regulation for water supply, refuse collection, sewerage collection, electricity
and heat energy has been loosened in most of the countries. In some countries
the prices in these categories went from fully administered to mainly administered
(i.e. in Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania). In other countries price regulation has been
abolished in most of these categories (i.e. in the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slove-
nia). In Hungary, the list of fully and mainly administered prices has remained
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unchanged since 2001.
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Figure 3.18: Share of administered prices in overall HICP
Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat.
In Figure 3.19, real exchange rates in CEEC are plotted against the share of ad-
ministered prices in HICP. Whereas an increasing share of administered prices is
associated with real appreciation in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia, the opposite
holds for Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.
This diagram illustrates again the problem arising when using the share of admin-
istered prices in HICP as approximation for price liberalization. In Hungary, for
instance, where the number of administered prices has remained unchanged, the
higher share of administered prices came about via an increase of administered
prices. Therefore, it is not the result of increasing price regulation.
To sum up, price liberalization should lead to real appreciation in the short run
(negative sign) and real depreciation in the medium to long run (positive sign).
However, the results should be interpreted with caution since the measurement of
price liberalization is not unproblematic.
Figure 3.20 depicts the development of private sector share in GDP in CEEC.
Most of the state enterprises were privatized in the 1990s. Therefore, the share
of private sector in transition economies has not changed substantially in recent
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Figure 3.19: Share of administered prices (horizontal axis) and real exchange
rates (vertical axis) in CEEC (logs)
Share of administered prices in HICP in percent and real exchange rates in CEEC;
Overall RER based on HICP; Source: Own calculation based on data from Eurostat.
years. The effect of privatization on real exchange rate occurred in the early years
of transition, if at all.
In Figure 3.21 private sector share in GDP is plotted against the real exchange
rate in CEEC. Notwithstanding low variability of the time series, the diagram
suggests a negative relationship between these variables since the private sector
share increased in times of real appreciation. Nevertheless, the expected sign of
the variable is positive both with regard to the overall real exchange rate and the
real exchange rate of the tradables sector, since privatization is associated with
intensification of competition and therefore with declining prices both of tradables
and nontradables. The effect on the prices of tradables relative to nontradables is
not clear and depends on the extent to which privatization has affected prices in
these main categories of goods and services.
The effect of government consumption and investment on the real exchange rate
is captured by their shares in GDP with data stemming from Eurostat relative to
Germany. Theoretical models suggest a negative sign of the relationship between
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Figure 3.20: Private sector share in GDP
Source: European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.
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government consumption and investment on the one hand and the real exchange
rate on the other hand, since increasing values of these variables should lead to real
appreciation via an increasing price of nontradables. In such a case, the expected
sign in the equation of prices of tradables relative to nontradables will be negative
as well. If, however, the share of installation costs is relatively low compared to
that of tradable investment goods, the opposite sign will be the case with regard
to investment demand, as pointed out earlier.
Figure 3.22 shows the development of government consumption (relative to Ger-
many) in CEEC. The share of government consumption in GDP in transition
economies decreased compared to Germany. If the negative relationship is empiri-
cally verified, then decreasing share of government consumption has weakened the
real appreciation in CEEC.
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Figure 3.22: Government consumption
Government consumption as share in GDP relative Germany, Source: Own
calculations based on data from Eurostat.
In Figure 3.23 government consumption is plotted against the prices of tradables
relative to nontradables in CEEC. Contrary to the explanations above, the dia-
gram shows a positive relationship in most of the countries. However, as in the
case of private sector share in GDP, this could be the result of a cum hoc ergo
propter hoc fallacy.
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Figure 3.23: Government consumption (horizontal axis) and prices of trad-
ables relative to nontradables (vertical axis) in CEEC (logs)
Government consumption as share in GDP relative Germany; Relative prices based on
the GDP deflator; Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurostat.
Figure 3.24 shows the development of gross fixed capital formation as a share of
GDP (relative to Germany). The process of transition was accompanied by an
increasing investment share of GDP until 2007. The value dropped substantially
during the economic crisis and has been recovering since then.
In Figure 3.25 gross fixed capital formation is plotted against prices of tradables
relative to nontradables. In most of the countries the diagram shows that higher
investment corresponds to decreasing relative prices. If this relationship is verified
by the empirical analysis, it will confirm the explanations proposed by theoretical
models.
Table 3.16 summarizes the expected signs of the coefficients of the corresponding
independent variables in the empirical analyses of the overall real exchange rate
and its two main components.
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Figure 3.24: Investment demand
Gross fixed capital formation as share in GDP relative Germany, Source: Own
calculations based on data from Eurostat.
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Table 3.16: Expected signs of the coefficients in the empirical analysis
Independent variable RER RER (T) Relative Prices
(T/N)/(T*/N*)
q qT qN
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) - (+) -
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) - (+) -
Consumption (L/B)/(L*B*) - - +
Government consumption - (+) -
Investment +/- (+/-) +/-
FDI - -
Openness - -
Private sector share + + +/-
Share of administered prices +/- +/- +/-
3.4.4 Empirical model
The stationarity of the time series is tested using the Fisher test.34 Similarly to
the IPS test, the Fisher test uses separate Dickey-Fuller unit root tests for the N
cross-section units instead of pooling the data. The combination of the observed
significance levels from the different tests is brought about using the additive prop-
erty of the variables as suggested by Fisher (1932). In the present case the methods
proposed by Choi (2001) are used to combine the p-values. The advantage is that
the test does not require a balanced panel and explicitly allows for gaps in the
data set. The null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root is tested against
the alternative that at least one panel is stationary.
The inverse normal Z-values reported in Table 3.17 refer to the Fisher test with
drift since all time series possess non-zero means. Cross-sectional averages are
removed from the data in order to control for cross-sectional correlation as sug-
gested by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002). The inverse normal Z-statistics indicate
that the null hypothesis that all panels contain a unit root can be rejected for all
variables used in the empirical analyses. Therefore, the empirical analyses in the
next subsection treat the variables as stationary.
34See e.g. Whitehead (2002).
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Table 3.17: Unit root tests
time series Z
RER (GDP deflator) -6.2029***
RER (HICP) -5.6936***
RER (T) -6.3153***
(P T/PN)/(P T∗/PN∗) -3.8504***
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -5.4135***
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) -6.6368***
Consumption (L/B)/(L*B*) -4.8511***
Government consumption -3.3308***
Investment -4.4838***
GDP per capita -6.6541***
FDI -7.9585***
Openness -7.0501***
Private sector share -9.0656***
Share of administered prices -2.7500***
No. of administered prices -3.1508***
Inverse normal Z statistic from the Fisher ADF unit root
test for panel data with drift;
H0: All panels contain a unit root;
*** significant at 1%;
Source: Own calculations.
The empirical model used to estimate the effects of the independent variables on
the overall exchange rate and the two components can be summarized as follows:35
yit = α + x
′
itβ + υi + it (3.15)
υi represents the unit-specific time-invariant residual accounting for cross-section
heterogeneity and it is the conventional residual with the usual properties. x
′
it
contains the itth observation on the explanatory variables and β is vector with
the coefficients of interest. The fixed-effects model deals with the correlation
between υi and the variables in xit by using the OLS estimators of the following
transformation of equation (3.15):
yit − y¯i = (xit − x¯i)′β + (it − ¯i) (3.16)
35On econometric analysis of panel data see Baltagi (2005).
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Therefore, the reported coefficients refer to the effect of one unit increase in the
particular explanatory variables on the dependent variable within the cross-section
units. Alternatively, in a random-effects model, the between and within estima-
tors can be combined to produce more efficient results than in the fixed-effects
model. However, the results of the random effects model are inconsistent, if the
unit-specific residuals υi are correlated with xit. In such cases, the coefficients
estimated by the random-effects model are significantly different from those esti-
mated by the fixed-effects model, and the random-effects model is misspecified.
The Hausman test is used to test the equality of coefficients in the random-effects
model and in the fixed-effects model. The null hypothesis of no difference between
the coefficients can be rejected for all specifications.36 Therefore, the fixed-effects
model was used since it delivers consistent estimates.
Besides the efficiency problem, there is one additional point that should be stressed
when using fixed-effects models: Since the model assumes time-invariant unit-
specific residuals, it is not possible to estimate the effect of further time-invariant
variables. In the context of the present analysis of real exchange rates, for instance,
it is not possible to use dummy variables for the group of countries that joined the
European Union in 2004 because this dummy variable remains unchanged over the
entire time span.
The reported standard errors are adjusted for possible heteroscedasticity and for
cluster-specific effects alongside the cross-section units. The effect of the economic
crisis is captured by a dummy variable that takes the value one in 2008-2012.
Alternatively time dummies are used for the years 2008-2012 in order to account
for time varying effects during the economic crisis not captured by the explanatory
variables in the regression. Therefore, the end model to be estimated is given by
the following equations:
qit = α1 + x
′
itβ1 + d1,08D08 + ...+ d1,12D12 + υ1i + 1it, (3.17)
qNit = α2 + x
′
itβ2 + d2,08D08 + ...+ d2,12D12 + υ2i + 2it. (3.18)
qTit = α3 + x
′
itβ3 + d3,08D08 + ...+ d3,12D12 + υ3i + 3it, (3.19)
36See Tables 3.18-3.20
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with all variables converted into logarithms. In the first equation, the dependent
variable is measured either by HICP based real exchange rate or by real exchange
rate calculated with the GDP deflator. The second equation explains the internal
RER and includes only explanatory variables for the prices of tradables relative
to nontradables (all explanatory variables except for FDI and the degree of open-
ness). The third equation explains the external or trade-related RER and contains
explanatory variables of the RER in the external sector presented in Section 3.2.2,
i.e. FDI, the degree of openness and private sector share in GDP. In a further
specification the regression is extended by including explanatory variables for rel-
ative prices as well as consumption of luxury relative to basic goods and services.
The reason is the possibility of having a nontradable component in tradable prices,
which is affected by the same variables as the RER in the sheltered sector. Fur-
thermore, if the assumption of PPP is not fulfilled in the tradables sector, these
variable will not only affect the relative prices but also the prices of tradables.
The share of administered prices in HICP and the private sector share in GDP are
included only as additional estimators into the regressions in some specifications
since these time series are much shorter in all CEEC than those of other variables.
For the variables capturing the effect of investment demand, FDI and openness
lagged values are used since these variables can be affected by the real exchange
rate as well. Nevertheless, the problem of possible reverse causation is not solved
and the coefficients should be interpreted as correlation rather than causation.
3.4.5 Results
Tables 3.18-3.20 show the results of the empirical analysis over the time span 1993-
2012. The coefficient of the productivity variable turned out to be significant and
negative in all four specifications of the regression analysis of relative prices (Ta-
ble 3.19). If productivity growth in the tradables sector relative to nontradables
sector is 10.0 percent higher in the transition economies than in Germany, then
the relative price of tradables to nontradables (relative to Germany) decreases by
4.2-8.6 percent. This result indicates that productivity development is an impor-
tant driving force of relative prices as suggested by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson
(1964). The coefficients of relative productivity in the extended model of the real
exchange rate of the tradables sector are not significant, again in line with the
theoretical explanations. Furthermore, the effect of relative productivity turned
out to be significant in five out of eight specifications of the overall real exchange
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rate. In these cases, the coefficient ranges between -0.25 and -0.56. In the other
three specifications the coefficient is insignificant. These are regressions that in-
clude the variables capturing the effect of administered prices and privatization.
There are two possible explanations for the insignificant coefficient. First, corre-
lation analysis reveals that the insignificant effect of the productivity variable is
possibly the result of multicolinearity since the correlation between relative pro-
ductivity and the share of administered prices is relatively high, over 0.4. Second,
the time span covered by the regressions including these variables is shorter than
in the other regressions, since data on administered prices is available since 2001.
Two further regressions were performed in order to check the validity of these two
hypotheses.37 In the first regression the share of administered prices reported by
Eurostat is replaced by a measure reported by EBRD. The time series start ear-
lier but end in 2009 and the correlation between the share of administered prices
and the productivity variable is lower, 0.09. Including this proxy for price liber-
alization leaves the significant coefficient of the productivity variable unaffected.
In the second regression the time span is reduced to 2001-2013 and the variables
capturing the effects of price liberalization and privatization are excluded. As a
result the productivity variable becomes again insignificant in the regression of the
RER both based on HICP and the GDP deflator. Therefore, the insignificant co-
efficient of relative productivity in the regressions reported in Table 3.13 is rather
the result of the different time span and less so the result of multicolinearity. The
impact of relative productivity seems to have weakened since 2001.
The coefficient of relative productivity becomes again significant in the regression
of RER based on the GDP deflator when the dummy variable for the economic
crisis is replaced by time fixed effects for the years after 2007. The peak in 2009
due to an extremely low value for tradables productivity in Germany has possibly
biased the results if not allowed for time fixed effects. Summing up, the results
indicate that relative productivity is one of the driving forces of the real exchange
rate in the process of transition, although the effect has become less pronounced
in recent years.
37See Table 3.29 at the end of the present chapter.
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Table 3.19: Explanations for the development of relative prices of tradables
to nontradables (relative to Germany)
Relative Relative Relative Relative
prices prices prices prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.7647*** -.4231*** -.8423*** -.8602***
(.0672) (.1263) (.0860) (.1883)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .2550 -.0284 .2645 .0932
(.2503) (.0420) (.2390) (.2150)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) .0851 .0547 .1336 .0940
(.1147) (.0552) (.1122) (.0990)
Government consumption .1963 .2947** .1562 .1427
(.2531) (.1441) (.2432) (.1570)
L.Investment -.0220 .0822 -.0909 -.0478
(.0723) (.0644) (.0895) (.1026)
Private sector share -.2449 -.6153**
(.1880) (.2524)
Share of administered prices .0746*** -.0276
(.0238) (.0539)
DCrisis .0193 -.0419**
(.0281) (.0211)
D2008 -.0029 -.0121
(.0181) (.0158)
D2009 .1116* .0968**
(.0532) (.0353)
D2010 .0025 -.0026
(.0361) (.0311)
D2011 .0024 .0034
(.0423) (.0409)
D2012 -.0003 .0041
(.0428) (.0389)
Constant -.1499 .5000 -.1318 2.5482**
(.1261) (.8674) (.1110) (1.1184)
Adj. R-Square .7345 .6053 .7527 .6803
Observations 146 113 146 113
Hausman χ2 44.95 .86 53.94 40.34
Fixed/random effects FE RE FE FE
Source: Own calculations
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
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The coefficient of consumption of nontradables relative to tradables (compared to
Germany) turned out to be significant and positive in seven out of eight regressions
of the overall real exchange rate. This result is inconsistent with the proposition by
Bergstrand (1991). A possible explanation for the positive sign of the coefficient
is that increasing demand for tradables has led to real appreciation via increasing
prices of tradables. This result is also confirmed by the extended regressions of
the external real exchange rate. In all four regressions, where demand side expla-
nations were included the coefficient of consumption of nontradables relative to
tradables is significantly positive.
The second demand variable, consumption of luxury goods relative to basic goods
(again compared to Germany) has a significantly negative effect in all regressions
of the real exchange rate of the tradables sector. Increasing demand for luxury
goods leads to increasing prices of tradable goods in the transition economies com-
pared to abroad. In the regressions of the overall real exchange rate the effect of
the relative consumption variable is significant in the regressions of RER based
on HICP. Therefore, the argumentation proposed by Bergstrand (1991) has to be
adjusted for the transition economies in order to account for the fact that in these
economies luxury goods are (still) mostly tradables.
Other demand side explanations proposed in the literature are government con-
sumption and investment demand. The effect of government consumption on the
overall real exchange rate and its two components is mostly not significant. Only
in two regressions of the overall real exchange rate and one regression of relative
prices the coefficient is significantly positive at the 10 and 5 percent level, respec-
tively. Therefore, the empirical analysis reveals only weak evidence that increasing
government consumption affects the real exchange rate and the coefficient is con-
trary to the expectations positive.
The effect of investment demand, on the contrary, is significant in two specifica-
tions of the real exchange rate of the tradables sector and in four specifications
of the overall real exchange rate. As opposed to the explanation proposed by
Schro¨der and Pfadt (1998), Fischer (2002) and Bhagwati (1984), the coefficient of
investment demand is positive. Increasing investment demand is associated with
decreasing prices of tradables relative to abroad and leads to real depreciation of
the overall real exchange rate. This outcome is possibly the result of augmented
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demand for imported investment goods.
From the variables measuring the progress in transition only private sector share
in GDP and share of administered prices in CPI have significant coefficients in
regressions of the overall real exchange rate. An increase of private sector share
in GDP is associated with real depreciation as a result of an intensification of
competition. The coefficients of this variable are hightly significant and positive
in all specifications of the external real exchange rate. Furthermore, privatization
has led to decreasing prices of tradables relative to nontradables, as indicated by
the significantly negative coefficient of private sector share in GDP in column (4)
of Table 3.19.
The share of administered prices has a significantly negative effect in the regres-
sions of overall RER based on HICP. Lower share of administered prices leads to
real depreciation in accordance with the theoretical explanations. The coefficients
of trade liberalization measured by the degree of openness, on the contrary, is
insignificant in all specifications.
The coefficient of foreign direct investment turned out to be negative and signifi-
cant at least at the 10 percent level in five out of ten specifications of the overall
RER. In the last regression, however, it is positive and significant at the 5 percent
level. Therefore, the effect of FDI inflows on the overall real exchange rate is
not robust. Furthermore, according to the theoretical explanations, FDI inflows
should affect RER via appreciation of the external real exchange rate. The coeffi-
cient of the variable FDI is, though, insignificant in all specifications in Table 3.20.
The dummy variable for the effect of the economic crisis as well as the time dum-
mies have no significant effect on the real exchange rate in most of the speci-
fications of the overall RER. The regressions of external RER indicate, on the
contrary, that real appreciation has accelerated in the tradables sector since 2008.
The dummy variables DCrisis as well as D2008-D2012 are significant especially in
the specifications where only driving forces for the real exchange rate of tradables
were included. If additional explanatory variables are added, the time dummies
become mostly insignificant.
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3.4.6 Robustness and some further results
The empirical analysis in the previous subsection reveals some major insights about
the driving forces of real exchange rates in CEEC. In this subsection, a range of
different estimators and specifications are used as a check for the robustness of
the results presented above. First, the share of administered prices in HICP is
replaced by the number of regulated price. As pointed out earlier, the share of
administered prices is not a perfect measure for price liberalization since increas-
ing values do not necessarily mean more price regulation. Second, the effect of
Euro adoption is tested by introducing a dummy variable and interaction terms
to measure if productivity- and consumption-driven real appreciation was sped up
or slowed down by the introduction of the common currency. Third, the effect of
consumption expenditure is further analyzed using a different estimator, namely
consumption of luxury goods relative to Germany. And fourth, the panel analysis
is complemented by time series analyses for transition economies where a longer
time span of data is available.
Alternative measurement of price liberalization
In Table 3.21, the second specifications shown in Tables 3.18-3.20 are reestimated
using the number instead of share of administered prices. The number of ad-
ministered prices is more suitable measure for price liberalization since increasing
values are associated with intensification of price regulation. However, its low
variability makes it less suitable as explanatory variable in empirical analyses. In
Hungary, for instance, the number of administered prices has remained unchanged
since 2001. In other transition economies, the list of fully and mainly administered
prices changes only every few years. Replacing the share of administered prices
by the number of administered prices leaves the results of the empirical analysis
for most of the specifications unchanged. However, the coefficient of administered
prices with regard to the overall RER based on HICP is no more significant. Thus,
the effect of price liberalization on the real exchange rate is not robust to changes
in the measurement of price liberalization, although the disaggregated analysis of
HICP above shows that services related to housing were an important source of
real appreciation.
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Table 3.21: Robustness check: Alternative measurement of price liberalization
RER RER Relative RER
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) prices (tradables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.2702 -.1640 -.6945** .1592
(.3413) (.1916) (.2269) (.1942)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .5631*** .2817*** .0974 .3954**
(.1530) (.0416) (.2414) (.1392)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.2204* -.1123*** .0403 -.2422***
(.1140) (.0286) (.1079) (.0606)
Government consumption .5129 .3878* .1383 .4611
(.3739) (.1971) (.1780) (.3007)
L.Investment .1627 .1275* .0425 .1537
(.1361) (.0678) (.0732) (.1189)
L.FDI -.0442 -.0217 -.0391
(.0249) (.0125) (.0252)
L.Openness .1732 .0509 .2125
(.1280) (.0556) (.1583)
Private sector share 1.3119** .5644** -.5071* 1.3156***
(.4210) (.2338) (.2521) (.2489)
No. of administered prices .1011 -.1690 .0166 .0393
(.3233) (.1555) (.1903) (.2279)
Dcrisis -.0309 -.0433* .0061 -.0535*
(.0336) (.0225) (.0226) (.0253)
Constant -1.9013 2.4609*** 1.9086 -1.8739**
(1.4304) (.6632) (1.1672) (.6752)
Adj. R-Square .6565 .7532 .6499 .5890
Observations 109 109 112 109
Hausman χ2 91.08 267.84 31.60 22.82
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
Effects of Euro adoption
The effects of Euro adoption on real exchange rates and their driving forces are in-
vestigated using a dummy variable called DEuro. It takes the value one beginning
in 2007 in Slovenia, 2009 in Slovakia and 2011 in Estonia, and zero otherwise. The
time span since the introduction of the common currency in these three countries
is rather short. Furthermore, it overlaps to a large extent with the time span since
the beginning of the economic crisis. Therefore, the dummy variable DEuro is
used in addition to the dummy for the effect of the economic crisis. Nevertheless,
the results should be interpreted with caution.
Table 3.22 shows the results of regressions including the dummy variable DEuro.
The coefficients of the explanatory variables remain by and large unchanged. The
coefficients of the dummy variable DEuro are insignificant in the regressions of the
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Table 3.22: Effects of Euro adoption on the real exchange rate development
RER RER Relative RER
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) prices (tradables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.3803*** -.2642** -.6935*** .0545
(.1093) (.1160) (.0522) (.1025)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .7835* .3891*** .2649 .5115**
(.3742) (.0830) (.2611) (.2052)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.2877 -.1274** .1213 -.3876**
(.2078) (.0407) (.0999) (.1292)
Government consumption .3032 .2090 .2796 .1245
(.4246) (.1867) (.2323) (.2456)
L.Investment .3659** .1783** -.0257 .3543**
(.1528) (.0588) (.0622) (.1279)
L.FDI -.0651* -.0311** -.0450
(.0299) (.0131) (.0274)
L.Openness .2250 -.0898 .3083
(.2054) (.1161) (.1906)
DCrisis .0003 -.0127 .0424* -.0500
(.0486) (.0184) (.0226) (.0418)
DEuro .0477 .0359 -.1287*** .1225**
(.0905) (.0407) (.0354) (.0524)
Constant 3.8645*** 5.1759*** -.1009 3.3484***
(1.1565) (.5440) (.1190) (.9411)
Adj. R-Square .6629 .7961 .7664 .5697
Observations 143 139 146 143
Hausman χ2 355.03 90.99 67.55 61.04
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
overall real exchange rate, based on both GDP deflator and HICP. However, the
coefficients are significantly different from zero for the two components of the real
exchange rate. The coefficient in the regression of the real exchange rate in the
tradables sector is positive and indicates that the real appreciation in the tradables
sector has been less pronounced since the adoption of the common currency. The
coefficient in the regression of the prices of tradables in terms of nontradables is
negative. Thus, real exchange rate appreciation via increasing relative prices of
nontradables has gained importance since the accession to the monetary union.
A possible explanation for this result is as follows: The introduction of the com-
mon European currency is expected to strengthen the propostion of Purchasing
Power Parity. Deviations from PPP are less likely to occur in a monetary union.
Koedijk et al. (2004) show, for instance, that the process of economic integration
has accelerated convergence toward PPP within EMU. Therefore, tradable prices
adjustment is not that pronounced as before Euro adoption. The real apprecia-
tion in the tradables sector becomes weaker. An increase of nontradables prices
translates more easily into real appreciation when tradables prices are relatively
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Table 3.23: Effects of Euro adoption on productivity-driven real exchange
rate development
RER RER Relative RER
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) prices (tradables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.3545*** -.2519* -.6809*** .0700
(.1035) (.1122) (.0545) (.0975)
DEuro*Productivity -.5416 -.2309 -.2130 -.3258
(.5094) (.2187) (.1549) (.2954)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .8124* .4026*** .2764 .5289**
(.3789) (.0821) (.2619) (.2104)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.2743 -.1218*** .1280 -.3796**
(.2092) (.0371) (.1018) (.1298)
Government consumption .3015 .2039 .2796 .1235
(.4409) (.1871) (.2388) (.2540)
L.Investment .3572** .1745** -.0289 .3490**
(.1530) (.0564) (.0606) (.1276)
L.FDI -.0630* -.0302** -.0438
(.0304) (.0129) (.0278)
L.Openness .2210 -.0930 .3059
(.2058) (.1148) (.1894)
DCrisis .0028 -.0119 .0429* -.0485
(.0508) (.0194) (.0227) (.0433)
DEuro -.0720 -.0148 -.1739** .0506
(.1568) (.0711) (.0536) (.0889)
Constant 3.8969*** 5.1976*** -.0881 3.3679***
(1.1512) (.5342) (.1223) (.9321)
Adj. R-Square .6638 .7965 .7663 .5690
Observations 143 139 146 143
Hausman χ2 239.97 90.68 67.30 59.03
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
stable.
The next four regressions analyze the effect of Euro adoption on productivity-
driven real appreciation as described by Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) by
including an interaction term between the productivity variable and the dummy
variable for the introduction of the common currency. The results in Table 3.23
show that the Balassa-Samuelson effect on the overall real exchange rate does not
change due to Euro adoption, at least not in the first years. The coefficients of
the interaction term are insignificant both for the overall real exchange rate and
its two components.
The regressions presented in Table 3.24 investigate the effect of Euro adoption
on consumption-driven real appreciation. The introduction of an interaction term
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Table 3.24: Effects of Euro adoption on consumption-driven real exchange
rate development
RER RER Relative RER
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) prices (tradables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.3463*** -.2458* -.6852*** .0733
(.1045) (.1143) (.0502) (.0985)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .7725* .3841*** .2649 .5034**
(.3826) (.0854) (.2650) (.2110)
DEuro*Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .6562 .1965 .3668 .2566
(1.4715) (.7160) (.2111) (1.1387)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.2649 -.1170** .1266 -.3747**
(.2085) (.0375) (.1002) (.1312)
DEuro*Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) .6736* .3267** .1806 .3870
(.3267) (.1278) (.1026) (.2543)
Government consumption .2489 .1747 .2732 .0909
(.4420) (.1887) (.2410) (.2503)
L.Investment .3236* .1581** -.0364 .3294**
(.1461) (.0553) (.0638) (.1271)
L.FDI -.0659* -.0315** -.0455
(.0298) (.0130) (.0272)
L.Openness .1804 -.1158 .2811
(.2062) (.1136) (.1949)
DCrisis -.0052 -.0164 .0420 -.0538
(.0493) (.0182) (.0231) (.0421)
DEuro .5005 .1960 .0891 .3231
(.7501) (.3626) (.1015) (.5905)
Constant 4.1184*** 5.3202*** -.0918 3.5016***
(1.1383) (.5225) (.1181) (.9556)
Adj. R-Square .6661 .7990 .7650 .5686
Observations 143 139 146 143
Hausman χ2 169.18 84.73 128.50 1869.51
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
between the consumption variables and the dummy variable for Euro adoption
leaves the coefficients of the other explanatory variables mostly unchanged. The
coefficient of the interaction term is insignificant with regard to consumption of
nontradables relative to tradables. The coefficient of the interaction term between
consumption of luxury relative to basic goods and the dummy variable for Euro
adoption is, on the contrary, positive and significant in the regressions of the over-
all real exchange rate. The real appreciation as a result of shifting demand toward
luxury goods diminishes after the introduction of the common European currency.
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Table 3.25: Robustness check: Alternative measurement of consumption ex-
penditure
RER RER Relative RER
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) prices (tradables)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.4953*** -.3163*** -.8029*** .0161
(.0923) (.0919) (.0661) (.0822)
Luxury consumption -.5789*** -.2510*** -.0432 -.5419***
(.1572) (.0481) (.0959) (.0973)
Government consumption .1669 .2111 .1919 .0113
(.4426) (.1716) (.2497) (.3311)
L.Investment .4600** .2194*** .0000 .4246**
(.1648) (.0612) (.0608) (.1477)
L.FDI -.0490 -.0231 -.0307
(.0298) (.0134) (.0245)
L.Openness .1324 -.1128 .2445
(.2505) (.1421) (.2149)
DCrisis -.0551 -.0386 .0003 -.0733
(.0408) (.0256) (.0268) (.0417)
Constant 1.6019 4.0871*** -.4744 1.2877
(1.5317) (.5516) (.3852) (1.2813)
Adj. R-Square .6373 .7674 .7223 .5143
Observations 143 139 146 143
Hausman χ2 57.43 24.71 30.08 37.21
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
Alternative measurement of consumption expenditure
In the baseline models, consumption of luxury relative to basic goods and con-
sumption of nontradables relative to tradables (both variables expressed relative
to Germany) are used to assess the effect of the consumption structure on the
RER development. The results indicate that a shift toward luxury tradable goods
has induced a price increase in the sector of tradables. If this is true, then the
effect can be captured by the level of luxury consumption (again relative to Ger-
many) as well. Hence, in the next four regressions, the robustness of the results
regarding the effect of a shift in consumption toward luxury goods is tested by
replacing the variables used above by consumption of luxury goods and services
relative to Germany. As shown in Table 3.25 the coefficient is negative and highly
significant in the regressions of both the overall real exchange rate and the real
exchange rate in the external sector. Increasing consumption of luxury goods and
services is associated with real appreciation and the result is robust to different
measurement of luxury consumption.
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Time series analyses
The main findings from the previous subsection are reassessed in the following for
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia and Slovakia in time series anal-
yses. The estimation for the other five countries considered in the panel analysis
is not possible since data for these countries covers only a very short time span of
less than 15 observations. Furthermore, the short time span makes it impossible
to include all potential explanations of the real exchange rate. Thefefore, only the
main determinants identified in the previous subsection are used as estimators in
the time series analyses.
Tables 3.26-3.29 show the results of the time series analyses. As in the panel
analyses above, the regressions of relative prices contain only driving forces of the
internal real exchange rate. The regressions of the external real exchange rate
contain potential supply-side explanations for the development of tradables prices
relative to abroad but also some demand-side variables. As the panel analyses
indicate, tradables real exchange rates are also driven by shifts in consumption
demand since PPP is not fulfilled even in the external sector. To assure compa-
rability with the panel regressions, the first column in each table represents the
results from panel analyses with the same explanatory variables as in the time
series analyses.
The results of the panel analysis of the overall RER can be confirmed by and large
by the time series analyses. In the regressions of overall RER, the productivity
variable has a significantly negative effect in the time series analyses for Estonia
and Slovakia (only in the regression of HICP-deflated RER). In the regressions of
relative prices (Table 3.28) the effect is stronger and the coefficient is significant
in Estonia, Slovenia and Slovakia. The coefficient ranges between -0.42 and -0.98.
In Hungary and the Czech Republic, the coefficient is correctly signed, though
insignificant.
The effect of private consumption on the real exchange rate can be observed in
all five countries. In Slovakia, Slovenia and the Czech Republic increasing con-
sumption of tradables relative to nontradables is associated with real appreciation
(positive coefficient of the corresponding variable in the regressions of overall RER
based on HICP and/or GDP deflator). The positive coefficient is also confirmed in
the regressions of relative prices. In the regressions of the external real exchange
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Table 3.26: Explanations for the development of overall RER based on GDP
deflator: Time series analyses
Panel CZ EE HU SI SK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.3277* -.1511 -.7580*** .2125 .0591 -.3023
(.1555) (.2093) (.1713) (.4438) (.2980) (.2033)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .8253** 1.0272** .3036 .5331 -.0566 1.5231***
(.3106) (.3890) (.1923) (.4748) (.3456) (.4171)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.2777 -.8675 -.3841** -.7203** -.3679** -.5538*
(.1721) (.7775) (.1669) (.3034) (.1557) (.2663)
L.Investment .2908 -.1619 -.1801** .5108** .2268** -.1545
(.1762) (.4242) (.0800) (.2061) (.0798) (.1170)
L.FDI -.0543 -.0495 -.0766*** .0106 .0115 .0380*
(.0303) (.0485) (.0149) (.0385) (.0199) (.0184)
Constant 4.9301*** 5.0444*** 4.6436*** 4.4470*** 4.3438*** 4.4348***
(.3000) (.5717) (.1992) (.3785) (.3050) (.3299)
Adj. R-Square .6575 .9159 .9420 .7707 .4259 .9729
Observations 143 19 18 17 17 15
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation in the panel regression.
Table 3.27: Explanations for the development of overall RER based on HICP:
Time series analyses
Panel CZ EE HU SI SK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.2831** -.1451 -.4830*** -.3159 .1675 -.3854***
(.1066) (.1580) (.0803) (.3596) (.1650) (.0821)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .4997*** .4871*** .1725 .5705 .5845** 1.0740***
(.1105) (.1559) (.1082) (.4321) (.2014) (.1727)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.1406** -.4957 -.1267 -.5354** .1230 .0443
(.0448) (.3888) (.0767) (.2310) (.0771) (.1069)
L.Investment .1331** -.1120 -.0736** .4412** -.0453 .0164
(.0574) (.2106) (.0325) (.1606) (.0350) (.0586)
L.FDI -.0321** -.0374 -.0318* .0336 -.0164 -.0046
(.0117) (.0215) (.0150) (.0425) (.0102) (.0091)
Constant 4.7981*** 4.8857*** 4.5335*** 4.1715*** 5.0335*** 4.9152***
(.1269) (.3102) (.1113) (.3315) (.1996) (.1151)
Adj. R-Square .7855 .9119 .9106 .8630 .8167 .9869
Observations 139 17 17 17 16 15
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation in the panel regression.
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Table 3.28: Explanations for real appreciation via increasing relative prices:
Time series analyses
Panel CZ EE HU SI SK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -.7556*** -.2093 -.9775*** -.3166 -.4335** -.4185***
(.0785) (.1262) (.1750) (.3091) (.1666) (.1237)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .2771 .6233*** -.1774 .7331* .8043*** .2749
(.2176) (.1327) (.1855) (.3568) (.1898) (.3810)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) .0671 -.2467 -.4920** .1242 -.0965 -.5244***
(.1163) (.2319) (.1634) (.2250) (.0735) (.1617)
L.Investment -.0583 -.0499 -.0919 .1611 -.1305* -.1703
(.0851) (.1589) (.0861) (.1576) (.0667) (.1324)
Constant -.1255 .0313 -.7813*** .0537 .2660* -.2526
(.1258) (.1360) (.1735) (.2046) (.1451) (.2538)
Adj. R-Square .7316 .9485 .8526 .7341 .9301 .9573
Observations 146 19 18 17 18 16
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation in the panel regression.
Table 3.29: Explanations for real appreciation in the tradables sector: Time
series analyses
Panel CZ EE HU SI SK
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) .3464 .1001 .5783*** .1477 -.0439 1.2274
(.2419) (.2182) (.0476) (.3142) (.3424) (.6763)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -.4930** -1.2384** .0967* -.8022*** -.0894 -.2152
(.1666) (.4835) (.0446) (.1719) (.1799) (.4306)
L.Investment .1864 -.4021 -.1334** .1869 .0576 -.0779
(.1079) (.2585) (.0448) (.1744) (.1128) (.3013)
L.FDI -.0023 -.0011 -.0386*** .0239 .0228 .0521
(.0170) (.0258) (.0069) (.0437) (.0163) (.0360)
Private sector share 1.0080** -1.7356** -.2138 -.8809 .5897** -.8189
(.3330) (.7503) (.3182) (.5959) (.1893) (2.4585)
Constant .0700 12.0480*** 6.0159*** 8.1444*** 1.8885** 8.0527
(1.6007) (3.3969) (1.3629) (2.5049) (.6592) (1.2529)
Adj. R-Square .4155 .8850 .9474 .7626 .7894 .8593
Observations 145 17 17 15 16 15
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation in the panel regression.
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rate, though, the coefficient is insignificant.
In Hungary, Estonia and Slovenia, a shift of overall consumption toward luxury
goods affects the real exchange rate development and leads to appreciation of the
overall real exchange rate (based on either HICP or the GDP deflator). The ef-
fect of luxury consumption on RER in the tradables sector can be confirmed for
Estonia, Hungary and the Czech Republic. The coefficient is negative for most of
the countries, though not significant.
Contrary to the other explanatory variables discussed above, the effect of invest-
ment demand differs from country to country. The coefficient in the regressions of
overall RER is significant and positive in Hungary and Slovenia, negative in Esto-
nia and insignificant in Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The same holds true for
the coefficient of private sector share in GDP in the regressions of external RER.
The coefficient is significantly positive in Slovenia, negative in Czech Republic and
insignificant in Estonia, Hungary and Slovakia.
To sum up, the time series analyses confirm that productivity and shift in private
consumption are important explanations for the real appreciation in transition
economies. Furthermore, they also indicate that the effect of other variables like
investment demand and private sector share in GDP is rather weak and not present
in all countries. This result underlines the advantage of panel analysis in cases
where only short time series are available. Pooling data across several countries
is an usefull tool to increase the power of econometric analysis. However, it does
not allow for identifying developments that are specific to one particular country.
3.5 Concluding remarks
The impossibility to fulfill simultaneously the criteria for exchange rate and price
level stability appears to be a serious problem for the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe because of the sustained RER appreciation. The plans of Lithua-
nia and Estonia (both joined the exchange rate mechanism ERM2 in June 2004)
to adopt the Euro along with Slovenia were revised because the inflation crite-
rion could not be met. Estonia initially postponed the accession to the EMU to
January 2008 but later changed its target date to January 2011. The Bank of
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Lithuania has announced a new plan for Euro adoption in 2015. Sizeable difficul-
ties in controlling inflation were also the main problem in Latvia (joined ERM2
in May 2005), where the Euro adoption was initially planned for the beginning
of 2008 but in 2006 was postponed until the beginning of 2014. Hungary, Poland
and the Czech Republic have not joined the ERM2 yet, although in 2005 all three
countries announced their plans to adopt the Euro in 2010, 2009 and 2010, re-
spectively. One year later these plans were revised and Euro adoption is not to be
expected in the near future in these countries.
The present analysis shows the real exchange rate development is mainly driven by
productivity growth and by shifts in the composition of total demand. Therefore,
it would be premature to conclude that the real appreciation will no longer char-
acterize the development of the CEEC, as the transition process is mostly over.
The shift of production factors toward more efficient industries, the emergence
of the nontradables service sector, and the increasing productivity coming from
this development, as well as further transition-specific factors, are becoming less
important. On the other side, the slowdown of the productivity growth in the
nontradables sector will reinforce the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect.
In the long term, the real exchange rate is expected to be driven mainly by fac-
tors accompanying the process of real convergence, like productivity growth in the
tradables sector.
Besides the fulfillment of the Maastricht criteria, a further concern among authori-
ties associated with the real appreciation has often been the loss of competitiveness
in the tradables sector (see e.g. Oomes 2005). This concern is due to the fact that
most of the transition economies show considerable current account deficits in the
last years. Though, this current account deficits are not surprising since they are a
corollary of net capital inflows. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe have
attracted a large amount of foreign investment. Furthermore, as pointed out in
Chobanov and Sorsa (2004) and Oomes (2005), the real appreciation should not be
a big deal regarding competitiveness as long as it has been driven by productivity
advances and quality improvements. The present analysis indicates, that produc-
tivity development is one important explanation for the overall real appreciation.
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Table 3.30: Further results
RER RER RER RER
(GDP
deflator)
(GDP
deflator)
(HICP) (HICP)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Productivity (T/N)/(T*/N*) -0.3738** -0.2867 -0.1926* -0.1135
(0.1614) (0.2646) (0.0993) (0.1410)
Consumption (N/T)/(N*/T*) 0.5390* 0.5790*** 0.3898** 0.3037***
(0.2583) (0.1475) (0.1250) (0.0512)
Consumption (L/B)/(L*/B*) -0.2845 -0.2034 -0.1408* -0.0925***
(0.2333) (0.1191) (0.0730) (0.0227)
Government consumption 0.1416 0.5295 0.0901 0.3312*
(0.4567) (0.3496) (0.1949) (0.1707)
L.Investment 0.2533 0.1305 0.1804* 0.0916
(0.2220) (0.1318) (0.0969) (0.0646)
L.FDI -0.0923 -0.0421* -0.0438** -0.0218*
(0.0528) (0.0230) (0.0172) (0.0107)
L.Openness 0.2762 0.1563 -0.0102 0.0213
(0.3419) (0.1415) (0.1251) (0.0590)
Private sector share 0.6759*** 1.2724** -0.0519 0.4637**
(0.1664) (0.3938) (0.1124) (0.1914)
Administered prices (Eurostat) -0.0529 -0.1283**
(0.1122) (0.0540)
Administered prices (EBRD) 0.0837 -0.1326**
(0.1838) (0.0481)
DCrisis -0.0264 -0.0354 -0.0328 -0.0567***
(0.0366) (0.0328) (0.0251) (0.0168)
Constant 0.6500 -1.1171 5.4994*** 3.2935***
(1.6896) (1.6727) (0.4085) (0.7679)
Adj. R-Square 0.5483 0.6565 0.7626 0.7792
Observations 109 110 109 110
Time span 1996-2009 2001-2011 1996-2009 2001-2011
Fixed/random effects FE FE FE FE
Source: Own calculations;
*/**/*** significant at 10%/5%/1%;
Standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for heteroscedasticity and autocorre-
lation as well as for cluster specific serial correlation.
Chapter 4
Explanations for the political
trust in national and European
political institutions
4.1 Introduction
Since the economic turbulences in the second half of 2008, the political process
in the European Union has been shaped by a range of unprecedented events and
discussions. After numerous unpunished cases of violation of the Stability and
Growth Pact, it now appears that the no-bailout clause incorporated in Article
125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union can be reinterpreted
in a way that allows for several of the solvent countries to be liable for the commit-
ments of other member states with insufficient fiscal discipline. Justification has
been provided even for the purchases of government bonds of financially stricken
countries by the seemingly independent European Central Bank. The discussion
about Eurobonds, which will irrevocably cross out the no-bailout clause, is still
vivid, and further plans for transferring competencies to the European level of gov-
ernance are already in operation. The previous is not surprising, since it is well
documented in the literature that “centralization ... breeds further centralization”
(Beer 1973: 75), and that bureaucracies expand simply because they exist (Parkin-
son 1957).1 It is surprising, however, for this process of further centralization to
experience significant acceleration in times, when trust in European governmental
1Vaubel et al. (2007), for instance, investigate staff growth in international organizations
and show that the elasticity of staff to membership is much larger than unity (1.36).
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institutions reaches its historical minimum. Whereas in 2007 three out of four
respondents to the Eurobarometer survey tended to trust European institutions
(Eurobarometer 67), this number has been steadily decreasing in recent years. At
the end of 2011 only one out of three respondents trusted the European Commis-
sion and the Council of the European Union (Eurobarometer 76). Therefore, trust
in the European institutions converges to the traditionally lower level of trust in
national institutions in many EU member states.
The downturn of popular trust in governmental institutions is accompanied by a
sharp decline in political participation, as reflected by voter turnout. In Germany
and France, for instance, the voter turnout in national elections decreased by over
20 percent in the period 1970-2010, from 90 percent to 70 per cent in Germany,
and from 80 per cent to 60 per cent in France.2 The turnout of the latest elec-
tions in 2009 regarding the European Parliament was about 22 per cent lower in
Germany and the Netherlands than the turnout of the elections thirty years ago.
Meanwhile it is questionable if the members of the European Parliament can be
considered representatives for their electorate, since turnout data shows that in
some countries, especially in Eastern Europe, less than one out of three eligible
voters do in fact cast their votes.3
The number of common policy fields within the European Union is increasing but
there is still a lack of transparency with regard to the decision-making process at
EU level. Just like in any international organization, the European citizens are
quite distant from the governing institutions - both in a direct and figurative sense.
The preferences of the political actors at EU level differ strongly from those of the
representative voter (Schmitt/Thomassen 1999, Vaubel 2009). Using data from
the European Elite Survey performed by the University of Sienna in 2006 (Univer-
sity of Sienna 2006), Vaubel (2009) shows that EU-related opinions of the general
public strongly differ from the opinions of top Commission officials and members
of the European Parliament.4 Lack of transparency of the decision-making process
within the European institutions, the large spatial distance between the institu-
tions and the voters, as well as the extended chains of delegation are all legitimate
2According to data from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(IDEA).
3For instance the voter turnout of the 2009 elections for European Parliament was 28 per
cent in the Czech Republic, 24.5 per cent in Poland, 27.6 per cent in Romania, 28.3 per cent in
Slovenia, and even 19.6 per cent in Slovakia.
4A further survey performed by Gallup (1996) shows that both national civil servants and
parliamentarians are “more EU-minded than citizens” (Vaubel 2009, p. 56).
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reasons for the prevalent belief among the citizens that they have less influence at
the EU than at the national level (Eurobarometer 44.1, Nov./Dec. 1995). This
principal-agent problem in the structures of the European Union explains why
many EU citizens show less confidence in the European Parliament than in the
national parliaments (Norris, 1999).
The aim of the present chapter is to analyze the driving forces of popular trust in
national and European governmental institutions. The empirical evidence thus far
shows that there is a range of economic factors, which are important for the pro-
cess of trust-building and trust-maintenance (see e.g. Roth et al. 2011, Mun˜oz et
al. 2011). Parameters such as GDP growth and unemployment tend to influence
the level of political trust, since they are important indicators for the performance
and, therefore, the trustworthiness of governmental institutions. However, the
existing empirical literature has not considered one important aspect of the pro-
cess of trust-building and trust-maintenance, namely the nature and particular
characteristics of the relationship between the voter as principal and the political
institutions as agent. As in every principal-agent relationship, the principal is
more likely to trust the agent if more information about the way the agent fulfills
his assignment is available and/or if the principal has more control over the actions
of the agent.5
This chapter consists of two main parts. The first part is devoted to the differ-
ences in political trust at European and national level. The concept of relative
political trust is introduced and its determinants are further analyzed. Empirical
investigation based on individual data from Eurobarometer offers explanations for
the different levels of trust in European institutions compared to their national
counterparts. The results indicate that socio-cultural and performance-based fac-
tors, perceived benefits and principal-agent problems explain the level of trust in
national relativ to European institutions.
In the second part driving forces of popular trust in national and European institu-
tions are analyzed since the breakout of the current economic crisis and compared
to the pre-crisis period. The panel analysis is based on semiannual data from the
Eurobarometer survey. The empirical analysis investigates the determinants of
trust in the national parliament and national government on the one hand, and
5About principal-agent problems in international organizations in general see Vaubel (2006).
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European Parliament, European Commission and Council of the European Union
on the other. An allowance for a structural break at the beginning of the current
economic crisis was made. The empirical results of the current analysis confirm
the role of important economic indicators. Furthermore, they confirm the impor-
tance of the principal-agent problem for the trust building process with regard to
governmental institutions. When the economy runs smoothly, for instance, people
tend to trust the European and the national institutions more, if they understand
the way the European Union works. In times of crisis, however, the sign of the
relationship is reversed, and the results indicate that people who understand the
politics of the European Union find its institutions even less trustworthy. This re-
sult indicates that in times of crisis people indeed became increasingly dissatisfied
with the political system of the European Union.
The chapter is organized as follows: The next section offers an overview of the
theoretical background for the process of trust-building and trust-maintenance.
Section 4.3 presents the empirical analysis of trust in national relative to Euro-
pean institutions. Section 4.4 is devoted to the panel analysis of trust in national
and European political institutions during the current economic crisis. A sum-
mary of the results and some concluding remarks are presented in section 4.5.
4.2 Theoretical background of political trust
4.2.1 Literature review of explanations for the level of po-
litical trust
The initiation of the systematic theoretical analysis of the process behind trust-
building and trust maintenance with regard to political authorities goes back to
the 1960s and the early 1970s when an abrupt decline in the political trust among
US citizens was observed. A much quoted and fairly controversial paper by Arthur
Miller (1974) has often been considered as the leadoff to significant analysis of po-
litical distrust in US society.6 Miller interprets the prevalent political discontent
and alienation not only as a threat for the political authorities but also as endan-
gering the whole political regime. A critical reading of Miller’s view on the political
6See e.g. Abramson (1983).
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situation was almost immediately published by Citrin (1974) who argued that the
lack of political support among US citizens is addressed rather toward the politi-
cal authorities and the current incumbents, and its interpretation as endangering
the political system as a whole can be seen as ”premature, if not misleading” (p.
978). In response Miller released further supporting arguments for his view and
concluded:
“The trend toward increased distrust, therefore, reflects
growing dissatisfaction and discontent with the performance of
government in the US.” (Miller, 1974a, p. 992)
Further foundation for the systematic analysis of political trust is provided by
David Easton in a series of publications about the concept of political support
(Easton, 1965, 1975, Easton and Dennis, 1969). Easton draws a distinction be-
tween specific support on the one hand, which is directly related to the current
satisfaction that members of a system possess with regard to the perceived po-
litical and economic performance of the authorities; and diffuse support on the
other hand, which can be considered as a “reservoir of favorable attitudes or good
will” toward the governing authorities since it is rather based on the long-term
experience with the authorities and is thus independent from the output and per-
formance in the short run. According to Easton’s conception, diffuse support will
typically express itself in two forms: in the belief in the legitimacy of the political
authorities and the regime as a whole, and in political trust. Easton defines trust
in Gamson’s terms as ”the probability [. . . ] that the political system (or some part
of it) will produce preferred outcomes even if left untended” (Gamson, 1968, p. 54)
and detects the sources of the level of political trust in the process of socialization
as well as in the experience with the authorities over time. Easton (1975) stresses
that the political and economic performance of the authorities can be considered
as a determinant, both of the specific and the diffuse support and thus of the
level of trust among the members of the system and the legitimacy of the political
regime. While the specific support is directly related to the current outcome of
the authorities, it is the experience aggregated over time that determines the level
of diffuse support.
In accordance with the foregoing considerations by Easton, the theoretical expla-
nations for political trust can be broadly classified into two main groups: socio-
cultural and political-economic. Socio-cultural theories provide a wide range of
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sociological as well as social-psychological determinants for the trust-building pro-
cess and are also applicable for most of the political attitudes. The main conclusion
is that political attitudes are the result of the early life experience and thus can be
influenced by factors such as age, education level, gender and socioeconomic status
(e.g., Almond and Verba, 1963, Easton, 1975, and Ingelhard, 1990). Therefore,
the explanations for the process of trust-building and trust-maintenance delivered
by the socio-cultural theories are by and large exogenous for the political system
and can only indirectly and to a certain extent be influenced by the political and
economic performance of the authorities.7
The conventional political-economic explanations for the level of political trust
are mainly based on the perceived performance of the political authorities. Higher
level of political trust is the result of a steadily positively judged experience with
the authorities and the political system as a whole (Miller, 1974, Easton, 1975,
Rogowski, 1974, Weatherford, 1989), whereas both the economic and the politi-
cal performance of the authorities are considered as key factors. However, it is
worth noting that it is not the outcome of the authorities itself, but rather the
perception about their performance that determines trust among the members of
the political system, since individuals do not respond to reality on its own, but
to their subjective perception of reality (Lewin 1936). This fact is also recognized
by Dalton and Eichenberg (1994) in their analysis of the public support for the
European integration process:
”In general it is more important to know what Europeans think
about economic conditions rather than to measure the economy in
objective terms.” (Dalton and Eichenberg, 1994, p. 20, in Marsh, 1999)
Their consideration motivates Marsh (1999) to include the variable ”perceived eco-
nomic improvement” in his empirical analysis of the satisfaction with EU politics
among the European citizens.
In well-established democracies the perceived economic performance of the gov-
ernment as measured by the perception about the overall economic conditions as
well as the individual material well-being are important explanations for a wide
7While factors such as gender and age are independent from the political outcome, factors like
socioeconomic status or education level can be indirectly affected on average by the performance
of the political authorities.
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range of political attitudes and especially for the level of political trust (Lewis-
Beck 1988). However, Clarke et al. (1992) demonstrate that besides the economic
output of the authorities, the perceived political performance of the government is
a further significant driving force of the process of trust building in society. It can
be expected that the sense of e.g. security, respect of human rights, equality or
compliance with the law is going to stimulate political trust among the members
of the political system.
Early analyses show that political trust is the result of accumulated positive eval-
uation of the performance of the system or the governmental institutions (Easton
and Dennis 1969). However, the measurement of the overall performance of politi-
cal institutions is hardly possible. Furthermore, in times of economic crises it is the
performance in economic terms which is actually expected to drive considerably
the level of popular trust in governmental institutions. Hence, the performance
of the institutions reflected by the prevailing economic situation (as measured by
leading economic indicators or the perception of the economic situation captured
by the responses to survey questions) should positively affect the level of political
trust in national institutions. Roth et al. (2011) deliver some directly related sup-
port for this hypothesis. Using Eurobarometer data they show that the increasing
distrust in national institutions is related to an increase in unemployment in the
EU-15. Furthermore, in the EU-27 increasing levels of public debt contribute to
the decrease of net trust both in national and European governmental institutions.
The analysis by Mun˜oz et al. (2011) provides some indirect evidence about the
effect of performance of governmental institutions on the level of political trust.
The main question of their analysis concerns the relationship between trust in
national and trust in European institutions. The starting point of the study is the
existing controversy in the literature regarding the sign of this relationship. On the
one hand, Sa´nchez-Cuenca (2000) and Kritzinger (2003) suggest that confidence
in national institutions hinders trust in their European counterparts, since the
trust-building process involves the evaluation of the performance of the particular
institutions. A positive evaluation of the performance of national institutions, and
therefore higher trust level with regard to the national institutions, mean higher
costs of transferring sovereignty to the EU level of government and lower trust
level in European institutions (Sa´nchez-Cuenca 2000). Kritzinger (2003) delivers
a slightly different argument for the negative relationship: As a sign of protest
citizens tend to express higher confidence in European institutions if they do not
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trust the national counterparts. Mun˜oz et al. (2011) refer to these arguments
supporting the negative relationship between trust in national and European in-
stitutions as the “compensation” model. On the other hand, Kritzinger (2003)
applies the “equal assessments” model developed by Anderson (1998) and argues
that EU citizens can also show higher trust levels in the European institutions
if they trust the national institutions, demonstrating a positive relationship be-
tween both trust levels. As an explanation Anderson (1998) and Kritzinger (2003)
stress the fact that citizens possess very low levels of information and knowledge
about EU politics and therefore base their opinions on domestic attitudes. If sat-
isfied with the performance of national institutions they tend to trust institutions
in general and therefore exhibit higher levels of trust in European institutions.
Furthermore, since national institutions are more or less directly involved in the
EU architecture, it is possible that trust in national political institutions is trans-
ferred to their European counterparts. This argument, which Mun˜oz et al. (2011)
referred to as the “congruence argument”, is also supported by the analyses by
Medrano (1995) and Rohrschneider (2002). Using data from the European Social
Survey Mun˜oz et al. (2011) provide evidence both for the compensation and the
congruence argument: They argue that high confidence in the national parlia-
ments positively impacts the trust in the European Parliament at individual level
(congruence); however, being citizen of a country with relatively high aggregated
confidence level with regard to the national parliament means heaving less confi-
dence in the European Parliament (compensation).
Although the analysis of the relationship between trust in national and trust in
European institutions can be tainted by the problem of common cause interdepen-
dence, it delivers some valuable insights about the controversy, which dominates
the effect of improving economic conditions on trust in European institutions. If
the citizens of the European Union use the performance of national institutions
as a proxy for the performance of their European counterparts, then the expected
sign of the relationship between economic performance and trust in European in-
stitutions is the same as in the case of trust in national institutions. However, if
better performance of the national economy hampers the support for transferring
competencies to European governmental institution, then it is possible to observe
the reverse sign with regard to the European institutions as well. The evidence
by Roth et al. (2011) supports the first hypothesis, since low growth levels of
GDP per capita and high public debt are associated with declining trust in the
European Commission and the European Parliament in times of crisis. However,
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it should be kept in mind that the opposite sign is likewise possible.
4.2.2 Explanations based on the principal-agent problem
The literature related to the level of political support and especially political trust
offers mainly sociological factors and factors based on the perceived economic
and political performance as determinants for the level of trust toward political
institutions. A further range of explanations for the trust level can be found
in the circumstances surrounding the relationship between the members and the
authorities of a political system. General trust and in particular political trust
can be viewed as the result of the perceived future activities of the person or the
authority under consideration:
”To say that I trust you means I have reasons to expect you to act,
for your own reasons, as my agent.” (Hardin, 1999, S. 26)
If the members of the political system as principals strongly believe that their
agents - the political authorities - pay attention to their interests, they are more
likely to exhibit a higher level of trust. However, it is more often than not the case
that political institutions and incumbents have their own vested interests, which
differ from those of the representative voter. As a consequence, the level of po-
litical trust will decline with an increasing perceived magnitude of the divergence
between the interests of the authorities and the members of the political system.
The intensity of the principal-agent problem described thus far can be influenced
by a wide range of important factors. To some extent it is captured by the per-
ceived performance of the political authorities: if the citizens evaluate the per-
formance of the authorities affirmatively, it is very likely that they would assess
the actions of the political agents as if they were in their own interest. A positive
experience with the political authorities over time will thus smother the prob-
lem. However, the favorable performance of the political agents does not solve the
problem since it is founded on the information asymmetries between the principal
and the agent. Long chains of delegation, lacking communication and information
facilities, the large distance between the majority of the citizens and the seat of
the authorities can all be used as explanations for lacking political trust and even
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political alienation despite high political and economic performance. Furthermore,
the feeling that one’s voice has only a negligible weight and that the citizens can-
not influence the political process at all is also expected to be negatively linked to
the political trust among the members of the political system. The consequences
of the principal-agent problem between the voters and the political authorities can
thus be further used to explain the level of political trust among the members of
the political system.
It is well documented that people are very poorly informed about the role and the
common practices within the European governmental institutions. According to
Eurobarometer data in 2011 69 per cent of the respondents consider themselves
as fairly badly or very badly informed about the European Parliament’s sphere
of work (EB Parlemeter 74.3). In 2007 43 per cent believed that the European
Parliament has the greatest decision-making power within the European Union,
as opposed to 14 per cent for the European Commission and ten per cent for the
Council of the European Union (Special Eurobarometer 288). According to the
same issue of Eurobaromter only 48 per cent of the respondents are aware that the
members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the citizens of the
EU. In the Czech Republic, Sweden and the Netherlands actually the prevailing
opinion is that members of the European Parliament are not directly elected.
This information asymmetry is the constituent element of the principal-agent prob-
lem between the median voters as principals and the governmental institutions as
agents. Information costs and limited control mechanisms explain the fact that a
considerable share of the population is rationally ignorant as regards the political
process. Although the principal-agent problem is also present with regard to the
national institutions, it is more severe with respect to the European government,
since the relationship between the voters as principals and some of the European
institutions as agents is tainted by a principal-agent problem at more than one
stage of delegation (see Vaubel 2006, Vaubel et al. 2007). In the case of the Eu-
ropean Commission citizens of parliamentary democracies, for instance, elect in
the first instance their national parliaments, which choose the national executive
(two-stage principal-agent problem up to this point). The members of the Euro-
pean Commission are then chosen by the President (nominated by the European
Council, thus from the Heads of State or Government of the member states) from
candidates put forward by the EU member states. The list of Commissioners must
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then be approved by the Council of the European Union and the European Parlia-
ment. The Council of the European Union is composed of several configurations
of representatives of the national governments elected by the national parliaments.
This would include two stages of delegation if all members of the Council were (at
least indirectly) elected by all citizens of the European Union. According to the
structure of the Council, however, the two-stage principal-agent problem exists
between the citizens of a member state and only one of the members of the Coun-
cil, namely the one representing their home country (dependent upon the topic of
discussion). The election of other members can be considered not in the control
of the median voter of each country. Among the European institutions only the
European Parliament is directly elected by the citizens of the EU member states.
However, as the Eurobarometer data has shown, the voters are neither informed
about the role of this institution nor are they really aware of the way the members
of the European Parliament get elected.
As Vaubel has pointed out, the information asymmetry between international or-
ganizations and their principals is due to high information cost and weak incentive
to be informed (Vaubel 2006). Besides the long chains of delegation, there is a
range of circumstances which intensify this problem. Large distance between the
seat of the European institutions and the citizens of the European Union as well as
language barriers increase the cost of information gathering compared to the case
of national institutions. Furthermore, the median voter has only a weak incentive
to collect information and to look for possibilities to exercise control, since the cen-
tralization of policies at the European level reduces the scope for comparison of the
performance of European institutions, the so-called “yardstick competition”. As
Eurobarometer data further demonstrates, the respondents believe to have only
marginal possibilities of influencing the political process at European level. At the
end of 2011 only one out of four respondents tend to agree with the statement “My
voice counts in the EU.” (Eurobarometer 76), and this trend has being decreasing.
All those aspects of the principal-agent problem breed distrust among the citizens
of the European Union, and the severity of the problem explains the fact that
trust in the European Union decreases faster than trust in national institutions.
The European level of government was embraced with hope at the beginning of
the integration process, especially in countries where the level of trust in national
institutions has been traditionally low, such as Italy and the countries of Central
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and Eastern Europe.8 The current economic crisis brought about a lot of dis-
enchantment, and the optimism in these countries to have the problems of their
national governmental systems solved by transferring competencies to European
authorities has significantly decelerated. It becomes more and more questionable
if centralization can be justified at all, since lacking knowledge and understanding
for the EU policy and only weak control mechanisms are expected to breed further
distrust among the EU citizens. This hypothesis will be subject to the empirical
analysis of the following section.
Figure 4.1 summarizes the theoretical explanations for the process of trust-building
and trust-maintenance with regard to national and European political institutions.
Socio-cultural and political-economic explanations for political trust should not be
considered as competing theories. They should rather be used as complements in
empirical analyses of the determinants of the trust level as regards the political
authorities.
8See also Martinotti and Stefanizzi (1995, p. 176 f) for the case of Italy, and Mishler and
Rose (1997) for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe.
Chapter 4. Trust in national and European institutions 155
Tr
us
t i
n 
th
e 
na
tio
na
l a
nd
E
ur
op
ea
n 
in
st
itu
tio
nP
ol
iti
ca
l-e
co
no
m
ic
 e
xp
la
na
tio
ns
S
oc
io
-c
ul
tu
ra
l e
xp
la
na
tio
ns
E
xp
la
na
tio
ns
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
P
rin
ci
pa
l-A
ge
nt
 P
ro
bl
em
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
-b
as
ed
 
ex
pl
an
at
io
ns
A
ge
G
en
de
r
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
tri
ev
al
In
te
re
st
s 
of
 
po
lit
ic
al
 a
ct
or
s 
E
co
no
m
ic
 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
E
du
ca
tio
n
In
flu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 
op
in
io
n 
le
ad
er
s 
C
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
of
 
na
tio
na
l i
nt
er
es
ts
P
ol
iti
ca
l 
pe
rfo
rm
an
ce
C
os
ts
 o
f 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
tri
ev
al
In
ce
nt
iv
e 
to
 u
se
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 
on
e'
s 
ow
n 
vo
ic
e
Tr
an
sf
er
s
D
is
ta
nc
e 
fro
m
 
po
lit
ic
al
 in
st
itu
tio
ns
W
or
ki
ng
 la
ng
ua
ge
A
ct
ua
l b
en
ef
its
 
(N
et
 re
ce
ip
ts
 fr
om
 th
e 
E
U
 b
ud
ge
t)
P
er
ce
iv
ed
 
be
ne
fit
s
F
ig
u
r
e
4
.1
:
T
h
eo
re
ti
ca
l
ex
p
la
n
at
io
n
s
fo
r
th
e
tr
u
st
in
n
at
io
n
al
an
d
E
u
ro
p
ea
n
p
ol
it
ic
a
l
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
Chapter 4. Trust in national and European institutions 156
4.3 Explanations for the political trust in na-
tional relative to European institutions9
4.3.1 The concept of relative political trust
The theoretical explanations presented in the previous section are aimed at ex-
plaining the level of trust attended to a specific political authority and demand an
adequate adjustment in order to be applied as explanations for the relative trust
in national compared to the corresponding European institutions.
For the purpose of the present analysis the relative trust is defined as the differ-
ence between the level of trust toward the national institution and the trust level
expressed by the respondents with regard to the European counterpart of the in-
stitution under consideration. Higher levels of relative trust can thus be observed
if the citizens of the member states are more likely to trust the national institution
and/or express less confidence10 in the corresponding European institution. Rela-
tive trust amounting to zero is the result of equally high or low levels of confidence
with regard to both the national and to the European institution. This approach
allows explanation factors to be left out which affect the political trust over the
level of general trust and should have a similar impact on the confidence in the
national as well as in the European institution.11
While most of the socio-cultural driving forces of the political trust described
above are expected to have similar effects on the confidence in the authorities
both at national and European level and should thus cancel out when implied for
the variable in relative terms, it is also possible that some personal characteristics
can influence the level of relative trust. Norris (1999) offers some confirmation of
this hypothesis in her empirical analysis of public support of the European po-
litical regime. In accordance with the empirical evidence thus far, she presumes
that young people as well as more highly skilled people are likely to express more
9The analyses presented in this section were conducted in 2007.
10In the following the word confidence is used synonymously with the word trust.
11For instance, if we assume a positive influence of the overall life satisfaction on the political
trust via the channel of the general trust, this factor can be excluded from the analysis of
the relative trust, since it would affect the confidence both in the national and the European
institution alike. One important exception is the case in which the overall satisfaction is caused
by the outcome of a specific political authority. However, under these circumstances its effect
should be captured by the perceived performance of the authority.
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support for the idea of a united Europe, while older people and those with a lower
level of education show more nationalism and conservatism and thus less support
for the European political regime. The effect of the socio-cultural aspect is cap-
tured in her empirical analysis by the variables of gender, age, social status, and
the education level measured as the number of years of education. All four vari-
ables turn out to have a strongly significant effect on the level of support for the
European political regime. Although the support for the idea of a united Europe
and the political regime is a different concept from that of the relative trust as
defined above, it is very likely that the socio-cultural background can also be used
as an explanation for the level of relative trust among European society.
While the socio-cultural variables can be directly included in the empirical analysis
of relative trust, the political-economic explanations need an adjustment in order
to obtain the variables in relative terms. In the case of the political-economic driv-
ing forces of political trust, an appropriate approach is to use a relative variable
expressed as the ratio between the value for the national institution and for its
European equivalent, or in the case of a discrete scale, such as in most of the social
surveys, as the difference between the two values.
The significance of the political and the economic performance as an explanation
for public support with respect to European integration or the European political
regime has already been tested. Dalton and Eichenberg (1991, 1993) observe a
significantly positive correlation between the evaluation of the country’s economic
performance and the support for EU membership. As a further explanatory vari-
able they propose the intra-EC exports of a country as a fraction of its total
exports, a variable which turns out to have a significantly positive impact on the
support for EU membership too. Vaubel (1993, 1994) confirms the results regard-
ing the effect of trade integration and also finds a significantly positive correlation
between the net receipts from the EC budget and the support for the European
unification. In this context it can be expected that a higher level of political
support and in particular of political trust as regards the European institutions
should be observed for citizens who expect some benefits from the EU membership
of their home country. This argument is in accordance with the definition of gen-
eral trust proposed by Hardin (1999) and Easton (1965, 1975).12 If the European
institutions contribute with their own activities to the interests of the population
of an EU member state, then they should appear to be trustworthy to the citizens
12See the preceding section.
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of this particular country. One possibility to capture this effect is to use the net
receipts of the country from the budget of the European Union, as in the analysis
by Vaubel (1994). Moreover, as a further measure the subjective opinion of the
citizens with respect to the benefits of their own country from its EU membership
can be used, since the present chapter makes use of data at individual level in the
empirical part.
The relative performance of the political institutions is a plausible explanation for
the differences in relative trust especially as regards the cross country comparison.
A notable discrepancy in the level of relative trust is observed in particular be-
tween the “old” 15 EU member states and the newcomers. Vaubel (2009) points
out that eastern Europeans have much more confidence in European institutions
like the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission than in their na-
tional counterparts. In the style of Martinotti and Stefanizzi (1995, p. 176 f),
the sources of the different levels of trust can be found in the lacking satisfaction
of the peoples of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) regarding
their political and economic situation, just as Italians expect an opportunity for
reform and overcoming the deficits in their present political system from the new
regime of a united Europe. In the same spirit, Mishler and Rose (1997) view the
low levels of political trust in the CEEC as a result of the dissatisfaction with the
economic performance. As regards the political aspect, it is rather optimism in
view of the future and a positive evaluation of the political performance compared
to the communist background that prevails in public political attitudes. An ex-
plicit comparison of the level of relative trust in the new EU member states and
EU-15 is provided in the next subsection.
While the relative performance shows sizable differences between the countries,
this is less the case with the principal-agent problem and its implications for the
relative political trust. The principal-agent problem in the working process of the
major European institutions exhibits similar intensity with regard to most of the
member states. It is a common characteristic of all international organizations,
and hence, of the European Union as such, that the principal-agent problem is
intensified by longer chains of delegation between the voters as principals and the
agent in comparison to other private and public organizations (Vaubel, 2006). The
political actors have vested interests which differ from those of the representative
citizen. They are interested in the survival and growth of their organization, which
can be ensured by expanding competencies, a larger budget and increasing staff
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numbers in spite of a constant or even shrinking output. However, not only the
diverging interests of the principal and the agent constitute the problem; further
determinants of the principal-agent problem can be found in the lack of control on
the part of the voters13 and the poor communication between the institutions at
EU level and the population. European citizens are less informed about the polity
and the working mechanisms of the European institutions than about those of their
national counterparts, and it is not surprising to observe a positive relationship
between their understanding and knowledge of EU politics and the relative trust in
favor of the European institutions. As Sobel (2006, p. 432) puts it, ”in a world of
uncertainty, people often ‘prefer the devil they know to the devil they don’t know’”.
The large distance between most of the citizens of the EU and the European
institutions, the working languages of the institutions that differ in most of the
cases from those of the voters, and the lacking transparency with regard to the
decision-making process are all factors which increase the information costs of the
European citizens (Vaubel, 1994). High information costs, as well as the large
electorate and the indirect kind of democratic control have reduced the incentive
of the individual citizen to search for information sources about European affairs
(Aranson, 1990, Vaubel, 1986, and Teutemann, 1991 in Vaubel, 1994).
Beichelt et al. (2006) describe the problem as a discrepancy between the var-
ious tasks of the political institutions and the opportunities for the citizens to
contribute to the fulfillment of the tasks and thus to be represented in the insti-
tutions. Moreover, recalling Eastons’s (1965, 1975) distinction between specific
support and diffuse accumulated trust, the lack of a long-lasting commitment to
the political regime can be seen as a threat for the political institutions and their
legitimacy in times of crises (Miller, 1974, Kielmannsegg, 1996).
13There is not much scope for the EU citizens to “vote by the feet” or to compare the output
of the European institutions with European rivals, as such are almost lacking.
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4.3.2 Empirical analysis
4.3.2.1 Definition of the variables and a first look at the data
The data for the empirical analysis is taken from Eurobarometer 65.1, which was
collected in spring 2006. It covers the 27 member states of the EU and consists of
24,693 relevant records.14
The dependent variables
Two political institutions are considered in the analysis, parliament and the gov-
ernment. The respondents’ trust in the national institutions is measured by their
answers to the following question:
QA10: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in
certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if
you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it.
3) the (NATIONALITY) Government
4) the (NATIONALITY) Parliament
A corresponding question was also asked with respect to the European institutions.
Following Norris (1999), the European government is represented by the European
Commission and the Council of the European Union:
QA25: And, for each of them [the following European bodies], please tell me
if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?
1) The European Parliament
2) The European Commission
3) The Council of the European Union
In both questions there are two response alternatives: “tend to trust” and “tend
not to trust”. The values of the responses were converted into dummy variables
where the answer “tend to trust” takes the value of one. In order to measure
14The complete dataset consists of 29,170 available records. However, not all of them are
from EU member states.
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the relative trust in favor of the national political institutions, two variables
were generated by subtracting the value of the response to question QA25 from
its corresponding counterpart of question QA10. The trust level with regard to
the European government is calculated as an average of the response values to
subquestions QA25 2) and QA25 3). The variables thus generated, the depen-
dent variables for the empirical analysis, represent the difference in the trust level
of the respondents in the national and European Parliament on the one hand
(rel trust parl), and in the national and European government, on the other hand
(rel trust gov).
The variable rel trust parl can take three values: 1, if the respondent has shown
more trust in the national relative to the European Parliament; 0 in the case
of equal trust levels; and -1, if the political trust in the European Parliament is
higher than that one regarding the national parliament. Figure 4.2 illustrates the
distribution of the relative political trust in the parliament. Over 60 percent of all
respondents have exhibited equal trust levels in the national and in the European
institution, while almost 30 percent tend to trust the European rather than the
national parliament. This result is mainly due to the respondents from the twelve
new EU countries, which show in more than 40 percent of the cases more trust
in the European than in the national parliament. The corresponding explanation
was given in the previous section.
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Figure 4.2: Trust in the national relative to the European Parliament
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
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The variable for the political trust in the national relative to the European govern-
ment can also take integral values between -1 and +1. Subtraction of the average
of the responses to the subquestions QA25 2) and QA25 3) from QA10 4) yields
one of the following values: -1; -0.5; 0; 0.5; 1. However, as 0.5 and -0.5 were not
accepted by the statistical software as ordinal variables, the cases with values 0.5
and -0.5 were added to those with values 1 and -1 since both imply more and
respectively less trust in the national relative to the European government.15 The
variable rel trust gov exhibits a distribution similar to the relative trust in par-
liaments (see Figure 4.3). About 60 percent of the respondents show equal trust
in both the national and the European government, represented by the European
Commission and the Council of the European Union. More than 30 percent trust
the European government rather than the national one, where this fraction is
higher in the twelve new EU member states.
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Figure 4.3: Trust in the national relative to the European government
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
15Alternatively, the values could be doubled to achieve a five-step scale with whole numbers.
However, this makes the interpretation of the empirical model much more complicated. If the
parallel line assumption is violeted (see below), then the empirical results contain four coefficients
per explanatory variable. In the case of three-step scale only two coefficients have to be reported
if the parallel line assumption is violated. Therefore, in the present analysis a three-step scale
was chosen. This approach not only assures easier interpretation of the results. It also makes
the results of the empirical analysis of relative trust in government comparable to those with
regard to parliament.
Chapter 4. Trust in national and European institutions 163
The explanatory variables
As an approximation for the perceived divergence between the performance of
national and European political institutions, question QA34 was used to capture
the satisfaction with the political performance and question QC1 as a measure for
the perceived economic performance:
QA34a: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satis-
fied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUN-
TRY)?
QA34b: And how about the way democracy works in the European Union?
QC1: How would you judge the current situation in each of the following?
1) The situation of the (NATIONALITY) economy
2) The situation of the European economy
A four-step scale was applied for the responses to these questions, and for the
purpose of a better interpretability the primary outcomes were transformed as
follows: The value of one was ascribed to the response “not at all satisfied” for
question QA34 and “very bad” for question QC1, and the maximal value of four
was given to “very satisfied” and “very good” respectively. The variables captur-
ing the perceived relative performance (rel perf econom and rel perf politic) were
generated by subtracting the values for EU performance from those for the home
country. Thus, negative (positive) values indicate better (worse) performance of
the European Union as compared to the home country of the respondents. The
hypothesis to be examined in the empirical analysis is that the variables for the
relative performance have a positive influence on the level of relative trust, as a
better performance of the national relative to the European institutions should
lead over time to higher relative trust as defined in the previous section. Fig-
ure 4.4 illustrates the distribution of the two variables capturing the relative per-
formance. Over 60 percent of the respondents exhibit similar satisfaction with the
way democracy works at both national and European level. In the new member
states almost 30 percent show a higher satisfaction with the European than the
national democracy. By contrast, the respondents from the EU-15 are on average
more satisfied with the way democracy works at the national level.
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Figure 4.4: Relative political and economic performance
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
As for economic performance, the distribution of the perceived relative perfor-
mance is even more striking. About 50 percent of the respondents from all coun-
tries in the survey evaluate the situation of the national economy and the Eu-
ropean economy alike. However, almost 50 percent of the respondents from the
new EU member states are of the opinion that the economic conditions in their
home countries are not as good as in the European economy as a whole. It is thus
possible that this voters hope for better economic conditions from EU membership.
Two variables are used to estimate the effect of the benefits from the EU mem-
bership on relative political trust. The first variable, net receipts per capita from
the EU budget in 2006 (receipt), is calculated from data published in the financial
report of the European Commission (EC, 2007). Data about the population is
taken from Eurostat. Bulgaria and Romania are excluded from the analysis when
the net receipts per capita are used as an explanatory variable, since reliable data
on net receipts is not yet available for these countries.
The effect of the perceived benefits for a country from being a member of the
European Union is captured using the following question:
QA 12: Taking everything into account, would you say that (OUR COUN-
TRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the European
Union?
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A dummy variable named country benefit was built from the responses to this
question. It takes the value one if the respondent has answered the question posi-
tively (“benefited”) and zero otherwise. As shown in Figure 4.5, about 65 percent
of the respondents believe that their home country has benefited from being a
member of the European Union.
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Figure 4.5: Perceived benefits for the home country from being a member of
the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
The expected sign of the coefficients of both variables is negative, since the bene-
fits from EU membership should be associated with a higher level of trust in the
European institutions.
In order to capture the effect of the political interest and the knowledge about
European issues and affairs on the relative political trust, the following three
questions were used:
QA1: When you get together with friends, would you say you discuss political
matters frequently, occasionally, or never?
QA15: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend
to disagree.
5) I understand how the European Union works.
Chapter 4. Trust in national and European institutions 166
QA26: For each of the following statements about the European Union could
you please tell me whether you think it is true or false?
1) The European Union currently consists of fifteen Member States.
2) The members of the European Parliament are directly elected by the
citizens of the European Union.
3) Most of the European budget is spent on administrative and person-
nel costs.
The answers the respondents gave to the first question show to what extent they
are interested in political matters. The variable was labelled pol discuss and a
three-step scale was used, whereas the value of one was given to the response
“never” and the value of three respectively to “frequently”.
The second question (QA15) is used to establish the extent to which the respon-
dents believe that they understand the way the European Union works. Hence it
is the subjective opinion of the respondents about their knowledge with regard to
the European institutions and their tasks. The responses were converted into the
dummy variable understand, where the value one has been ascribed to “tend to
agree”, therefore to the case in which the respondents think they understand how
the European Union works.
The objective of question QA26 was to acquire the actual knowledge of the re-
spondents as regards the European Union and some certain facts surrounding it.
One point was given for every correct answer and the responses to the three sub-
questions were additively aggregated to form the variable knowledge, which takes
integer values between zero and three and can be used as an index for the objec-
tive knowledge of the respondents about the European affairs. Surprisingly, the
partial correlation between the variables understand and knowledge turned out to
be relatively low (0.139), which allows both variables to be included in the em-
pirical analysis. The low correlation coefficient indicates that the perceived EU
knowledge of the respondents widely diverge from the actual one.
The expected sign of the coefficients of all three variables is negative, since, rem-
iniscent of Sobel (2006), people tend rather to trust the institutions which they
are more familiar with. However, the sign may also be positive because a better
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level of knowledge and more discussion on political topics enables the respondents
to be more critical as they posses more understanding both for the positive and
the negative aspects of the matter.
The distribution of the variables pol discuss, understand and knowledge is shown
in Figure 4.6. It does not distinguish between the respondents from the EU-15
and the twelve new EU member states because the differences are negligible.
Although over 80 percent of the respondents discuss political topics with friends
at least occasionally, almost half of all participants state that they do not under-
stand the way the European Union works. Furthermore, almost 40 percent can
give only up to one correct answer in question QA26, and only about 20 percent
of the respondents answered all three questions correctly.
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Figure 4.6: Political interest / Knowledge about the EU
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
The next three variables capture the intensity of the principal-agent problem. The
first variable (distance) is a measure for the geographical distance between the in-
stitutions and the citizens of the European Union, approximated as the distance
between Brussels and the capital of the home country of the respondent.16
16The data used for this variable originates from www.map24.de. A more appropriate measure
would be the relative distance, as measured by the difference between the distance from the
national and that from the European institutions. However, due to missing data only the distance
between the capital of the home country and Brussels could be applied.
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The dummy variable language was used to check for a potential effect of the for-
eign working languages of the European institutions on the relative political trust.
The variable takes the value of one if the mother tongue of the respondent differs
from the working languages of the European institutions, and zero otherwise.
The third proxy for the principal-agent problem is the sum of the responses to the
following three parts of question QA15:
QA15: Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend
to disagree.
4) My voice counts in the European Union.
6) The interests of (OUR COUNTRY) are well taken into account in
the European Union.
7) (OUR COUNTRY) will become more influential in the European
Union in the future.
As regards the first subquestion, one would wish to use the difference between
these answers and corresponding values for the home country to explain relative
trust. However, as comparable data for the home countries is missing, it has to
be assumed that the voice of the respondents counts to the same extent in all
countries.
All three subquestions were integrated into one variable, since the bivariate cor-
relation between each two of them exceeds the value of 0.5. As in the case of the
variable knowledge, one point has been given to every response of “tend to agree”
and then the points are summed to generate the variable voice. This variable can
then take discrete values between zero and three and accounts for the opportuni-
ties of the residents and their home countries to influence political events at the
European level. The distribution of this variable is represented in Figure 4.7. Al-
most one third of all respondents have given the answer “tend to disagree” to all
three subquestions, which can be interpreted as a clear sign of a principal-agent
problem. However, the respondents from the twelve new EU member states are
less pessimistic, especially with regard to the third subquestion. Most of them
believe that the influence of their home country within the European Union will
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increase, especially in Estonia, Poland, Romania and Slovenia.17
The expected coefficient for the variable voice is negative, since higher values corre-
spond to more control at the EU level, which then increases trust in the European
institutions.
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Figure 4.7: Influence of EU citizens and their home countries in the European
Union (voice)
Source: Own calculations based on data from Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006,
increasing values indicate lower intensity of the problem
The influence of the opinion leaders on trust has been proxied by the variable
capturing the perceived distortion of the image of the EU in the media. For this
purpose the answers to the subquestions of the following question are used:
QA22: Do you think that the (NATIONALITY)
1. television;
2. radio;
3. press
presents the European Union too positively, objectively or too negatively?
For each subquestion the value zero is given to the answer “objectively”, and the
value one to both “too positively” and “too negatively”, as both responses imply a
17Of course, a better measure for the purpose of the present chapter would be the perceived
current influence of the country. However, this question has not been asked.
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distortion. An aggregation over the answers with respect to all three media results
in the variable image capturing the overall perception of the distorted image of
the EU in the media. It can take four values beginning at zero if the respondent
holds that no medium distorts the image of the EU and ending at three in the
case that the respondent perceives the image of the EU in all three media as dis-
torted. Figure 4.8 shows the distribution of this variable. Over 60 percent of the
respondents do not observe a distortion of the EU image in the media. However,
more than 20 percent of the participants hold that the representation of the EU
is biased in all three media.
The expected coefficient for the variable image is positive, since higher values in-
dicate that the respondents perceive the available information about the EU in
the media as not trustworthy.
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Figure 4.8: Perceived distortions of the EU image in the media
Source: Eurobarometer 65, Spring 2006
The variables age, sex and education were applied as control variables in order to
capture the socio-cultural aspects. The dummy variable for the gender takes the
value one for male and zero for female respondents. The variable education can
take three values: one, in the case in which the respondents have completed their
last education levels by the age of 15; two, if the last education level was graduated
at an age between 16 and 19; and three for a higher education level. The potential
effect of the length of EU membership of the home country of the respondent (in
years) on the relative trust was estimated by using the variable membership. In
Chapter 4. Trust in national and European institutions 171
accordance with Vaubel (1994), the expected sign of this variable for the EU-15
is negative, since the countries in which EU membership and generally European
unification is more popular were probably the first to join and their citizens will
thus express more confidence in the European institutions.
4.3.2.2 The method of the empirical analysis
The empirical analysis of the relationship between several exogenous variables and
a single dependent variable is normally performed as an OLS estimation of a lin-
ear regression equation. However, this widely used and very transparent empirical
method is applicable only in the case of a metrically scaled dependent variable.
The empirical analysis of a variable measured on a nominal or an ordinal scale
entails some problems of a mathematical and statistical nature (see e.g., Pampel,
2000, pp. 3 ff.). The dependent variable, just to mention one of them, has mostly
only a small number of possible values (in the case of the relative political trust
three), so it is impossible to approximate the distribution of the residuals by the
normal distribution.18
An appropriate method for empirical analysis of a nominally or an ordinally scaled
dependent variable is instead the multinomial logistic regression analysis (MLR).
Following Norusˇis (2007, p. 69 ff.) and Baltes-Go¨tz (2006), the present section
offers an overview of the estimation procedure using the variable rel trust parl, and
the empirical results are subsequently presented.
Contrary to conventional linear regression analysis, MLR delivers estimates for
the so-called ”odds” instead of the probabilities for the occurrence of a particular
event. A reference category should be chosen, e.g. Y (= rel trust parl) = 0.19 The
following equation is then estimated for the remaining two values of the variable
rel trust parl using the Maximum Likelihood method:
ln
(
P (Y = j)
P (Y = 0)
)
= βjX, (4.1)
18For further discussion on the shortcomings of the linear regression analysis of ordinally and
nominally scaled dependent variables see Pampel (2000).
19rel trust parl = 0 is the case of equal trust in the national and European Parliament.
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whereas
j = −1, 1; βj := [βj0, βj1, ..., βj0];X =

1
X1
X2
...
XM

M denotes the number of the independent variables, and the logarithm on the left
hand side of the equation is the odd for the occurrence of Y = j (in the example
j = 1 or j = −1) relative to the case of Y = 0. The interpretation of the estimated
coefficients should be accordingly adjusted as compared to the linear regression
model. The following example should shed light on the specificity of the interpre-
tation when using MLR as method of the empirical analysis. Let’s assume that the
estimation for the value of Y = 1 delivers the coefficient β11 = 0.5. The outcome
for the regression coefficient means that an increase of X1 by one unit leads to
a higher probability ratio between the probability for the occurrence of relative
trust amounting to one and respectively amounting to zero
(
P (Y=1)
P (Y=0)
)
. The new
value of the probability ratio can be calculated by multiplying the old one by the
factor e1·0.5 ≈ 1.65. Thus, the probability ratio increases by the factor eβ11 when
the value of X1 rises by a unity. A positive coefficient for the variable Xm means
respectively that the relationship between Xm and the probability ratio is positive,
since eβj,m > 1. The output of the statistical software delivers in most of the cases
both the values of the estimated coefficients βji and the values of e
βji.
A special case of MLR is given when the dependent variable is ordinally scaled
(Ordinal Logistic Regression, OLR). An adjustment can be made as compared
to the odds estimated by MLR to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated
coefficients. The probability ratios are built as follows:
θ1 =
P (Y = −1)
P (Y > −1) (4.2)
θ2 =
P (Y ≤ 0)
P (Y > 0)
(4.3)
Unlike the procedure of MLR, in OLR only one equation is estimated, as it is
assumed here that the different values of the ordinally scaled dependent vari-
able are associated with different intercepts, but the slope coefficients remain un-
changed. This approach allows for an appropriate interpretation of the estimated
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coefficients: A positive coefficient implies, like in the OLS regression, a positive
relationship between the corresponding independent and the dependent variable.
The estimation procedure should then be continued by testing for parallel lines
assumption using a Brant-test (see e.g., Long and Freese 2006), thus verifying the
hypothesis of equal slope coefficients above all categories of the dependent variable.
A rejection of the null hypothesis can be considered as evidence for an incorrectly
made assumption of parallel lines and the OLR estimation should be adjusted
accordingly. One possibility is to use the MLR estimation irrespectively of the
ordinal scale of the dependent variable. Although straightforward, this approach
delivers regression coefficients with a fairly complicated interpretation if one wants
to stick to the ordinal character of the variable. Instead of this, Generalised OLR
(GOLR) can be applied (see e.g., Fu, 1998 and the extension by Williams, 2007),
which includes a testing procedure for parallel lines and allows for different slope
coefficients when necessary.
A further specific characteristic of international survey data which has to be ac-
counted for in the empirical analysis is the way the data was collected. The
features arising from the design and the data collection procedure concern mainly
sampling weights, clustering of the individuals and stratification of the sample
(see e.g., StataCorp, 2007). In the present analysis they have been accounted for
by weighting the individual responses in accordance with the population of the
country they come from and by the number of interviews taken in each country.
Furthermore, the whole survey has been divided into clusters using the individual
member states.
4.3.2.3 Results of the empirical analysis
Trust in the national relative to the European parliament
Table 4.1 shows the empirical results for the relative trust in parliament. In the
first regression the variables receipt, distance, language and membership as well as
the dummy for the EU-15 are not included, and these country specific character-
istics are captured by the country dummies. In the following five regressions the
country dummies are excluded and the other country specific variables are consid-
ered one at a time to avoid extreme multicollinearity. In the last regression the
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variable receipt is used to capture the effect of the benefits from the EU member-
ship instead of the variable country benefit. Where two coefficients are reported
the Brant-test showed that the parallel line assumption was violeted. A signifi-
cantly positive (negative) value of the upper coefficient indicates that increasing
values of the explanatory variable raises (decreases) the probability of having rela-
tive trust amounting to zero or one against the probability of having relative trust
amounting to -1. A significantly positive (negative) value of the lower coefficient
indicates that increasing values of the explanatory variable raises (decreases) the
probability of having relative trust amounting to one against the probability of
having relative trust amounting to -1 or zero. In both cases the coefficients can
be interpreted as evidence of existing positive (negative) effect of the explanatory
variable on the dependent variable.
In all six regressions the coefficient of the variable rel perf politic turned out to
be positive and highly significant. According to the hypothesis, the respondents
tend to trust the European parliament more than its national counterpart if they
are more satisfied with the way democracy works in the EU than in their home
country. As regards the situation of the economy at national and European level,
the coefficient of the variable is significant only in the first and the fifth column
of Table 4.1. However, the effect of the difference in the economic conditions on
the relative trust can express itself in the belief that the home countries of the
respondents obtain, or do not obtain, net benefits from being a member of the
European Union. Although the coefficient of the variable representing the effect
of the net receipts from the EU budget in the last regression is not significant, the
coefficient of the perceived benefits from EU membership is highly significant and
has the expected negative sign in all regressions. In accordance with the theoret-
ical considerations, the European Parliament tends to be more trustworthy than
the national parliament if the respondents believe that their home countries have
benefited from being a member of the EU.
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The coefficient of the variable understand turned out to be insignificant in all
specifications. The coefficients of the variables knowledge and pol discuss show
significant coefficients either for the first or for the second reference value of rel-
ative trust. The coefficient of the variable knowledge is significant only at the
10-percent level in the first three specifications. The results can be interpreted as
weak evidence that respondents who discuss political matters more frequently as
well as those who exhibit less knowledge about European issues are more likely to
trust the national than the European Parliament. Although there is no conclusive
effect of this aspect of the principal-agent problem on the relative trust in the
parliament, there are further aspects that show more affirmative results. Partic-
ularly, the variable voice exhibits a negative and highly significant coefficient in
all six regressions for the reference value rel trust parl = 0. This implies that the
respondents tend to trust the national but not the European Parliament if they
feel that their interests or those of their home country are not well taken into
account in the European Union.
The variable capturing the distortion of the EU image in the media as well as
most of the control variables regarding socio-cultural factors show in most of the
specifications no significant effect on the relative trust in the parliament. Only
the variable education has partly significant positive coefficients for the second
reference value indicating higher trust in the national relative to the European
Parliament among better educated respondents. One possible explanation is the
fact that the knowledge of foreign languages is positively correlated with the level
of education.
The coefficient of the variables for the impact of the large spatial distance between
the principals and the agents and for the effect of the length of the EU member-
ship are partly significant but wrongly signed. Probably this is due to the fact
that no country dummies were included and these variables capture the negative
influence of being a citizen of one of the new EU member states on relative trust in
parliament, since these are mostly countries which are quite distant from Brussels.
The coefficient of the difference between the working languages of the European
institutions and the mother languages of the respondents turned out to be not
significant. This result is at least partly surprising since all three variables exhibit
correctly signed and highly significant coefficients if the observations are not clus-
tered and weighted.
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Table 4.2: Country-specific intercepts in the regression rel trust parl (1)
ger -.050 (.182) gre -.254 (.000)*** spa .512 (.002)***
-.413 (.000)*** -1.112 (.000)*** .002 (.971)
fra .299 (.000)*** ita -.056 (.176) ire .901 (.000)***
.020 (.708) -.521 (.000)*** .249 (.000)***
lux .107 (.002)*** den 1.175 (.000)*** net -.043 (.036)**
-1.350 (.000)*** .090 (.252)
uk .297 (.000)*** por .826 (.000)*** aus 1.073 (.000)***
.192 (.000)*** .057 (.242) .146 (.018)**
swe .002 (.969) fin .660 (.000)*** cyp .592 (.000)***
-2.135 (.000)*** .262 (.000)*** .205 (.000)***
cze -.926 (.000)*** est -.470 (.000)*** hun -.909 (.000)***
.096 (.072)* -.917 (.000)*** -1.032 (.000)***
lat -.107 (.000)*** lit -.273 (.000)*** mal -.810 (.000)***
.358 (.000)*** -1.019 (.000)*** -.926 (.000)***
pol -1.332 (.000)*** slovak .342 (.000)*** sloven -1.224 (.000)***
-1.874 (.000)*** -.236 (.010)*** -.671 (.000)***
bul -.845 (.000)*** rom -.363 (.000)***
-1.168 (.000)*** -.819 (.000)***
p-values in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%;the parallel
line assumption (i.e. equal slope coefficients above all categories of the dependent variable has
been violated where two values are reported - the first value refers to the reference -1, the second
to the reference 0); For the coefficients of the other explanatory variables see Table 4.1.
As regards the cross-country differences in the relative trust, the results broadly
confirm those from the graphical analysis above. Belgium has been chosen as ref-
erence country, because many European institutions have their seats in Brussels.
Some of the other EU-15 countries, namely Spain, France, Denmark, UK, Por-
tugal, Austria, Finland, Cyprus and most notably Ireland, exhibit significantly
higher relative trust in favor of the national parliament as a whole than Belgium.
Almost all of the twelve new EU member states who joined the European Union
in 2004 and 2007 show much higher relative trust in the European Parliament.
This result has also been confirmed by the fifth regression in which the dummy
variable for the EU-15 has a highly significant positive coefficient.
Trust in the national relative to the European government
Many of the results regarding relative trust in the parliament have been retained
when trust in the national relative to the European government is used as a depen-
dent variable instead. Table 4.3 reports the results corresponding to the variable
rel trust gov, whereby the procedure of all six regressions corresponds to that in
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the preceding subsection.
The coefficient of the variable approximating the effect of the relative political
performance of the institutions remains positive and highly significant in all speci-
fications. However, unlike the case of the parliament, the variable rel perf econom
now shows a significantly positive coefficient in all six regressions.20 This result
confirms the hypothesis that not only the political performance but also the eco-
nomic situation in the national country relative to that in the European Union
has strong impact on relative trust in the government at national and EU level.
Respondents who judge the current situation of the national economy to be better
than that of the European economy are likely to place more trust in the national
government than its European counterpart. This effect appears besides the im-
pact of the benefits of the home country from being a member of the EU, since
the variable country benefit maintains its significantly negative coefficient in all
specifications.
Contrary to the results regarding relative trust in the parliament, the variables
capturing the understanding and knowledge of the respondents with respect to
EU issues have significantly negative effect on the relative trust in the government
in all six specifications.21 Respondents who confess not to understand the way the
European Union works as well as those who show less knowledge about the EU
are likely to trust the national more than the European government. This result
confirms the effect of the principal-agent problem on relative trust and implies that
higher relative trust in the European government could be achieved by improving
the transparency and information policy of the European institutions.
Further notable results regard the variables voice and image. In the case of rela-
tive trust in the government the coefficient of the variable voice turned out to be
mostly insignificant. The variable capturing distortions of the image of the EU
in the media has significantly positive effect in all regressions implying that the
relative trust in favor of the national government is significantly higher among
respondents who perceive the image of the EU as distorted in the media.
20In the regressions of relative trust in parliament the coefficients is significantly positive only
in three out of six specifications.
21In two specifications the coefficient of the variable understand is significant only for the
second reference value.
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Table 4.4: Country-specific intercepts in the regression rel trust gov (1)
ger -.046 (.385) gre -.433 (.000)*** spa .251 (.002)***
-.268 (.000) ***
fra .216 (.000)*** ita -.482 (.000)*** ire .700 (.000)***
-1.054 (.000)*** -.634 (.000)*** .112 (.055)*
lux -.002 (.962) den .081 (.321) net -.088 (.049)**
-1.101 (.000)*** -.097 (.308)
uk -.494 (.000)*** por .906 (.000)*** aus .895 (.000)***
-.023 (.373) .450 (.000)*** .304 (.000)***
swe -.092 (.121) fin -.502 (.000)*** cyp .210 (.000)***
-1.689 (.000)*** -.159 (.002)*** -.395 (.000)***
cze -.840 (.000)*** est .050 (.521) hun -.392 (.000)***
-.122 (.011)** .430 (.000)***
lat .495 (.000)*** lit .203 (.012)** mal -.392 (.000)***
.318 (.000)*** -.319 (.000)*** -.701 (.000)***
pol -.649 (.000)*** slovak -.482 (.000)*** sloven -.439 (.000)***
-37.96 (.)
bul -.651 (.000)*** rom -.284 (.000)***
-1.293 (.000)*** -.972 (.000)***
p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; the
parallel line assumption (i.e. equal slope coefficients above all categories of the dependent variable
has been violated where two values are reported - the first value refers to the reference -1, the
second to the reference 0); For the coefficients of the other explanatory variables see Table 4.3.
For the control variables and the country specific variables, the results are similar
to those with respect to the parliament. The only difference is the fact that the
level of education has no significant effect here, but rather the sex of the respon-
dents. Men tend to trust more the national than the European government as a
whole, one possible explanation being a higher level of nationalism and conser-
vatism among men. Furthermore, the coefficient of the variable distance is not
significant with regard to the relative trust in the government. The coefficients of
the country dummies are by and large similar to those in the regressions of the
relative trust in the parliament with a few exceptions. The tendency that respon-
dents from the twelve new EU member states show less confidence in the national
relative to the European institution remains also in the case of the government,
although to a smaller extent.
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4.3.3 Summary of main findings
To sum up, the analysis in the present section has identified several explanations
for the differences in the level of political trust in national relative to European
institutions as represented by the parliament and the government. From the socio-
cultural explanations for the differences in trust, gender and education turned out
to have a significant impact on the relative trust, whereas male respondents and
respondents with a higher level of education show less trust in European com-
pared to national institutions. Furthermore, a better performance in political and
economic terms of the European Union, the feeling of receiving benefits from the
membership of the home country in the EU, as well as the perception that the im-
age of the EU is correctly represented by the media are all factors which positively
influence the level of trust in the European relative to the national institutions.
Behind the performance-based explanations, the empirical analysis indicates a
considerable importance of the principal-agent problem in the way the European
Union works on the relative trust. Lack of understanding and knowledge about the
political process and the feeling that the interests of one’s country are neglected
at EU level are important factors which explain the fact that many EU citizens
tend to trust the national rather than the European institutions. While socio-
cultural factors can only partly be influenced by the politics of the institution, a
better information strategy, more transparency and shorter chains of delegation
should, at least to a certain extent, be helpful in solving the problem of the current
democratic deficit in the way the European institutions fulfil their tasks.
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4.4 Trust in times of crisis
In the present section the focus turns to the effect of the current economic crisis
on the determinants of trust in European and national institutions. It is closely
related to a series of publications by Roth et al., in which the authors analyze the
development and determinants of net trust in different European and national po-
litical institutions22 during the recent years (Roth 2009, Roth and Gros 2010, Roth
et al. 2011, Roth et al. 2012). Roth and his co-authors observe declining trust in
the European Central Bank, European Parliament and European Commission as
a result of the financial crisis. On the contrary, the net trust in national institu-
tions, such as the national governments and parliaments, increased immediately in
the direct aftermath of 16 September 2008 in most EU countries. As Roth (2009)
points out, the increasing trust in times of crisis has already been investigated by
Chanley (2002), and is referred to as the “rally around the flag” effect described
by Hetherington and Nelson (2003). According to Roth et al. (2011) the main
explanations for the development of the net trust can be found in the percep-
tion of the citizens about the performance of the institution under consideration.
They conclude that inflation is one of the parameters which influence the level of
net trust when the economy runs smoothly, whereas in times of crisis its effect
diminishes because European citizens tend to worry much more about jobs and
the effects of recession. As pointed out in the previous discussion, Eurobarometer
data in Roth et al. (2011) shows that increasing distrust in national institutions
is related to an increase in unemployment in the EU-15. Besides unemployment,
low growth of GDP per capita is associated with declining trust in the European
Commission and the European Parliament in times of crisis. Furthermore, in the
EU-27 increasing levels of public debt contribute to the decrease of net trust, both,
in national and European governmental institutions.
As pointed out earlier, Roth and his co-authors analyze only the effect of economic
development on political trust and do not include variables capturing the aspects
of the principal-agent problem described above. The present section examines the
effect of both performance-based and political-economic explanations on the level
of trust in national and European political institutions in a panel analysis between
2004 and 2011. The empirical analysis investigates the determinants of trust in
the national parliament and the national government on the one hand, and trust
22Net trust is calculated as the difference between the share of respondents who trust and the
share of respondents who do not trust the particular institution. See below.
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in their European counterparts, the European Parliament, the European Commis-
sion and the Council of the European Union on the other hand.
4.4.1 Empirical analysis
4.4.1.1 The data
Data about the dependent variables (trust in the national parliament, the national
government, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Coun-
cil of the European Union) is taken from the Eurobarometer survey for the years
2004 to 2011.23 2004 is chosen as the beginning of the period under considera-
tion because of the expected structural break in some data due to the Eastern
Enlargement of the European Union. The analysis is based on semiannual data
for 27 EU member states.24 In order to account for the variation of the “don’t
know” responses, the dependent variables are represented as net trust calculated
as the difference between the percentage of responses “Tend to trust” and that of
“Tend not to trust”.25 The development of net trust in the governmental institu-
tions and the European Union as a whole over time (not included in the empirical
analysis) is shown in Figure 4.9. As indicated above, the net trust has been de-
creasing since the beginning of the economic crisis and has reached historically
low levels at the end of 2011. However, the decline of net trust in national insti-
tutions was not that pronounced as net trust in European institutions, especially
in recent years. In the extreme case of trust in the EU and trust in the European
Parliament net trust declined by 35 points within seven years. Trust in national
government and national parliament decreased by 20 and 22 points, respectively,
during the same time period. Detailed data about the development of net trust in
the 27 EU member states is provided in the composite Figure A1 in the Appendix.
23Data on trust in the Council of the European Union is however missing for the first half of
2009. Therefore, this observation has been excluded in the regressions of trust in the Council.
Moreover, the formulation of the Eurobarometer question regarding trust in European insti-
tutions and its position within the questionnaire were changed in 2008. However, this should
not have major influence on the quality of the analysis, since the content of the question was
preserved.
24Croatia is not considered in the analysis.
25This procedure has been applied also for the case of all explanatory variables based on
Eurobarometer data listed below.
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Figure 4.9: Net trust in national and European governmental institutions
and the European Union in the EU27 (Source: Own calculations based on
Eurobarometer data)
Four variables are used to investigate the importance of objective economic per-
formance. The first variable, gdp growth, contains data on growth of real GDP per
capita for each country. The expected sign is positive, since an increase of GDP
growth indicates a better performance of the national economy. If the population
of the concrete country is satisfied with the performance of the governmental insti-
tutions measured in terms of GDP growth, then the overall net trust in the political
institutions will increase. This should be the case for both national and European
institutions depending on the level of governance which is held responsible for
the economic conditions. However, it is still possible to obtain the opposite sign
for European institutions if better economic performance of the national economy
hampers the support for transferring competencies to the European level of gov-
ernment and vice versa (see above). The second variable, unemployment, contains
data on unemployment rates in the EU member states. The expected sign of this
variable is negative with regard to the national institutions, and could be positive
or negative with regard to their European counterparts. The explanation is as in
the case of GDP growth. The only difference is the fact that high unemployment
rates do not indicate higher but rather lower performance of the political institu-
tions, hence the opposed sign is expected. The third variable, inflation, captures
the effect of inflation as further measure for the economic performance. In ac-
cordance with the argumentation above, the expected sign is the same as in the
case of the unemployment rate. If, however, low inflation is evaluated as rather
negative, which would be the case if the fear from deflation and wage reduction
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prevails, then the sign of the coefficient could be as in the case of GDP growth.
The fourth variable, debt, contains data on the development of government debt
as a percentage of GDP. The expected sign is the same as in the case of unem-
ployment, since increasing government debt is one of the main concerns during
the current economic crisis.
Semiannual data for all four variables is taken or calculated from data provided
by Eurostat. The unemployment rate in the first quarter of each year is used
for the spring wave of the Eurobarometer survey, whereas the values in the third
quarter are used for the autumn waves. For growth of GDP data is used for the
six months preceding the respective survey. The semiannual inflation rates were
obtained from the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), and measure
the inflation between the months September of the preceding year and March of
the current year for spring wave and between March and September of the cur-
rent year for the autumn wave. Annual data on government debt is used for the
variable debt and the values change only every second period.
Two variables calculated from Eurobarometer survey data are used to proxy the
effect of perceived performance of the institutions on net trust. The best measure
of the perceived performance would be according to the question about the respon-
dent’s judgment of the national and the European economy and democracy (as
in the analysis of relative trust in the previous subsection). However, since these
questions were not asked very often, many data are missing and two proxy vari-
ables were used. The first variable, lifesatisfaction, contains data on the responses
to a question about the overall satisfaction of the EU citizens with the life they
lead. Although life satisfaction reflects a broad range of different developments, it
is expected to be positively correlated on average with the way democracy works,
and with the economic conditions in a particular country. To the extent to which
these aspects are influenced by the political institutions this variable should serve
as a proxy for the perception of EU citizens of the performance of the institutions
under consideration. In addition, the variable expecteconomy should capture the
effect of expected economic development in their home country during the next
twelve months as perceived by the respondents. If the respondents ascribe the
extent to which they are satisfied with their life, and/or the expected development
of the economic situation in the national economy to the performance of a political
institution, the expected sign of the variable(s) in the regression of net trust should
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be positive. It is still possible, however, to observe the opposite sign, if the posi-
tive evaluation of one institution leads to mistrust with regard to other institutions.
As in the case of relative trust, the effect of the net payer position of the EU
member states on net trust is investigated using data from the series of Finan-
cial Reports of the European Commission (European Commission 2011). The net
payments are calculated as the difference between the total revenue and the total
expenditure in every country, and are expressed as percentage of GDP. Includ-
ing the variable net contr makes the extension of the time span to the year 2011
impossible, since the Financial Report for 2011 was not published at the time of
the present research. The expected sign of the variable is negative in the regres-
sions of net trust in European institutions, since positive net payment position
indicates less benefits from the membership of the particular country in the EU,
and therefore, in accordance with the principal-agent problem, less trust in the
governmental institutions. As regards the national institutions, a positive or a
negative sign is possible. On the one hand the national institutions may be held
responsible for the amount of net payments to the EU budget, implying a negative
sign of the coefficient. On the other hand, a positive sign is possible, since higher
net payments indicate smaller benefits from EU membership and make the people
rather trust the national institutions.
The role of the principal-agent problem for the process of trust-building and
trust-maintenance is further approximated by three variables calculated from Eu-
robarometer data. In the present analysis the variable knowledge contains the
country averages of the responses to the question “Have you heard of . . . ?” with
respect to the particular European institution.26 According to the theory behind
the principal-agent problem, net trust in European institutions should increase as
the (net) number of citizens, who are aware of the existence of the concrete institu-
tion, becomes larger. The variable in the regressions of trust in national parliament
and national government is the average of the values for the three European in-
stitutions considered in the analysis. Similarily to the analysis of relative trust,
the second variable, understand, contains information about the understanding of
the population about the way the European Union works. Increasing net levels
of understanding are expected to raise trust in European institutions. The third
variable, voice, reflects the extent to which EU citizens agree with the statement
26The questions used in the individual data analysis in the previous section could not be used
here due to missing data for several years.
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“My voice counts in the European Union.”.27 Increasing values of this variable
mean that more people believe in their ability to influence the political process
within the structures of the European Union. Therefore, the expected sign of the
variable is positive with regard to European institutions. Both, a positive and a
negative sign of the coefficients can be justified regarding national institutions for
all three variables. It is possible that lacking control mechanisms, knowledge and
understanding concerning European institutions favors trust in national institu-
tions if they are considered as alternatives to the European ones. However, it is
more likely for the trust in national institutions to decrease as the share of the well
informed population declines and/or as less people tend to believe that their voice
counts in the EU, since the national institutions could be held responsible, both
for the lack of information about European politics and for the poor democratic
control of the European institutions. Moreover, it is very likely for the level of
information about European institutions and the values of the variable voice to
be positively correlated with overall political awareness and thus with the level of
information about national politics on the one hand, and with the control possi-
bilities with regard to national institutions on the other hand. Since this effect
cannot be estimated directly due to the lack of suitable data, it cannot be ruled
out that these effects are captured by the variables described above.
The dummy variable elections should control for temporary effects of elections on
the level of net trust. Considering again Figure A1 in the Appendix this effect is
visible in most of the EU member states. The election dates are represented by
the gray vertical lines in the figure. If the fieldwork of the survey takes place at
the time of elections or immediately after the new government was built, the net
trust in national institutions tends to increase. The effect is very pronounced in
Bulgaria, Estonia, Greece, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Swe-
den. However, in most of the other countries the effect is present as well. In some
countries a similar though less pronounced effect is observable with regard to the
European institutions. In addition, the variable EPelections should capture the
effect of European elections on net trust. The latest elections took place during
the fieldwork of the spring survey of 2009. Although the influence of European
elections seems not to be as pronounced as in the case of national elections the
effect is visible in some countries, especially with regard to the net trust in Eu-
ropean institutions (see e.g. Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain).
However, this variable will capture not only the effect of European elections on net
27Again, this variable differs from the variable voice used in the previous section due to
missing data.
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trust, but also other events affecting the EU member states in 200428 and 2009,
since it takes the value one for all cross section units in this time period.
As further control variable gdp pc contains Eurostat data on per capita GDP. It
should control for changes in trust level, which occur as a reflection of the stage
of economic development in the EU member states. The effect of the economic
crisis is investigated using the dummy variable crisis, which takes the value one
in the period since the second half of 2008.29 The expected sign of this variable is
negative both in the regression of trust in national and European institutions. In
addition, the estimation has been run for both time periods, before and after 2008,
separately. In the last specification, interaction terms between the variable crisis
and the main determinants of political trust which are identified in the previous
specification are used to test if the economic crisis has changed the magnitude
and/or the sign of the concrete coefficients.
Table 4.5 summarizes the expected signs for the coefficients of the explanatory
variables.
4.4.1.2 The method of the empirical analysis
In the following the estimation approach is presented before proceeding with the
results of the empirical analysis.30 The empirical model can be described by the
subsequent equations:
yit = α + x
′
itβ + υi + it, (4.4)
whereas υi represents the unit-specific time-invariant residual accounting for cross-
section heterogeneity and it is the conventional residual with the usual properties.
x′it contains the it
th observation on the explanatory variables and β is vector with
the coefficients of interest. The fixed-effects model deals with the correlation
between υi and the variables in xit by using the OLS estimators of the following
28In Bulgaria and Romania 2007.
29The turbulences in direct aftermath of September 15th 2008, the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers, are taken as the beginning of the severe economic crisis in Europe.
30See also Chapter 3.
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Table 4.5: Expected signs for the coefficients of the explanatory variables
Trust in
national
institutions
Trust in
European
institutions
gdp growth + +/-
unemployment - -/+
inflation -/+ -/+
debt - -/+
lifesatisfaction + +/-
expecteconomy + +/-
net contr -/+ -
knowledge +/- +
understand +/- +
voice +/- +
elections + +
EPelections + +
gdp pc +/- +/-
crisis - -
+/- Positive sign is more likely to occur;
-/+ Negative sign is more likely to occur.
transformation of equation (1):
yit − y¯i = (xit − x¯i)′β + (it − ¯i) (4.5)
Therefore, the reported coefficients refer to the effect of a one unit increase in
the particular explanatory variables on the dependent variable within the cross-
section units. Alternatively, in a random-effects model the between and within
estimators can be combined to produce more efficient results than the fixed-effects
model. However, the results of the random effects model are inconsistent, if the
unit-specific residuals υi are correlated with xit. In such case, the coefficients esti-
mated by the random-effects model are significantly different from those estimated
by the fixed-effects model, and the random-effects model is misspecified. Although
in some specifications of the present analysis the Hausman test cannot reject the
null hypothesis of equal coefficients, it turned out that in most of the cases the
random-effects estimators are biased. In order to assure comparability of the re-
sults the fixed-effects model is applied to all specifications, albeit more efficient
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alternative would be available in some cases.
Besides the efficiency problem, there is one further point which should be stressed
when using fixed-effects models: Since the model assumes time-invariant unit-
specific residuals, it is not possible to estimate the effect of further time-invariant
variables. In the context of the present analysis of trust in political institutions, for
instance, it is not possible to use dummy variables for the EU-15 or for the GIPSI-
countries31 because these variables remain unchanged over the entire time period.
Furthermore, it is not possible to investigate the effect of the spatial distance of
the EU citizens from the institutions (the average distance does not change over
time), or that of being net payer or net receiver of payments from the EU budget,
since there has been only one change of the position - in 2007 Cyprus became net
payer after being net receiver in the previous period. However, it is still possible to
use the absolute amount of net payments (as percentage of GDP) for this purpose.
The reported standard errors are adjusted for possible heteroskedasticity and for
cluster-specific effects alongside the cross-section units. Time dummies (dt) are
used to account for variation in the dependent variable, which is caused by common
time varying effects not captured by the explanatory variables in the regression.
Therefore, the end model to be estimated is given by the following equation:
yit = α + x
′
itβ + d
′
tγ + υi + it. (4.6)
4.4.1.3 Results
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Tables 4.6.A and 4.6.B. Six
different specifications were applied. In the first specification only economic factors
were included as in most of the previous studies of trust in national and European
institutions. The second specification contains three variables capturing the ef-
fect of the principal-agent problem. In the third regression the model is extended
by time dummies to account for time-fixed effects not captured by the remaining
variables. The fourth and fifth specification are similar to the third one, the only
difference being the time span of the data: The fourth specification contains solely
the pre-crisis period, whereas the fifth specification investigates trust during the
economic crisis. The last specification uses the whole data set and accounts for
31Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy: The EU countries, where the economic crisis is
the most severe.
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the structural break due to the economic crisis using interaction terms. In Tables
4.6.A and 4.6.B only coefficients significantly different from zero are reported.
The results of the empirical analysis show that trust in European institutions has
been decreasing in recent years (Table 4.6.A). The coefficient of the dummy vari-
able for the time period since the breakout of the economic crisis in 2008 used in
the first two specifications is not significantly different from zero. Nevertheless,
the time dummies in the third specification indicate that net trust was higher in
the time period before 2008 and was significantly lower in 2009 and 2010 than
in the second half of 2008, which served as a reference. Trust in the European
institutions was particularly high in the second half of 2007, probably due to the
economic turbulences overseas, and the positive evaluation of the performance of
European institutions compared to the USA. Furthermore, as suggested by the
descriptive analysis, net trust increases in times of elections. National elections
have a strongly positive effect on trust, which remains relatively stable and can
be observed in most of the institutions after accounting for time-fixed effects. Net
trust in national institutions is by about five to eight points higher, if the field
work of the survey takes place during the period of national election or a few
months after the new government was built. Although to a lesser extent, trust in
European institutions increases in times of national elections as well. A possible
explanation is that citizens become more involved in political matters due to the
intensified representation and discussion of political topics in the media and in the
society in general. This result already points toward the effect of the principal-
agent problem in the way political institutions fulfill their work: Providing more
information about political institutions and incumbents, being present in society,
and increasing political involvement of the general public is one way for the polit-
ical actors to positively influence the process of trust-building among the citizens,
and thus strengthen the legitimacy of governmental institutions. Especially the
coefficient of the variable capturing the effect of European elections indicates the
presence of the principle-agent problem. The coefficient is positive and signifi-
cant in the first model but becomes smaller and insignificant in the case of net
trust in the national parliament, when variables capturing different aspects of the
principal-agent problem are also included (Model 2). Therefore it is not only the
election itself which positively affects the net trust in political institutions, but
also the flow of information and the belief of being involved in political matters
and to influence the political decision making process during election times.
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Among the variables capturing the effect of the principal-agent problem the vari-
able voice has the strongest impact on net trust. Respondents exhibit higher trust
in governmental institutions if they believe their voice counts in the European
Union. Interestingly, the effect of this variable is significant, not only in the case
of European institutions; the coefficient is significant and even higher in the regres-
sions of net trust in national institutions. This is the combination of both effects
discussed in the previous section: On the one hand, citizens hold their national
governments and parliaments responsible for the low weight of their voice within
the structures of the European Union. On the other hand, this variable is expected
to capture the effect of the possibility to influence the overall political process on
trust in institutions, since the question in Eurobarometer was asked only with
regard to the European Union and not with regard to concrete institutions. Net
trust can, ceteris paribus, be increased by one to two per cent if three per cent of
the respondents change their opinion, and begin to believe that their voice does
indeed count in the European Union. The other two variables, understand and
knowledge also exhibit significantly positive coefficients in some of the specifica-
tions. Increasing share of those respondents who assert to understand how the
European Union works leads to higher net trust in the European Commission and
the European Parliament. Trust in the Council of the European Union is further-
more positively connected to the knowledge of the population about the existence
of this institution, although the magnitude of this relationship measured by the
coefficient of the variable knowledge is relatively low.
A slightly different aspect of the responsibility of national governmental institu-
tions for the position of a particular country within the European Union is indi-
cated by the coefficient of the variable capturing the effect of the net payments to
the EU budget. The coefficient is negative and mostly significant in the regres-
sions regarding the European institutions. The net share of respondents who tend
to trust the European governmental institutions decreases by about two to three
per cent, if the net payment position of the member state under consideration
increases by one percentage point relative to GDP. However, this is not the case
in the regressions concerning the national institutions. Therefore, people trust the
European institutions less, if they have to pay more for European matters. At the
same time they do not blame the national institutions for they are the ones who
have allowed for or accepted those circumstances.
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Among the variables capturing the impact of the overall economic situation only
the variable debt has a strongly significant effect in most of the specifications.
People tend to trust both the European and the national institutions less, if the
government debt of their respective country increases over time. However, the vari-
ables inflation, gdp, and unemployment mostly do not have a significant impact
onthe net trust in the overall regression. Only GDP growth is partly significant in
the first two specifications, but the effect diminishes after inclusion of time dum-
mies.
Altogether, net trust in European and national institutions seems to have similar
determinants in the overall regressions. Besides the variable net contr, the other
exception is the variable lifesatisfaction, which has significantly positive coefficient
only with regard to national institutions. People evaluate national political insti-
tutions as more trustworthy, if they are satisfied with the life they lead. This
result can be motivated by the fact that the performance of political institutions
in terms of economic and social conditions is positively related to the overall life
satisfaction of the population.
Trust in times of crisis
The second part of the analysis is devoted to the question about the determinants
of net trust in times of crisis. In columns (4) and (5) of Table 4.6.B the regressions
are estimated for the two sub-periods – before the crisis and during the crisis. The
comparison of the results of both periods points at the presence of similarities as
well as significant differences between the determinants of net trust before and
during the economic crisis. Although the absolute value of the coefficient of the
variable debt changes between the different specifications, the effect of public debt
on net trust can be generally confirmed for both periods. Similar conclusion can
be drawn with regard to the variable voice: The coefficient remains positive and
significantly different from zero in the regressions concerning net trust in Euro-
pean institutions. However, the coefficient increases in times of crisis and becomes
almost twice as large as the coefficient prior to 2008. Therefore, the negligible
impact the EU citizens have on the political process tends to decrease trust in
European institutions more heavily in times of crisis. Nevertheless, this is not the
case when considering net trust in national institutions. Here, the coefficient of
the variable voice is significantly positive for the time period before the crisis and
becomes insignificant during the crisis indicating the existence of other reasons
for declining trust in national institutions in times of crisis. The other variables
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capturing the effect of the principle-agent problem exhibit significantly positive
coefficients prior to the beginning of the economic crisis. In accordance with the
theoretical considerations, net trust increases if the citizens of the EU member
states understand how the EU operates or if they are familiar with the particu-
lar political institution. However, this effect becomes insignificant during the crisis.
Further differences in the determinants of net trust concern the coefficients of the
variables lifesatisfaction, elections, net contr and expecteconomy. The coefficient
of the variable capturing the effect of the overall life satisfaction of the respon-
dents is significant merely in the period prior to 2008. Surprisingly, the coefficient
is negative with regard to the European institutions and positive with regard to
their national counterparts. Therefore, increasing life satisfaction leads to higher
trust in national governmental institutions and lower trust in the European Com-
mission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The
explanation for the different sign of the coefficient can be as follows. As a direct
effect people could ascribe a gain in life satisfaction to the performance of the
national institutions. This consideration could explain the positive sign of the co-
efficient in the regressions of the national parliament and the national government.
The negative sign of the coefficient in the regressions of trust in EU institutions
could be explained as an indirect effect of the performance of the national insti-
tutions. Decreasing life satisfaction could be due to poor performance of national
institutions, and it could induce higher trust in the European institutions if they
are considered an alternative to the national ones. Whatever the reason for the
different sign, the coefficient for all five institutions becomes insignificant during
the crisis.
The coefficient of the variable capturing the effect of national elections is signif-
icantly positive in the period before the economic crisis only in the regressions
regarding the European institutions. After 2008 the stimulating effect on net
trust decreases and becomes insignificant in the case of the European Commission
and the European Parliament. A similar outcome can be observed also for the
variable expecteconomy. Apart from the European Parliament and the Council of
the European Union, people tend to trust more all institutions if they expect the
economic situation in their country to get better in the next twelve months prior
to the economic crisis. During the crisis this effect diminishes.
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In the last column of Table 4.6.B the shift of the coefficients discussed above is
further investigated using a larger data set. Model (6) can be considered an exten-
sion of Model (2), whereas interaction terms should account for the difference of
the coefficients before and during the crisis. The results of Model (6) mostly con-
firm the previous findings. Elections had temporary positive effect on net trust
mostly before the crisis. Increasing public debt reduces trust, and the effect is
stronger during the crisis, in particular, when concerning the Council of the Eu-
ropean Union. Having the feeling that the own voice counts within the European
Union increases trust, and again the effect is stronger during the crisis with regard
to the Council of the European Union.
Although many of the conclusions drawn above can be confirmed here, there are
further effects which can be detected using this richer data set. It is still the case
that understanding the way the European Union works leads to higher trust levels
prior to the economic crisis. However, the coefficient of the interaction term is
negative with regard to the European institutions and larger than the coefficient
for the pre-crisis period. Therefore, increasing knowledge and understanding of
European politics makes the European institutions even less trustworthy in times
of crisis. Furthermore, there are some variables capturing the overall economic
conditions deserving special attention. GDP growth in particular has a signifi-
cantly positive coefficient prior to the economic crisis in the regressions concern-
ing the national institutions. The explanation might be similar to that regarding
life satisfaction.32 Increasing GDP growth can positively affect trust in national
institutions if citizens ascribe the improvement of economic conditions to the per-
formance of the particular institution. This effect is reversed in the second time
period, since the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative and
larger in absolute terms. According to the sign of the difference of the coefficients,
in the crisis people exhibit higher trust levels with regard to the national insti-
tutions the lower is GDP growth. This outcome shows that national institutions
become more trustworthy as crisis managers in times of severe economic crisis.
The significantly positive coefficients of the interaction term in the regressions of
trust in the European Commission and the European Parliament indicates that
this is not the case for the European institutions. The interaction term of unem-
ployment is also negative in the regressions of trust in the European Commission
and trust in the national institutions. Increasing unemployment did not determine
trust in the pre-crisis period but has gained in importance since the beginning of
32See above.
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the economic crisis.
4.4.2 Summary of main findings
Although the results of the empirical analysis do not indicate directly that the
population of the European Union is dissatisfied with the political regime as a
whole, they show that increasing distrust in governmental institutions in recent
times is driven not only by the prevailing unfavorable economic conditions, but
also by constituent characteristics of the political system. People tend to trust
both national and European institutions more if they are well informed about
the political process, and furthermore if they believe their voice and opinions are
not ignored by the incumbents of the institutions. Overall political alienation is
driven by increasing public debt and unemployment in times of crisis. However,
the empirical results show that the “rally around the flag” effect described by
Hetherington and Nelson (2003) causes the citizens of the European Union to
return to their national governments as the economic conditions deteriorate. While
low levels of overall life satisfaction were partly responsible for the willingness
of citizens to transfer competencies to the EU level of government in the time
period before the crisis, this effect is no longer present in recent years. Moreover,
decreasing economic growth during the crisis makes people trust the national and
distrust the European institutions. The dissatisfaction of the EU citizens with
the political regime is further reflected in the fact that better understanding of
the way the European Union works is associated with lower trust levels since the
breakout of the economic crisis.
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4.5 Concluding remarks
The results of the empirical analyses presented in this chapter reveal that trust
in national and European political institutions is not solely determined by socio-
cultural and performance-based factors. Further explanations for the level of po-
litical trust result from the principal-agent problem due to the constituent char-
acteristics of the political regime. The problem is more severe at European level
since European authorities are more distant from the representative voter – both
in direct and figurative sense. Long delegation chains and the lack of control mech-
anisms explain the fact that European citizens are not aware of political matters
at the European level and do not have incentive to collect information. As a re-
sult, trust in European institutions declines rapidly both in absolute terms and
compared to national institutions.
All these results indicate that the economic crisis should not be used as pretext
to promote further centralization, as it is currently the case. The legitimacy of a
broad range of common measures to combat the economic turbulences is by and
large questionable. The discussion about alternative methods of political decision-
making with regard to significant steps in the process of European integration
(e.g. referenda in the style of Switzerland) should not be disregarded but rather
appreciated and encouraged.
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Figure A1. Net trust in national and European governmental institutions and the European 
Union: Country series (Source: Own calculations based on Eurobarometer data)  (II) 
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Figure A1. Net trust in national and European governmental institutions and the European 
Union: Country series (Source: Own calculations based on Eurobarometer data)  (III) 
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Figure A1. Net trust in national and European governmental institutions and the European 
Union: Country series (Source: Own calculations based on Eurobarometer data)  (IV) 
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Chapter 5
Did the Bundesbank target
monetary expansion or inflation?
Evidence from monetary base
growth1
5.1 Introduction
In the last years prior to the introduction of the Euro, several empirical stud-
ies raised doubts whether the Bundesbank had been pursuing monetary targets.
First, von Hagen (1995) demonstrated that, in 1979–1993, the rate of monetary
expansion had been uncorrelated with the announced target rate and that the
deviations from target showed a significantly negative correlation with both the
deviation of inflation from the underlying inflation objective and the rate of change
of the real exchange rate.2 Second, Bernanke and Mihov (1997) tested for Granger
causality and found that the monthly variations of the German call rate were sig-
nificantly affected by the expected inflation rate but not by the expected rate of
monetary expansion (nor by the expected rate of change of industrial production
and the nominal exchange rate). Moreover, the expected rate of inflation had a
more significant effect on the Lombard rate than the expected rate of monetary
1Co-author: Roland Vaubel; published in Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics
148(3):439-447, 2012.
2Neumann (1997) confirmed the second of these results. In his analysis, the deviation of
monetary expansion from target also exhibited a significantly positive correlation with money
demand shocks estimated as residuals from a velocity regression. By contrast, deviations of
economic growth from potential did not have a significant effect.
203
Chapter 6. Monetary policy of the Bundesbank 204
expansion had. Third, Clarida and Gertler (1997) found that monthly variations
in the German overnight rate among banks followed a Taylor rule, reacting sig-
nificantly to the deviation of both (expected) inflation and industrial production
from trend. Fourth, Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1998) added that this interest rate
had also been significantly affected by the real exchange rate and the US federal
funds rate but not by the deviation of monetary expansion from the preannounced
target. Finally, Solveen (1998) confirmed that the short-term interest rate did not
significantly respond to deviations of monetary expansion from target in a reaction
function.3
At the time, the publication of these research results was of considerable political
significance. Was the Bundesbank, one of the most successful inflation fighters of
the world, not a monetary targeter after all? Did it pursue an inflation target in-
stead? The issue is not whether the Bundesbank had an inflation objective. It had.
It derived its monetary target from the inflation objective and assumptions about
potential output growth and the velocity trend in a quantitytheoretic framework.
The issue is whether it was committed to the announced money supply target or to
the underlying inflation objective which it also published. Even though the money
supply targets were derived from inflation objectives,they were considered superior
to direct inflation targets because the money supply can be controlled much more
closely than the inflation rate. Thus, the central bank’s responsibility for missing
the target is much clearer in the case of monetary targets. The incentive to pursue
a money supply target is much stronger than the incentive to pursue an inflation
target.
The above-mentioned econometric studies were bound to affect the monetary strat-
egy of the future European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB did indeed adopt an
inflation target band (from zero to two percent) but announced a “reference rate”
for monetary expansion (M3) as a concession to the monetarists. However, it did
not take this indicator very seriously and in May 2003 delegated it to second rank.
Some argue that it has been abandoned. None of the other participating central
banks had been announcing money supply targets. They had been pegging to the
deutschemark.
3Subsequently, Kamps and Pierdzioch (2003) came to the same conclusion. For other recent
estimates of Bundesbank reaction functions see Faust et al. (2001), Heinemann and Hu¨fner
(2004), Clausen and Hayo (2005), Hayo and Hofmann (2006) and Hayo (2007).
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In the meantime, these studies have been criticized on several grounds. The first
critic was Helmut Schlesinger, the former president of the Bundesbank. He empha-
sized that “money supply changes within the announced band, especially within
the first months of the year, did not require any reaction but merely attention.
Most of the econometricians ignore this and treat the mid-point of the band as
the target” (Schlesinger, 2002: 147, our translation). We shall remedy this defect
in the analysis of this paper.
Second, Gerberding, Worms and Seitz (2004) have criticized that these studies
ignore the lag in the availability of data. Using real-time data, they find that the
short-term interest rate reacted significantly to (i) the deviation of the inflation
rate from the underlying objective, (ii) expected output growth, (iii) the interest
rate in the previous quarter and (iv) the deviation of monetary expansion from
target. Clausen and Meier (2005), who also use real-time data, confirm this result
in an error-correction model.
The third criticism which has been levelled against all these studies (except von
Hagen, 1995) is that central bank policy is measured by some short-term interest
rate. As Schlesinger (2002) has also stressed, a short-term interest rate, even if
it is the central bank’s main lending rate, fails to capture all its monetary pol-
icy actions. For example, changes in reserve requirements, changes in discount
or Lombard credit lines and foreign exchange interventions are entirely ignored.
The comprehensive measure of the central bank’s policy actions is the monetary
base adjusted for changes in reserve requirements. This aggregate is also likely
to bear a closer relation to the money supply, the target variable, through the
money multiplier4 than a short term interest is likely to do. For these reasons, the
following analysis uses the adjusted monetary base.
5.2 Hypotheses
The main hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that changes in the Bundes-
bank’s adjusted monetary base growth (db) reacted negatively to deviations of the
4Scheide (1993) has shown that the DM multiplier has been highly predictable - even after
monetary unification.
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money supply from its target.5 Thus, we hypothesize that adjusted monetary base
growth (b) is ceteris paribus constant (the change is zero) if the deviation of the
money supply (M) from target (M∗) is zero.6 Since 1979, the first year of our
time series, the targets have usually been defined as bands of two or three percent.
Thus, as has been explained, the deviations from target will be measured, first
of all, as the deviations from the nearest margin of the target band (M −M∗mar).
However, we shall also compare this with an estimate using the deviation from the
midpoint of the band (M −M∗mid).
We include three control variables which are commonly used in the literature:
- the change in the growth of production,
- the change in the rate of unemployment,
- the change in the DM/USD exchange rate growth.
All explanatory variables are lagged.
Finally, we compare these two estimates of monetary targeting with two estimates
of inflation targeting: (i) the lagged deviation of the inflation rate from the Bun-
desbank’s inflation objective (pt−1−p∗t−1) and (ii) the currently expected deviation
(Et(pt)− p∗t ) estimated from an ARMA (2,2) process.
5.3 Data
The time series of our dependent variable starts in the third quarter of 1979 and
ends in the last quarter of 1998 so that we have 78 observations. We do not include
the period from 1975 to 1978 because our adjusted monetary base series contains
5Until 1987, the target variable was “central bank money”, thereafter the money supply M3.
Central bank money in the definition of the Bundesbank was not the same as the monetary
base but comprised the components of M3 weighted by constant values of their minimum reserve
ratios.
6Note that Clarida et al. (1998) regress the level rather than the change of their policy
instrument, the short-term interest rate, on the deviation from monetary target. Thus, they test
the hypothesis that the interest rate is ceteris paribus zero if the deviation from target is zero.
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a statistical break in June 1978 and because 1979 is generally considered the be-
ginning of resolute monetary targeting by the Bundesbank. Our data is quarterly.
The monetary base data has been seasonally adjusted using the additive Census-
X12-ARIMA procedure.
The mid-points of the Bundesbank’s money supply targets have been computed for
each quarter by applying the target growth rate, announced in the fourth quar-
ter of the preceding year, to the average money stock prevailing in the quarter
in which the announcement was made. Then the limits of the target bands were
calculated by applying the announced percentage margins to the target midpoints.
The inflation rate is measured by the Consumer Price Index and output by Gross
Domestic Product. The data sources are listed in Table 6.2 in the Appendix.
5.4 Estimates
As all time series are stationary, we use ordinary least squares.7 As for the lags,
all conventional information criteria (AIC, HQIC and SBIC) indicate a maximum
lag of one quarter for all control variables. To deal with any remaining autocorre-
lation and heteroskedasticity we use the Newey-West variance estimator allowing
for possible autocorrelation up to four quarters.
Table 6.1 contains our results. Columns 1 to 4 include only the hypothesized tar-
get variables, one by one, plus two dummies for the statistical break at the time
of German re-unification (1990Q3 and 1990Q4) which are highly significant and
contribute considerably to the explanatory power of the regression. As can be seen
the deviation of money supply from its nearest target margin reduces the change
of adjusted monetary base growth. The effect is significant at the 5 percent level
but not very large. If the deviation of money supply from the midpoint of the
band is used instead, the coefficient decreases in absolute terms and is significant
only at the 10 percent level. By contrast, the inflation deviations as alternative
7We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test. All time series are
stationary according to both tests except for the expected deviation of inflation from target.
However, this variable turns out to be stationary when using the modified Dickey-Fuller test
proposed by Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996).
Chapter 6. Monetary policy of the Bundesbank 208
Table 5.1: Changes of adjusted monetary base growth, 1979Q3-1998Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
intercept .01 .02 -.04 -.04 -.06 -.05 -.09 -.09
(.15) (.21) (.55) (.53) (.61) (.55) (1.11) (1.10)
deviation of money supply
from nearest target margin
in percent (t− 1)
-.17**
(2.04)
-.15*
(1.74)
deviation of money supply
from target midpoint in per-
cent (t− 1)
-.10*
(1.85)
-.08
(1.42)
deviation of inflation from
objective (t− 1)
-0.00
(.01)
-.08
(1.12)
expected deviation of infla-
tion from objective (t)
-.02
(.23)
-.08
(.98)
change of real GDP growth
(t− 1)
-.05
(.82)
-.05
(.82)
-.07
(1.16)
-.06
(.95)
change of unemployment
(t− 1)
.82*
(1.95)
.80*
(1.91)
.97**
(2.42)
.92**
(2.32)
change of DM/USD ex-
change rate growth (t− 1)
-.04
(1.13)
-.04
(1.15)
-.04
(1.18)
-.04
(1.13)
dummies for 1990Q3 and Q4 yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
adj. R2 .60 .60 .59 .59 .61 .62 .61 .61
***/**/*: significant at 1/5/10 percent level;
t-statistics in parentheses (computed from Newey-West standard errors.)
potential target variables (columns 3 and 4) do not have a significant effect.
In columns 5 to 8 we add the change of real GDP growth, the change of the un-
employment rate and the change of the DM/USD exchange rate growth to each of
the regressions 1 to 4. The coefficient of the deviation of money supply from the
nearest target margin decreases and its significance drops to the 10 percent level
(column 5); the coefficient of the deviation from the midpoint of the band now loses
its significance completely (column 6). The coefficients of the control variables are
also insignificant at conventional levels – but only marginally for the change in the
unemployment rate. The inflation target variables remain completely insignificant
(columns 7–8).
To analyze the statistical break further, we split the time series in 1990. The
number of observations drops to 44 in the first subperiod (1979Q3 to 1990Q2)
and 32 in the second (1991Q1 to 1998Q4). The Chow test shows that there is no
significant structural break in regressions 1 and 2.
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5.5 Conclusion
Our analysis demonstrates that the changes of monetary base growth adjusted
for changes in minimum reserve requirements, the summary measure of the Bun-
desbank’s policy actions, responded negatively and significantly to deviations of
money supply growth from the announced target if the deviation is correctly mea-
sured, namely, from the nearest margin of the announced target band. By contrast,
if the deviation is measured from the mid-point of the target band, the coefficient
decreases and its significance drops to the 10 percent level. Deviations of current or
expected inflation from the underlying inflation objective do not have a significant
effect, regardless of whether control variables are added. The hypothesis that the
Bundesbank has been an inflation targeter has to be rejected. Our results favor
the hypothesis that the Bundesbank has targeted the money supply even though
its effect on monetary base growth is fairly small and not robust to the addition
of standard control variables.
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Appendix
Table 5.2: Data: Definitions and sources
Series Definition and sources
Adjusted monetary base end of month; until 1990:6 West Germany;
source: Sachversta¨ndigenrat zur Begutach-
tung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage (upon
request)
Consumer price index seasonally adjusted; source: Deutsche
Bundesbank, Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaft-
szahlen, Table III. 23 (new classification)
DM/USD exchange rate monthly or quarterly averages; source:
Deutsche Bundesbank, Monatsberichte, Ta-
ble X.10
Gross domestic product
(real)
seasonally adjusted; source: Deutsche
Bundesbank, Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaft-
szahlen, Table II.1 (new classification)
M3 end of month data until 1989, monthly av-
erages since 1990; until 1990:12 West Ger-
many; seasonally adjusted; source: Deutsche
Bundesbank, Saisonbereinigte Wirtschaft-
szahlen, Table I.1 (new classification)
Central bank money monthly averages, seasonally adjusted;
source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Monats-
berichte, Table 1.3
Unemployment rate as a percent of employable persons in
the non-military sector; seasonally adjusted;
source: Deutsche Bundesbank, Saisonbere-
inigte Wirtschaftszahlen, Table II.8 (new
classification)
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